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THE COMMONS CONCEPT- AN HISTORICAL CONCEPT
WITH MODERN RELEVANCE
LYNDA L. BUTLER*
In October 1974 the Nature Conservancy, a nonprofit environ-
mental organization, filed a suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting monetary and
injunctive relief for alleged trespass committed by members,
guests, and employees of the Machipongo Club, a corporation
formed for its members' recreational use.1 Both the plaintiff and
defendant owned land on Hog Island, one of the barrier islands off
the eastern coast of Virginia's Eastern Shore. In support of its re-
quest for relief, the plaintiff asserted that it owned land extending
to the low water mark on the northern end of Hog Island and that
the defendant had used, without authorization, parts of the plain-
tiff's property, including the beach, marshes, meadowlands, and
several roads and trails.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. B.S., College of William and Mary. J.D., University of Virginia. Research for this
Article was supported by a grant from Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, a subsidiary of
Continental Financial Services Company, and is part of a comprehensive study being con-
ducted on the legal rights and interests of the state, the public, and private riparian proprie-
tors m Virgnia's tidal resources. The author wishes to thank Fred Schauer for his comments
on some of the constitutional issues raised in the Article and to acknowledge the assistance
of Professor N. Bartlett Theberge and the staff of the Virginia Institute of Marine Science,
School of Marine Science of the College of William and Mary for making available informa-
tion and research on commons in the Institute's files. The author also would like to thank
all of her research assistants for their contributions to the article, but especially Lucie
Moore, Mike Robusto, Mike Terry, and Kathy Wilson who dedicated a significant amount
of time to the project.
1. Nature Conservancy v. Machipongo Club, Inc., 419 F Supp. 390 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 579 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1978) (abstaining on state law issues).
2. More specifically, Nature Conservancy alleged ownership of the entire northern section
of Hog Island, except for a 5.4 acre parcel owned by the defendant. Nature Conservancy
claimed that the Club committed the following acts of trespass: (1) driving vehicles over
sand dunes and otherwise using the Atlantic beach area; (2) hunting in the marshes and
meadowlands and damaging nesting areas; (3) traveling on a right-of-way beginning at the
defendant's clubhouse and running to the beach (referred to in the opinion as the beach
access road); and (4) traveling on a road running southward from the beach access road and
bisecting plaintiff's tract of land (referred to in the opinion as the north-south road). Id. at
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The defendant argued3 that the plaintiff did not own the beach,
meadows, or marshlands because several Virginia statutes prohib-
ited the conveyance of lands used in common by Virginia citizens
for fishing, fowling, and oystering. More specificially, the defen-
dant relied on sections 1338 and 1339 of the 1887 Virginia Code,
which the defendant alleged were effective when the state origi-
nally granted the land to a private party Section 1338 provided
that "[a]ll the beds of the bays, rivers, creeks, and the shores of
the sea" that had not been "conveyed by special grant or compact
according to law, shall continue and remain" the state's property
and "may be used as a common by all the people of the state for
the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking and catching oys-
ters."4 Section 1339 extended the boundary of land adjacent to the
above waters to the low water mark, but made the extension sub-
ject to section 1338. 5 The defendant also relied on an 1888 statute
enacted to protect "all unappropriated marsh or meadow lands ly-
mg on the eastern shore of Virginia, which have remain ungranted,
and which have been used as a common." 6
Although the district court ruled in part for the plaintiff,' the
395.
3. The defendant also argued that it had acquired the right to travel on the north-south
road because: (1) the United States Coast Guard had conveyed the beach access road to the
Club, thus giving the Club the right to use the north-south road which intersected the ac-
cess road; (2) the north-south road had become a public road under the theory of implied
dedication because of continuous public use; and (3) prescriptive use of the road for more
than 20 years had created either a public or a private easement. The defendant argued that
the United States Coast Guard transferred some, if not all, of the beach access road as an
appurtenance to the 5.4 acre tract and that the Coast Guard had made prescriptive use of
the remaining part of the right-of-way ineffectively conveyed to it for the statutory period.
4. Act of 1887, tit. 20, ch. 60, § 1338 (current version at VA. CODE § 62.1-1 (1973)), quoted
in 419 F Supp. at 401; see text accompanying notes 271-274 infra.
5. Act of 1887, tit. 20, ch. 60, § 1339 (current version at VA. CoDE § 62.1-2 (1973)), quoted
in 419 F Supp. at 401 n.6; see text accompanying notes 278-280 infra.
6. Act of February 24, 1888, ch. 219 (current version at VA. CODE § 41.1-4 (1981)), quoted
in 419 F Supp. at 402; see text accompanying notes 281-284 tnfra.
7. The district court held: (1) that the defendant had no right to use the north-south road
either as a public road or as a private easement acquired by prescription; (2) that the defen-
dant's predecessor in title had acquired a private easement by prescription in the beach
access road, which subsequently had been conveyed to the defendant; (3) that the plaintiff
held title to the Atlantic beach to the low water mark; and (4) that the grant of marshes and
meadowlands to a private party was void. As relief for the plantiff's injuries, the court
granted it $10 in damages and an injunction against the Club's use of the north-south road
and the beach area. The Club, however, retained the right to use the beach access road and
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court responded favorably to the defendant's commons argument.
After noting that the plaintiff's title extended to the low water
mark,8 the court declared that the grant of marshes and meadow-
lands to the plaintiff was void. According to the court, under the
1888 act "[s]uch lands belong[ed] to the people of Virginia for the
purposes of fishing, fowling or hunting."' The Nature Conservancy
therefore could not prevent public use of these lands.10
The court, however, rejected the defendant's commons argument
based on Virginia Code section 1338. According to the court:
Section 1338 of the Code of 1887 established that Virginia sea-
shores would remain as property of the State unless conveyed by
special grant or compact according to law. There is no require-
ment in the statute that seashores qualifying under the histori-
cal doctrine of "common lands" forever remain in that status.
The statute contains an express prohibition against grants by
the State of its interest in "any natural oyster bed, rock, or
shoal," but there is no corresponding prohibition dealing with
the shores of the sea Section 1338 was viewed as a decla-
ration of the right in the State to the navigable waters and soil
underneath them within the state's territorial limits, sanctioned
and supported by common law. It would be inconsistent to read
the statute as invalidating provisions within the property law of
Virginia concerning the grant of the land owned by the State."1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
the marshes and meadowlands. 419 F Supp. at 405.
8. Id. at 401-02 (relying on § 1339).
9. Id. at 403.
10. According to the court, there was "ample support for the conclusion that the marsh
and meadow lands were used as a common by the residents of Virginia." Id. The evi-
dence consisted primarily of testimony of a native of the island in 1901. Id.
The plaintiff attempted to minimize the effect of the 1888 Act on its title by relying on a
1966 statute ratifying certain grants issued by the State Librarian. See VA. CODE § 41.1-6
(1981). In summarily rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the Act retroactively validated
one of the grants in its chain of title, the district court noted that the statute expressly
excludes grants that were issued prior to 1932. 419 F Supp. at 403-04.
11. 419 F Supp. at 402 (footnote and citation omitted). The defendant argued that
§ 1338 voided the conveyance to the plaintiff of any interest in the intertidal strip because
the area was ungranted and used in common at the time of the state's conveyance to a
private party. The plaintiff, on the other hand, maintained that, although § 1338 vested title
to the seashores in the state, it did not prohibit a lawful conveyance of those shores to
private parties. Id.
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agreed with the district court's ruling on the commons issue, but
reversed the decision in part on other grounds. 2 After both parties
and the state of Virginia filed petitions for rehearing, the Fourth
Circuit abstained from adjudicating the common rights issue. The
Fourth Circuit explained that abstention was proper because reso-
lution of the common rights issue involved interpretation of Vir-
ginia statutes "which had not been authoritatively construed by
the Virginia courts.' 3 Further, the matter raised "fundamental
questions of public policy that should be resolved in the first in-
stance by the state courts." '14 The Fourth Circuit deferred a deci-
sion "until the state courts have spoken 1 5 because several Virginia
citizens had filed a bill of complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against the Nature Conservancy
The bill of complaint referred to in the Fourth Circuit's opinion
was filed in the circuit court of Northampton County On February
27, 1979 that court reached a complicated decision16 based on its
interpretation of sections 1338 and 1339, and on the 1888 act. In
summary, the court concluded: (1) the Nature Conservancy's title
to part of the land bordering the Atlantic Ocean extended only to
the high water mark, with the intertidal strip belonging to the
state and subject to the public's right to fish, fowl, and hunt; (2)
title to the remainder of the tract bordering the ocean extended to
the low water mark, but remained subject to the statutory "ease-
ment" for fishing, hunting, and fowling; (3) the plaintiff held the
property bordering tidal waters other than the Atlantic Ocean to
the low water mark and held it free of public rights, except for any
marsh and meadowlands granted by the state after 1888; and (4)
the public had a right to fish, hunt, and fowl in these protected
marshes, which were described by the court as "a public com-
12. Nature Conservancy v. Machipongo Club, Inc., 571 F.2d 1294 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1047 (1978). The appellate court upheld the district court's decision except that
part dealing with the beach access road. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Club's pred-
ecessor in title neither had been granted a right-of-way nor had acquired one by prescrip-
tion. At most, the predecessor in title acquired a license. Id. at 1296, 1298.
13. Nature Conservancy v. Machipongo Club, Inc., 579 F.2d 873, 875 (4th Cir. 1978).
14. Id. at 875-76.
15. Id.
16. Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, Chancery No. 16 (Va. Cir. Ct., Feb. 27, 1979), ap-
peal docketed, No. 79-1288 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1979).
[Vol. 23:835
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mon." 17 The state circuit court's decision has been appealed to the
state supreme court, but oral arguments have not yet been heard.
The controversy in Nature Conservancy presents the Virginia
Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the law of public
rights in Virginia's natural resources. The Virginia Supreme Court
has not addressed the concept of public or common rights in a
comprehensive manner since 1932, and its resolution of the issues
in Nature Conservancy could represent a landmark decision in
Virginia environmental law."' Unfortunately, courts that recently
have considered issues relating to the commons concept have
tended to proceed in a vacuum, focusing primarily on statutory law
and almost totally ignoring common law origins.19 State supreme
court decisions, statutes, and constitutional provisions demon-
strate, however, that common law principles continue to be signifi-
cant in water rights cases generally, and in common rights cases
specifically Although the General Assembly recently has enacted
various statutes dealing with water resources, these statutes prima-
rily have only supplemented common law doctrines and do not re-
present a comprehensive revision of Virginia water law.2"
17. Id. at 32-38; Declaratory Order and Decree of the Chancery Court 1-3. The court's
opinion apparently was convoluted because, according to the court, the plaintiff's chain of
title resulted from the amalgamation of several different land tracts acquired from the state
at different times. A change in the wording of the common lands reservation statute also
contributed to the complex holding. See Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, Chancery No. 16,
slip op. at 22-33 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 27, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1288 (Va. Sup. Ct.
1979).
18. The decision could be important to other states' environmental law because the con-
cept of public rights in natural resources was transplanted from England into the two origi-
nal colonies, Virginia and New England.
19. The district court opinion in Nature Conservancy v. Machzpongo Club, Inc., for ex-
ample, reveals several misconceptions about the statutes reserving common rights. When
describing the effect of one of these statutes, the court states that "[i]t would be inconsis-
tent to read the statute as invalidating provisions within the property law of Virginia." 419
F Supp. at 402. What the court fails to realize, however, is that at common law common
rights were property rights; as the court earlier conceded, the statute largely codified the
common law concept.
20. The schedule to the Virginia Constitution, for example, declares: "The common law
and the statute laws in force at the time this Constitution goes into effect, so far as not
repugnant thereto or repealed thereby, shall remain in force until they expire by their limi-
tation, or are altered or repealed by the General Assembly." VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3. See
also VA. CODE § 62.1-12 (1973)("Nothing in this chapter shall operate to affect any existing
valid use of such waters or interfere with such uses hereafter acquired "); Miller v.
Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 929-31, 166 S.E. 557, 558-59 (1932)(After the Revolution "the
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This Article presents an extensive study of the common law
principles underlying public interests in tidal water resources in an
attempt to resolve some of the dispute in Virginia concerning this
subject. The Article will begin by examining the origins of public
interest law in Roman society It then will follow the development
of the Roman-based ideas in England, from feudal days until the
late 1700's, during which time public interests in natural resources
achieved legal recognition and acceptance through the concept of
common lands and rights. Finally, the Article will focus on how the
commons concept was transplanted into colonial America, and on
its subsequent legal development in the United States and, more
specifically, in Virginia. Part of this discussion of the commons
concept in early America will consider the historical evidence of
common rights that has been discovered in researching the Article.
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMONS CONCEPT
Throughout history, many different cultures and civilizations
have developed and flourished. Most have recognized, in one form
or another, public rights and interests in their society's natural re-
sources. In more primitive societies, public rights and uses existed
out of necessity, helping to ensure the civilization's survival.21 As
societies became more sophisticated and complex, they continued
to recognize public interests, although sophistication produced a
shift in the theories used to justify the existence of public rights.
Whereas more primitive cultures recognized public rights because
of compelling economic needs, more developed cultures explained
public rights' existence in philosophical terms.22
The English-based societies developed several concepts to gov-
ern public rights in natural resources such as land, tidal and non-
tidal waters, wild animals, and fish. The key concept, that of the
commons, is difficult to define precisely or accurately because it
became intertwined with several other concepts. 23 Also, as the com-
common law of England became the common law of the Commonwealth.").
21. For a discussion of public interests in primitive non-English systems see T. Smolen,
Historical Overview of Lands Known as Common 6-33 (1974) (C. Jones & N. Theberge eds.)
(unpublished manuscript available at Virginia Institute of Marine Science, School of Marine
Science of the College of William and Mary, Gloucester Point, Virginia).
22. See text accompanying notes 60-63, 82-93, 137-140 infra.
23. It often has been classified as an easement. Juergensmeyer & Wadley, The Common
[Vol. 23:835
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mons doctrine evolved, it began to include two related but distinct
concepts, common lands and common rights.
The origin of the commons concept is disputed. Some commen-
tators argue that common lands developed during the English feu-
dal period as a consequence of the tenure land system set up by
William the Conqueror.24 Others maintain that common lands ex-
isted before the feudal era in early Germanic and Roman settle-
ments, where a kind of communal land ownership prevailed.25
Even in early England it appears that common lands denoted
lands held by a community for public benefit.2 Gradually, how-
ever, as the royalty and central government gained power, this no-
tion of communal ownership disappeared. Instead, the theory arose
that the Crown or some designated governmental body owned the
common lands and held them subject to certain public uses. 27
Lands Concept: A "Commons" Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 362, 367-68 (1974); see text accompanying notes 178-180 infra.
24. E.g., W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, THE COMMON LANDS OF ENGLAND AND WALES 6 (1963).
More specifically, Hoskins and Stamp argue that common rights in the forest had been
exercised since "time immemorial," and that even an all-powerful Norman King was obliged
to recognize them while he enlarged his forest if he did not wish to encourage a rebellion. Id.
25. F POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 18-21 (3d ed. 1896). It is inaccurate, from a theoretical
perspective, to describe early societies as communally owning lands because the concept of a
corporate entity and of treating a group of people as one was foreign to them. Perhaps the
phrase "communal enjoyment" would more accurately depict the situation in these societies.
Id. at 21. See generally T. Smolen, supra note 21, at 23-30.
26. See W. HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 34; ROYAL COMMISSION ON COMMON
LAND 1955-1958, at 152 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL REPORT]; F POLLOCK, supra note
25, at 6, 20-21.
27. The lord of the manor, for example, held certain manor lands for the benefit of his
tenants. See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra. This theory also was visible in colonial
America, especially in the New England colony where the Crown frequently used proprietor-
ships to create new settlements. Under the proprietary system the king conveyed absolute
ownership and control over large land tracts to a single person or group of grantees. The
primary duty of the town proprietors was the division and distribution of the land. Usually,
the proprietors set aside a small area for the inhabitants' common use, which often was
located in the center of the town. Some of these town commons exist today (perhaps the
most famous of which is the Boston Common). T. Smolen, supra note 21, at 45-55.
Although the proprietorship was not used as frequently in the Virginia colony, some
grantees held tremendous land tracts m Virginia under the proprietorship method. Lord
Fairfax and Lord Culpeper, for example, acquired land on the Northern Neck of Virginia by
monarchical proprietorship. F. HARRISON, VIRGINIA LAND GRANTS 61-79 (1925); 2 W. HENING,
THE STATUTES AT LARGE 569-78 (1823) [hereinafter cited as HENING'S STATUTES]. 15 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 392-99 (1907-08) (printing Charter of 1688 to Lord Culpeper); see
Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218, 219 (1810), rev'd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603,
604-05 (1812)(discussing history of Northern Neck charters). See generally A. EMBREY, WA-
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Over time, this definition of common lands also became obsolete as
private parties appropriated a steadily increasing amount of com-
mon lands. While some of these privately appropriated lands per-
manently lost their common lands status, many land tracts re-
tained common lands status even after being conveyed to private
parties. The nature of the public interest in common lands, how-
ever, had changed from a communal ownership interest to a com-
munal right to make certain uses of another's land. Thus, a system
of common rights evolved from the original common lands
concept.2 s
The system became increasingly complex and structured as Par-
liament and the higher ranking lords responded to a rising demand
for common lands by regulating their use. To prevent the total de-
struction of the common lands, the government imposed regula-
tions restricting not only the class of people who could use com-
mon lands, but also the scope and nature of the use. As the
regulations became more restrictive and specific, narrow categories
of common rights developed.2"
TERS OF THE STATE 94-127 (1931); T. Smolen, supra note 21, at 45-48. Also, the London
Company initially held all land in the Jamestown settlement for the colonists' benefit. This
first system of landholding in Virginia was remarkably similar to the socialist approach to
property ownership. See A. BROWN, THE FIRST REPUBLIC IN AMERICA 76-79 (1898); text ac-
companying notes 141-147, 151-156 infra.
28. Some English commentators developed an even narrower definition of common lands
to reflect the fact that common rights attach to two types of land: common lands and com-
monable lands. Common lands are lands subject to common rights at all times and thus are
lands to which no rights of severalty attach. Commonable lands are lands that are held in
severalty for part of a year, but become commonable after the severalty crop is removed.
Thus, they are lands subject to exclusive use for part of the year and common use during
the rest of the year. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 23; 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND,
§§ 517-518 (4th ed. 1974).
29. See W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 34-36; ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26,
at 149-52. In his now famous article, The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin explained the
demise of common rights in economic terms. According to Hardin, each individual seeks to
maximize his gain in using the common. For each additional unit of use of the common
there is a positive and negative component. The positive component is a function of the
benefits received from the unit of use. The positive component is nearly one because the
individual receives all the benefits of his additional unit of use. The negative component is
the additional burden imposed on the commons resources by one additional unit of use. The
effects of overuse are shared by all the commoners. Thus, the negative component borne by
an individual who has decided to add an additional unit of use is only a fraction of -1.
Adding the components together, the rational individual will choose to add another unit of
use to the common. Unfortunately, because every commoner will reach this conclusion, the
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A right of common currently designates a right of one or more
persons to take or use a product naturally produced on another's
lands or in another's waters.30 Although many courts classify the
right as an easement, the right technically is a profit d prendre.
Unlike a common right, an easement merely creates a right to use
another's land in a specified manner and does not confer any right
to take the land's natural products. Also, whereas an easement cre-
ates an exclusive right of use, a common right, by definition, is
shared by all commoners.31 A common right is not an estate held in
common because the latter involves an interest in the land that is
shared by more than one party and gives each equal possessory
rights in the entire tract. Thus, regulation of land held in a con-
current estate would be impossible without the consent of all par-
ties.32 Finally, unlike most other property interests, common rights
exist regardless of the property owner's intent.33
The above introductory discussion of the commons concept dem-
onstrates its tremendous flexibility. The concept originally devel-
oped out of economic necessity when England was scarcely popu-
lated and collective use of lands and waters was the only way to
make productive use of resources. Over time, this collective effort
led to defining common rights in certain land and waters. Eventu-
commons resources inevitably will be exhausted by overuse. G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
30. W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 4; F POLLOCK, supra note 25, at 41-43. See
generally Juergensmeyer & Wadley, supra note 23, at 367-69.
31. 1 R. MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 70, 91 (2d ed. 1928). The distinction
between common rights and easements can have important legal consequences. The right of
use acquired by the holder of an easement, for example, generally will be extinguished by a
change in the condition of the dominant estate not reasonably contemplated by the parties.
2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.66-.69 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 R. MINOR, supra, §§ 106,
110. A common right, however, will not be extinguished by a radical change unless the right
no longer can be exercised effectively. For example, a common of pasture will be extin-
guished if cattle no longer can be kept on the land or maintained by its produce. 6 HALS-
BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 630 (4th ed. 1974). See text accompanying notes 54, 55, 134-136
infra.
32. The holder of a tenancy for years, for example, traditionally had the right to exclusive
possession although seisin remained with the lord, thus making the tenant the owner of an
estate in fee simple. Modern courts usually characterize the lessor's interest as a reversion m
fee simple. See generally T. BERGIN & P HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND Fu-
TURE INTERESTS 41-48 (1966); C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
63-65, 73, 87-92 (1962).
33. See W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 5-6.
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ally, as the population increased to the point at which division of
labor became possible, the need for collective rights diminished
and private appropriation of common lands became widespread.
Additionally, the population increase necessitated regulation of
common lands not privately appropriated or otherwise subject to
public rights. The regulation extinguished many common rights
and severely restricted others.
Ironically, the even greater population increase in the twentieth
century has caused modern English-based societies to react differ-
ently to the public rights problem." The tremendous population
increase intensified the problems of pollution and overcrowding,
causing the demand for open spaces and lands reserved for public
use to increase, but for different reasons, such as fulfillment of aes-
thetic and recreational needs.3 5 In responding to this increased de-
mand, a few American courts have resurrected the ancient common
law commons doctrine and its offspring, the public trust doctrine,
under which the Crown holds title to lands in trust for the public. 8
Breathing life into this ancient doctrine is not an easy task for a
modern court, for the commons doctrine evolved informally
through continued usage and acquiescence. Uncertainty continues
to exist about the commons concept because the principles gov-
erning common use usually were not clearly delineated or formally
adopted as rules of law. Further, even when rules of law finally
developed, they generally represented nothing more than "the for-
mal expression of the dispositions and habits of society.
13 7
34. It is even more ironic that in both England and the United States, two countries
which have strived to protect the rights of even its poorest citizens, the legal system should
find little room for public rights in natural resources. See F POLLOCK, supra note 25, at 16.
35. Of course, some common rights play a vital economic role. The Chesapeake Bay, for
example, supports thriving commercial, agricultural, and recreational industries. The bay's
waters provide access to two major Eastern ports, Baltimore Harbor, Maryland and Hamp-
ton Roads, Virginia. The bay also supports extensive recreational activities, such as boating,
hunting, and fishing. The Army Corps of Engineers estimates this demand will more than
double between 1980 and 2020. Additionally, the bay supports commercial shell fishing and
seafood processing industries. Estimated revenues for blue crabs and oysters alone
amounted to $30 million in 1980. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research
and Development, Chesapeake Bay 2 (May 1980).
36. E.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972);
Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 84, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); see notes 178-181 infra.
37. F POLLOCK, supra note 25, at 18. Uncertainty exists, for example, about the various
kinds of common rights, the identity of lands subject to common rights, the nature of the
[Vol. 23:835
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The flexible nature of the commons concept further complicates
the problem. Changing the role or nature of the commons concept
was a much easier task in feudal England, where the Crown had
tremendous power and could act relatively free from due process
constraints. Further, transplanting the commons doctrine from
England into America was difficult primarily because the doctrine
developed in the context of the English tenure land system. In-
deed, when the first English settlers arrived in America, the tenure
property system had disintegrated to such an extent that colonial
America never fully experienced the feudal tenure system.38
Resurrection of the commons doctrine raises important and
often conflicting interests and policies. On the one hand, the pri-
vate landowner who suddenly finds his land subject to public
rights has strong ownership interests. Most of the basic tenets of
our property system, such as the assumptions of private ownership
of property and maximization of resources, argue against subject-
ing his land to common rights. On the other hand, the private
property system must fit into its proper legal perspective. The
public also has important interests which may have existed before
the private ownership system fully developed. Indeed, evidence ex-
ists of common rights in colonial America.39 Resolving the common
rights issue will have legal consequences that transcend a private
landowner's immediate ownership interests.40
Regardless of how today's courts resolve the common rights is-
sue, the answer must be reached in a legally responsible manner.
Normally, the due process and takings clauses of the state and fed-
eral constitutions impose sufficient constraint on judicial action.
The commons doctrine, however, provides a unique situation
public use, and the scope of the class of users. RoYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 46-47.
38. 1 R. MINOR, supra note 31, § 15; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 22-27.
39. See part II. A., Appendix, Tables 1 & 2.
40. For example, if a court strictly construes the public interest in navigable waters to
include a right of navigation and perhaps a right of fishery, then the court may be excluding
other important public uses such as diversion of watercourses for establishment of a public
water supply. Under the riparian doctrine, as interpreted by the Virginia judiciary, diversion
of a watercourse is generally not permissible. Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E. 2d
700 (1942); Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). Riparian rights in naviga-
ble waters, however, are subject to whatever public rights and uses are recognized at law.
See Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932); text accom-
panying notes 238-252 infra.
19821 845
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where the due process clause may not give adequate protection to
the reliance interests of private parties. By definition, a common
right is a property right in the privately owned land of another.
The private landowner conceivably always held his land subject to
the common right, even though the right was neither apparent nor
exercised, because inaction usually is not an effective method of
extinguishing a property right.41 Thus, subjecting the private own-
er's interests to common rights arguably neither deprives him of a
property interest nor constitutes a taking entitling him to just
compensation. To ensure that the commons issue is treated in a
legally responsible manner, the concept's common law evolution
must be fully explored.
I. ROMAN LAW
Although most commentators agree that Roman law had an im-
pact on the development of public rights in natural resources, the
origin of common or public rights m Roman law is difficult to
pinpoint. Early Roman civilization was organized around tribal
units. When one tribe conquered another, any lands taken by con-
quest were for the tribe's benefit. Although one person might be
allowed to take the land's natural products, no tribe member could
exclusively control the land. Similarly, other spoils of war belonged
to the entire tribe and were either divided among the tribe's mem-
bers or sold, with the proceeds paid into the public chest.42 Other
than these general principles, early Roman law was unstructured.
As Roman civilization became more sophisticated, an organized
legal system began to develop. This system was derived from three
important sources: natural law, universal law or the law of nations,
and civil law.43 Natural law, or jus naturale, was defined as "that
which all animals have been taught by nature; this law is not pecu-
41. The common right arguably may be destroyed by adverse possession or prescriptive
use. Some jurisdictions, however, hold that a party may not adversely possess against the
state. If, therefore, the state is deemed to hold the common rights for its citizens, this
method of extinguishment may not be possible. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.13 (A.
Casner ed. 1952).
42. H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW
10, 138-39, 267 (3d ed. 1972).
43. F WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 355 (1912).
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liar to the human species, it is common to all animals."' 44 Unlike
natural law, the law of nations, or jus gentium, applied only to
humans and encompassed special local laws governing the Roman
Empire as well as univeral law applicable to all peoples.4" The civil
law was contained in codified statutes, decrees of the senate, and,
enactments of the emperors that applied to Roman citizens.6
Roman law eventually developed two main branches: (1) the jus
publicum, or the public law regulating the relations between the
state and the citizen; and (2) the jus prwatum, or the law regulat-
ing the relations between individuals. 47 The second branch, the jus
prwatum, regulated property rights through a complex classifica-
tion system. First, it classified types of property either as tangible,
corporeal things (tangi possunt) or as intangible, incorporeal
things (tangi non possunt). Second, the system grouped property
according to whether it was within one's estate or sphere of trade
(in commercio), or whether it was outside of one's estate or sphere
of trade (extra commercium).49 For purposes of this Article, the
last category of property, extra commercium, is the most impor-
tant and included the following classes of property- (1) Res divine,
or things dedicated to and vested in the control of the gods; (2)
Res publicae, or things open for public use and subject to state
regulation, but incapable of exclusive individual ownership; (3) Res
omnium communes, or things legally not property because they
were incapable of dominion and control; and (4) Res nullius, or
things not possessed by an individual but capable of possession.50
Under Roman law, two kinds of incorporeal property rights sig-
44. DIGEST 1.1.1.3.
45. INSTITUTES oi GAius 1.1; see F WALTON, supra note 43, at 361.
46. INSTITUTES OF GAiUS 1.2; see R. SOHM, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 44-47 (1892).
47. INSTITUTES 1.1.4; W MOREY, OUTLINES OF RoMAN LAW 223-24 (2d ed. 1884). The jus
publicum today would include such topics as constitutional law, administrative law, and
criminal law. P VAN WARMELO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RoMAN CivIM LAW
33 (1976). The bulk of Roman law, however, including that governing a person's property
and actions, was part of the jus prvatum. See F WALTON, supra note 43, at 349.
48. R. SOHM, supra note 46, at 225.
49. P VAN WARMELO, supra note 47, at 63.
50. See id. at 63-65; R. SOHM, supra note 46, at 225-27. Roman law did not describe the
state as the "owner" of res publicae because the state was not a legal person and therefore
could not own property. Id. at 226. Examples of each type of property include: (1) res
divine, or temples and altars; (2) res publicie, or public roads and places; and (3) res com-
munes, or air and flowing water. Id.
1982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
nificantly contributed to the development of common or public
rights: real and personal servitudes. Servitudes were similar to the
modern easement and gave an individual a right to use another's
property 51 If the servitude was associated with and improved the
value of nonburdened, dominant property, then it was a real or
praedial servitude.2 If, however, the servitude was granted to an
individual independently of property ownership, then the servitude
was personal.53 An important kind of personal servitude was the
usufruct, or "the right of using and enjoying, without consuming or
destroying, things which are the property of another. ' 54 A usufruct
usually could be exercised only as long as the thing subject to the
use existed, because it generally was restricted to things that could
not be consumed by use. 5 This characteristic of the usufruct sug-
gests that any public interests developing from it also could be ex-
tmguished once the burdened property ceased to exist or perhaps
even when the burdened property underwent a radical change in
nature.
Servitudes were created by either contract, testamentary trans-
fer, or judicial decree. 56 They could not be created by custom or
informal agreement.5 7 Once created, however, a servitude could be
acquired by prescription. 8 Roman servitudes therefore differed in
51. P VAN WARMELO, supra note 47, at 102.
52. Praedial servitudes were divided into two classes: rural, or those that related to land,
and urban, or those that related to buildings. Examples of rural servitudes included: iter, a
right to pass over an adjoining field on foot; actus, a right to drive cattle over an adjoining
field; via, a right to have a road cross the servient tenement for vehicular transport; and
acquaeductus, a right to let water flow across the servient tenement by means of an
aqueduct. P VAN WARMELO, supra note 47, at 103-04. Urban servitudes included: jus onerts
fireendi, the right of supporting a building upon another's wall; jus tigni immitendi, the
right to place a beam into another's wall; and jus stillicidii vel flumints reciplendi, the right
to project a roof over another's ground. W MOREY, supra note 47, at 291.
53. W. MOREY, supra note 47, at 292; R. SOHM, supra note 46, at 259; P VAN WARMELO,
supra note 47, at 107.
54. INSTITUTES 2.4; DIGEST 7.1.1.
55. Originally the usufruct was restricted to things which could not be consumed by use,
such as homes, slaves, and cattle. INSTITUTES 2.4.2. Subsequently, however, quasi usufructs
in consumable objects were permitted if sufficient security was given to ensure that the
object would be restored in kind or money. W MOREY, supra note 47, at 292.
56. W MOREY, supra note 47, at 293.
57. P VAN WARMELO, supra note 47, at 109.
58. Under Roman law servitudes were recognized as incorporeal rights separate from own-
ership in the property subject to the use. Under early Roman law servitudes could not be
[Vol. 23:835
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one important respect from the English common right. Whereas
the Roman servitude could be created only if the land owner in-
tended to do so, the English common right existed despite the pri-
vate owner's intent because of long established usage and the very
nature of the common right.59
The Roman law of public or common rights focused primarily on
the sea and the seashore because the Roman civilization was al-
most completely dependent on navigation for economic survival. 0
It is unclear whether Roman law classified the sea and seashore as
res publicae (public property), res omnum communes (property
incapable of physical control), or res nullius (unoccupied prop-
erty). The primary legal authority on public common rights and
the status of the sea and the seashore was Justinian's work, the
Institutes. In a now famous passage, Justinian declared:
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea;
no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the
seashore, whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments,
acquired by prescription because they were incorporeal and therefore incapable of dominion
and control. In practice, however, individuals continued to exercise the use allowed by a
servitude, even though they actually did not hold the servitude. Eventually, Roman law
recognized this exercise as a form of quasi possession which was protected by the law of
prescription (praescriptio longi tempors) after a period of continued use. The user was
considered to be a servitude holder after 10 years if the owner of the property was present
or after 20 years if the owner was absent. M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 120 (2d ed. 1968);
P VAN WARMELO, supra note 47, at 110.
59. See T. Smolen, supra note 21, at 21-22.
60. See H. JoLowICz & B. NICHOLAS, supra note 42, at 75-78. Deveney, Title, Jus Pub-
licum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 21 (1976); Note,
The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE
L.J. 763 (1970).
Roman law defined the shore as including "all that tract of land; over which the greatest
winter flood extends itself." iNSTITUTES 2.1.3; DIGEsT 50.16. This definition was broader than
the common law definition and therefore subjected a greater area of land to public use. Lord
Hale defined the shore as the land between the common high water and low water mark. M.
Hale, De Jure Mars et Brachiorum e jusdem, reprinted in S. MooRE, A HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE AND TEE LAW RELATING THERETO 370, 378 (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter paginated
to S. MOORE]. The Virginia courts adopted the common law definition of the shore. In
French v. Bankhead, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 136 (1854), the Virginia court held that the shore
was "that space alternatively covered and left dry by the rise and fall of the tides, being the
space between high and low water marks." Id. at 160. The United States Supreme Court
also adopted the common law definition of the shore. See Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 29 (1935). See generally Deveney, supra, at 22 & n.47.
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edifices, etc., which are not in common as the sea is."1
Various parts of this passage have perplexed scholars of Roman
law. The phrase "things common to mankind," for example, has
fostered conflicting interpretations.6 2 The phrase apparently re-
flected the influence of philosophy on Roman law and originated in
the works of Marcian. According to Marcian, the earth produced
its fruit and bounty for the benefit of all, at least until greed and
civilization eventually caused the development of a private prop-
erty system. In Marcian's opinion, communal ownership imposed a
moral duty not to deprive others of essential things, especially "el-
emental" or common things. The air, flowing water, and the sea
were included as things common to all because they were difficult
to possess or control. The seashore also was included, probably be-
cause it was considered an arm of the sea. 3
The phrase "no one is prohibited access to the shore" also is un-
clear. One commentator suggests that it should be interpreted in
light of the various remedies available for injury to property inter-
ests.64 Under Roman law a trespass action lay only if a person
broke a close of another or willfully interfered with another's prop-
erty 6' The action did not cover property damage indirectly in-
flicted when an individual exercised his rights. It therefore seems
that a person could prohibit access to the sea from across his up-
land without being liable in trespass.66
Various prohibitory and restitutionary injunctions (or in-
terdicta) also were available to protect against injury to public
rights in waters and the shore. 7 Many of these injunctions were
available to any citizen, regardless of whether he claimed actual
61. INSTITUTES 2.1.1. It must be remembered that both the INSTITUTES of Justinian and
the DIGEST were not legally binding under the Roman system. They represent the works of
various scholars interpreting Roman law.
62. See Deveney, supra note 60, at 26 & nn.74-76. The original latin phrase "res omnium
communes" also can be translated as meaning "things common to all."
63. Deveney, supra note 60, at 26-27. The notion that property interests in the shore were
severable from those in the sea did not develop in English law until the late sixteenth cen-
tury. Id. at 27. See generally S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND LAW RELATING
THERETo 1-29 (3d ed. 1888).
64. Deveney, supra note 60, at 25.
65. W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 102-03 (2d ed. 1965).
66. See Deveney, supra note 60, at 25.
67. See INSTITUTES 4.15. 1-6.
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damages.18 Roman law, however, created an exception for interfer-
ence with fishing, limiting remedial options to damage actions."9
These remedies, however, did not afford the public broad protec-
tion of most of their rights in coastal resources. Even if an injunc-
tion were granted, no penalty existed if the person continually
committed the wrong;70 practically speaking, the only effective
remedy was a damage action. Thus, even if the phrase "no one is
prohibited access to the shore" was intended as a broad statement
of public rights, the lack of effective remedies limited its practical
effect.
Another important source of Roman law was the Digest, a collec-
tion of the legal works of various scholars. According to the Digest
writers, the sea and seashore were common to all under principles
of natural law.1 Consistent with this view, the Digest declared that
anything found on the shore became the property of the finder7 2
and that no one was prohibited from entering on the shore to fish,
provided he did not interfere with existing buildings.73 The Digest
also considered rivers and harbors to be public property under the
law of nations, although the river banks were classified as private
property subject to the public's right to load and unload cargo, dry
nets, and fasten ropes to trees.74
The status of the public's property interests in the seashore was
not as clearly defined as their interests in river banks. Passages in
the Digest suggest that the seashore could be appropriated for per-
sonal use. One passage, for example, described the seashore as
public only "in the same sense as things which come direct from
nature and have not yet passed into the ownership of any one,"
and not "in the sense that things belonging to the state and pub-
68. For example, interdicts were granted to prohibit a person from: (1) obstructing a pub-
lic footpath along the bank of a public waterway; (2) building structures on the shore or in
the sea that interfered with navigation or docking; and (3) diverting the waters of a public
river. Deveney, supra note 60, at 24 & nn.56-69.
69. Id. at 24; see W BUCKLAND & A. McNAiR, supra note 65, at 420-23; R. SOHM, supra
note 46, at 214-16.
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lic. 175 Analogizing to "fishes and wild beasts," which "on capture
become beyond doubt the property" of the possessor, the same
passage concluded that "[w]hat a man has built on the sea-shore
will be his."'1 6 If, however, the structure later was "rased," then
the sea-shore "revert[ed] to its original condition and [was] as
public as though there had never been a building on it."' 77 Thus,
the seashore appears to have been res nullius, that is, property not
possessed by a specific individual but capable of private ownership
through acts of dominion and control. Those who built structures
on the shore became the owners of the soil so long as the structure
remained. 8
In conclusion, Roman law afforded the public important public
or common rights in the sea, the seashore, and other watercourses.
These rights included the right to load and unload cargo, to use
the natural products of the sea and shore, to build cottages on the
shore, to dry and keep nets on the shore, to navigate in public wa-
ters, and to bank vessels. Even some private property was subject
to public rights, for although the river banks were privately owned,
the public continued to have the right to use the banks for naviga-
tion and fishing.7 9 So, as early as Roman times, the legal system
recognized that privately owned land should not always be under
the owner's exclusive control and use.
The Roman system also recognized the economic value of private
ownership and control, for the public rights in the sea and shore
were not indestructible. Indeed, they appeared to last only so long
as either the state did not grant exclusive rights or an individual
did not appropriate by occupancy the land subject to the common
rights. Grants of exclusive rights in coastal lands and resources
were prevalent. There was, however, a reluctance to convey actual




78. At least one other writer, however, expressed concern that private appropriation
should not be to the public detriment. See id. 41.1.50. If the seashore were classified as res
publicae instead of res nullius, then this would mean that an individual could not appropri-
ate the shore without authorization. Indeed, any structure built on public land would be-
come public property. Id. 41.1.65.4.
79. Id. at 1.8.5.
[Vol. 23:835
THE COMMONS CONCEPT
verse to public rights was construed strictly.80 Grants often were
limited to possessory rights, or, if the common thing was less capa-
ble of possession, an exclusive right to obtain possession was
granted."s
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMONS CONCEPT IN ENGLAND
As mentioned previously, the commons concept developed in
early England as a necessary part of the agrarian economy It con-
tinued to play a vital economic role until the end of the 1700's.s2
While the English settlements remained sparsely populated, the
only way to effectively use the land was by collective farming and
grazing. Over time, those participating m the collective efforts ac-
quired legally recognized rights in the commonly-used land. The
commons concept went through several key evolutionary stages in
England before it was transplanted into the United States. These
stages are discussed below.
A. Historical Development
Evidence exists that, as early as 688, English settlements used an
open field system of agriculture, involving a rotating use of com-
mon fields, meadows, and pastures.8 After the fall of the Roman
Empire, the Roman common or public rights concept gradually fell
into disuse in England. 4 Settlements placed increasing limitations
on the use of common fields, meadows, and pastures. Initially, the
right to use common lands was restricted to the people of a partic-
ular region in a shire or county By the time of the Norman con-
quest in 1066, the right to use common land generally was limited
to the people of a particular manor, vill, or borough, and some-
times even to a particular class of inhabitant within a manor, vill,
or borough.8 5 Besides limiting the size of the class of users, restric-
80. See Deveney, supra note 60, at 32 n.17.
81. Id. at 31-33. For example, an exclusive right of fishery could be granted.
82. W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 44.
83. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 149. Under the open field system, crops were rotated
yearly from one open field to another. Usually two fields were used for the same period,
while one was left fallow. Also, the fields typically were divided into strips for use by indi-
vidual villagers. After harvest, the villagers pastured their animals over the fields. Id. at 44.
84. See Note, supra note 60, at 764.
85. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 150-51. When, however, waste or common land was
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tions also limited the manner in which a common right could be
exercised. For example, quotas were placed on the number of ani-
mals that could be grazed on certain land.86
When William the Conqueror assumed control of England in
1066, he reshaped England's property system by developing a land-
holding system that served as the basis of the government, the mil-
itary, and the economy The King declared himself to be the fee
owner of all lands in England. He held these lands in his capacity
as sovereign and had the power to grant exclusive rights in them,
as well as in the sea, the foreshore, and other navigable waters.
The King then granted, or enfeoffed, land to his favorite nobles in
return for their promise to perform tenures or services previously
agreed upon. These nobles, called tenants in chief or tenants in
capite because they held directly of the King, in turn conveyed
parts of their lands to nobles of lesser rank in exchange for the
performance of tenures. As this infeudation continued, a pyramid
structure developed with the King at the top.8 7
contiguous to two manors, the animals from both were pastured over the entire area. This
practice of "intercommoning" developed because of the difficulty of keeping the manor's
animals on the manor's half of the common. Id. at 169.
86. Id. at 151. These quotas were referred to as "stints" and took several forms. The
commoners each would agree to a stint determined generally by farm size. The first form of
stinting, called the rule of "couchant and levant," involved limiting the number of animals
that might be pastured on the commons to those that the farmer could feed during the
winter months. In more populated areas of England, however, the stint became a fixed num-
ber of animals per yardland or virtgate (usually 24 to 32 acres). Id.
87. Tenures were classified as free or unfree. Free tenures involved the performance of
certain services agreed upon in advance when the tenurial relationship was created. The free
tenures included the following: (1) tenure by knight service, the most honorable of tenures,
originally required the tenant to provide armed knights to the lord, but later substituted a
monetary payment for the duty of actually providing able-bodied men; (2) serjeanty tenure
involved an obligation to perform personal services for the crown ranging from participating
in ceremonies of state to performing menial services such as supplying goods to the lord; (3)
frankalmom tenure was a tenure used when land was given to a church, religious body, or
ecclesiastical official in return for religious services, such as saying masses; and (4) free and
common socage involved providing either a fixed and definite quantity of agricultural prod-
ucts or a monetary payment to the lord. In contrast to the free tenures, the unfree tenures
involved the performance of services not clearly defined and dependent on the will of the
lord. Those that held land by unfree tenure were subject to the lord's arbitrary command. 1
R. MINOR, supra note 31, § 6; C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 1-27; see F POLLOCK, supra
note 25, at 53-79. The only tenure that ever existed in the United States was free and com-
mon socage, and even that tenure had lost its most burdensome aspects by the time America
was colonized. 1 R. MINOR, supra note 31, § 15.
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Often a lord within the upper part of the pyramid would form
"an agricultural, governmental and fiscal unit composed of
lands held by the lord and by tenants of different classes."88 This
unit, called a manor, typically contained several different kinds of
lands. First, a manor contained the lord's demesne lands, that is
lands held by the lord in fee for his own benefit and not conveyed
to a feudal tenant. These lands, which were subject to the lord's
exclusive control, included lands on which the manor house stood,
as well as lands within the manor that were used for farming, graz-
ing, or other purposes directly benefiting the lord. Second, some
lands were held of the lord by a freehold tenant, that is, a tenant
who had been conveyed seisin and therefore had an ownership in-
terest in the land, but who owed' specific services to the lord. 9
Third, a manor contained common fields, meadows, and pastures
that might have been used either by the freehold tenants or the
nonfreehold tenants.90 If the freehold tenants had the right to use
a common field or meadow, then they were vested with the fee or
ownership interest, but they continued to hold of their lord. If,
however, nonfreehold or customary tenants had the right to use
the common lands, then the lord held those lands m fee, subject to
the common rights of the tenants. This usually meant that the
commoners had the right of first use."" Finally, a manor contained
waste lands, which were vested in fee in the lord, holding of the
Crown, but which were subject to certain common rights. Once
again, the lord usually had the right to use the land for grazing and
taking timber, minerals, and other products from the waste land,
but only after the commoners exercised their common rights.2
88. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 32, at 15.
89. Seisin was a hybrid creature, blending the concepts of possession and ownership. A
party who had seisin possessed the land in a manner that also signified the party's owner-
ship interest in the land. See id. at 87-92.
90. In contrast to freehold tenants, nonfreehold tenants received only a possessory inter-
est, not an ownership interest, in the land. In other words, the lord did not convey seisin to
the tenant who held by unfree tenure. See notes 87 & 89 supra. Another important differ-
ence between the freehold and nonfreehold tenants was the remedial options available to
each. Whereas the freehold tenant could seek redress in the King's courts, the nonfreehold
tenant was limited to the manorial courts of his particular lord. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note
32, at 11.
91. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 66, 169 app.
92. Id. at 169. For a general discussion of the manorial organization, see 1d. at 168-71.
During the feudal era, important differences developed between common lands and waste
1982] 855
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:835
As the population of English settlements increased, they ex-
panded onto lands that were previously waste or common. Often
the lord of the manor appropriated the lands for his private use.
Fields, meadows, and pastures, however, were not the only lands
taken for private use, for the lords or the Crown often also appro-
priated the forests, the seashore, and even the fisheries."e Com-
bined with the settlements' encroachment onto waste and common
lands, this private appropriation drastically reduced the lands and
coastal resources available for general public use and consequently
had a serious impact on the peasant economy
The tremendous public inconvenience caused by the Crown and
upper nobility contributed to the adoption of the Magna Carta.
Although the Magna Carta did not expressly recognize public
rights in coastal resources, it did curb the Crown's infringement of
lands. First, severalty rights could attach to common lands, but not to waste lands. That is,
an individual could have the exclusive right to use certain common lands until after the
harvest, at which point the land could be used by all commoners. If severalty rights at-
tached to common lands, they technically were called "commonable." See note 28 supra.
Waste lands, however, could not be used exclusively by an individual. Second, the two
types of land differed in their physical attributes. Whereas common lands typically were
arable fields used for cultivation and grazing, waste lands essentially were uncultivated and
worthless. W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 26, 53; ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26,
at 152, 168-69.
The English inclosure statutes eventually altered the definition of waste by introducing
the term "superfluous waste" to refer to the common lands not needed or used by the com-
moners for pasture or for the lawful exercise of any other common right. Under English
law, the lord who held title to lands subject to common rights could inclose any part of the
commons constituting superfluous waste without the commoners' consent. Although the le-
gal effect of inclosure usually extinguished common rights, some rights, like estovers and
turbary, could not be destroyed, and the lord, if he inclosed superfluous waste lands, had to
allow the commoners access to exercise these rights. Statute of Merton, 1 D. PICKERING, THE
STATUTE AT LARGE, 27 ch. 4 (Cambridge 1762) [hereinafter cited as PICKERING'S STATUTES];
The Commons Act of 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 46; see ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 69, 172-
74. Under the inclosure statutes, a commoner holding a strip of common land by freehold
tenure also had the right to inclose or "approve" that strip of common land. If he chose to
do so, however, his inclosure not only destroyed the common rights of others in his strip,
but also terminated his common rights in the remaining common land. Statute of Merton, 1
PICKERING'S STATUTES, supra, at 27b ch. 4; The Commons Act of 1285, 13 Edw. 1 ch. 46; see
ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 172.
Several Virginia Supreme Court decisions appear to adopt the distinction between waste
lands and common or public lands. See, e.g., James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old
Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461, 471-73, 122 S.E. 344, 347-48 (1924); French v.
Bankhead, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 136, 165-69 (1854).
93. Deveney, supra note 60, at 39; W HOSKINS & L. STAMP, supra note 24, at 8.
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property rights by establishing the principle that the Crown was
subject to the people. Further, the document contained provisions
that the common law subsequently interpreted as protecting spe-
cific public interests in watercourses. Chapter 33, for example, pro-
vided that "[a]l kydells [weirs] for the future shall be removed
altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout all England,
except upon the sea shore."' 4 Apparently adopted to prevent the
nobility from severely impeding river navigation by placing weirs,
or permanent fishing structures, in the waterways,9 5 the provision
gave the people a legal foothold in their struggle to protect their
rights from encroachment by the lords. Seizing upon the provi-
sion's general intent to facilitate navigation, the common law con-
strued Chapter 33 broadly and applied the prohibition to all ob-
structions, even those not technically weirs. Perhaps more
important, the common law also extended the provision's protec-
tive arm to several fisheries.96
Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta also dealt with public rights in
watercourses. It provided: "No riverbanks shall be placed in de-
fense from henceforth except such as were so placed in the time of
King Henry, our grandfather, by the same places and the same
bounds as they were want to be in his time. '97 According to Lord
Hale, this provision referred to the King's practice of putting salt
and fresh rivers "in defenseo for [his?] recreation; that is, to bar
fishing or fowling in a river till the king had taken his pleasure or
94. The Articles of the Barons, the schedule of demands presented to King John that
formed the basis of the Magna Carta, did not include the clause "except upon the seashore"
in the provision for the removal of kydells from rivers. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 489
(2d ed. 1914). The clause does appear m chapter 33 of the original Magna Carta, signed in
1215, and in chapter 23 of the revised Magna Carta of 1225. Id. at 343, 503.
95. W McKECHNIE, supra note 94, at 343; Note, supra note 60, at 766.
96. Note, supra note 60, at 766-77; see Lord Fitzhardinge v. Purcell, [1908] 2 Ch. 139,
167; Attorney General v. Emerson, [1891] App. Cas. 649, 654 (H.L.). Many commentators
disagree with this broad interpretation. E.g., Deveney, supra note 60, at 39. Lord Hale inter-
preted the provision as imposing a limitation on rights in the shore, arguing that the excep-
tion recognized, at least implicitly, the alienability of land between the high and low water
mark. M. Hale, supra note 60, at 389.
97. 1 PICKERING'S STATUTES, supra note 92, at 7 ch. 16. Chapter 16 was adopted from
chapter 47 of the original Magna Carta, which provided: "All forests that have been made
such in Our time shall forthwith be disafforested; and a similar course shall be followed with
regard to riverbanks that have been placed in defence by us in our time." W. McKEcHNIE,
supra note 94, at 435.
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advantage of the writ . de defensione ripartae."9 The writ ena-
bled the King to force riparian owners to bear the costs of repair-
ing roads and bridges so that the King could effectively use the
waters when he visited.9 Once again the common law went beyond
the immediate circumstances surrounding the adoption of the pro-
vision and interpreted the chapter as a ban against granting exclu-
sive fisheries in tidal waters. 100
The Magna Carta represented a turning point in the develop-
ment of common rights because the common law seized upon the
spirit of the movement leading to the adoption of the Magna Carta
to interpret its provisions broadly The legal scholar Bracton
added even more impetus to the directional change of the evolu-
tionary process. In his thirteenth century work De Legibus et Con-
suetudinibus Angliae'0 Bracton relied on the Roman concept of
common property as explained in Justinian's Institutes to declare
the sea and seashore to be common to all. He also used Roman law
as support for recognizing various public rights, including the com-
mon right of fishing in the rivers and ports, the right to use the
seashore for building cottages and for drying nets, and the right to
use river banks for banking and towing.10 2  Although Bracton
sometimes restated the Roman law inaccurately, his explanation of
common rights eventually became authoritative. 03
The increased recognition of common or public rights was re-
flected not only in the Magna Carta and the works of Bracton, but
also in acts of Parliament. The Statute of Merton, passed in 1236,
was the first state regulation of common lands. It provided that a
98. M. Hale, supra note 60, at 373.
99. S. MOORE & H. MOORE, THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FISHERIES 6-18 (1903).
100. See 2 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (Oxford 1766).
Once again, Lord Hale disagreed with the court's broad interpretation. Under his construc-
tion, the chapter placed the right of fishery prima facie in the public. The Crown, however,
could defeat this presumptive right by granting exclusive fisheries. M. Hale, supra note 60,
at 386. See also Carter v. Murcot, 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1768); Lord Fitzwalter's Case, 86
Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1674).
101. H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (S. Thorne trans. 1968).
102. Id. at 40.
103. Bracton, for example, differentiated between public and common things by stating
that under Roman law public things belonged "to all people for the use of mankind,"
whereas common things belonged "to all living things." Id. Yet this distinction did not accu-
rately reflect Roman law. See text accompanying notes 50-63 supra. See generally 2 F POL-
LOCK & F MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 138-40 (1895).
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lord could enclose common lands and therefore extinguish common
rights only if sufficient common lands remained for the freehold
tenants.10 4 Another commons act passed in 1285 placed the burden
of proof on the landowner to establish that sufficient land re-
mained for common pasture. °5
In the fourteenth century the plague alleviated the pressure on
common lands, causing a retreat from many common and waste
lands already privately appropriated. This pressure was not re-
vived until the late 1500's when the population reached preplague
levels and caused a renewed interest in common rights, especially
in the foreshore. In an attempt to regain power over the seashore,
Queen Elizabeth established a commission in 1571 to determine
the Crown's interests in various tidal areas. After the commission-
ers concluded that the land belonged to the Queen, she granted to
Digges, one of the commissioners, by patent dated July 25, 1571,
all of her fee interests in such lands as he could recover, including
mesne. profits, within seven years.106 In response, Digges developed
the prima facie theory, which he published in a pamphlet entitled
"Proofs of the Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the
Salt Shores Thereof.' 10 7 Under that theory Digges maintained that
104. Statute of Merton, 1 PICKERING'S STATUTES, supra note 92, at 27 ch. 4. Inclosure
literally meant putting fences around land, but in the eighteenth century it also signified a
means of fencing a commons to extinguish common rights. See RoYAL REPORT, supra note
26, at 173; note 135 & accompanying text supra.
105. The Commons Act of 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 46. At common law, the owner of land
incumbered with common rights could not inclose the land because common rights attached
to the whole parcel and could not be severed from any part. E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 85 (1797). A conflict therefore arose between manor lords who desired to
inclose the common to put the land to more productive use and commoners who needed the
land for pastures. The Statute of Merton circumvented the common law rule and balanced
the competing interests of the owners and tenants. Statute of Merton, 1 PICKERING'S STAT-
UTES, supra note 92, at 27 ch. 4. The statute permitted owners to inclose wasteland provided
sufficient pasture was left for the tenants. Id. at 27. A subsequent act, the Statute of West-
minster, expanded the owner's authority to inclose commons. Statute of Westminster, 1
PICKERING'S STATUTES, supra note 89, at 225 ch. 46. Whereas under the 1235 Act the owner
could inclose only land incumbered with common of pasture appendant, the 1285 Act per-
mitted the inclosure of neighboring commons as well. Id. at 226. See also ROYAL REPORT,
supra note 26, at 172.
106. S. MOORE, supra note 63, at 212-24.
107. T. Digges, Arguments Prooving the Queenes Majesties Propertye in the Sea Landes,
and Salt Shores Thereof, and That No Subject Cann Lawfully Hould Eny Parte Thereof
But By The Kinges Especiall Graunte, reprinted in S. MooRs, supra note 93, at 185-211.
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those things which by natural law are common to all were now by
common law the Crown's property 108 For "it is a sure maxim in
the common law that whatsoever land there is within the king's
dominion whereunto no man can justly make property it is the
king's by his prerogative." 10 9 Title to the shore, therefore, re-
mained in the Crown despite previous grants of tidal lands, unless
those grants contained language specifically granting the foreshore
to the grantee. An individual could not acquire title to the shore
in any other manner, such as by usage or prescription.11
As support for his theory, Digges relied primarily on Roman law
and Bracton's work. He reasoned that reclaiming lands subject to
common use under natural law did not increase the powers and
rights of the Crown because the Crown already had jurisdiction as
sovereign over such lands. Under the Roman legal principle of oc-
cupanti, anyone could become the owner of things which natural
law declared to be common to all by taking possession of them.
This legal rule, however, applied only where the land was uninhab-
ited or within a King's territorial limits. Yet, under the common
law tenure system, the Crown held all land either mediately or im-
mediately, and therefore, no land could be acquired by occupa-
tion.1 Although the courts initially rejected the prima facie the-
ory, 112 they eventually yielded to royal pressure and accepted the
theory, at least until Charles I was beheaded for, among other rea-
sons, "the taking away of men's right under colour of the King's
title to land between the high and low water marks. '"1 3
The prima facie theory did not receive serious attention again
until the middle of the seventeenth century, when Lord Hale wrote
his famous treatise De Jure Marts et Brachiorum Ejusdem (Con-
108. Id. at 185.
109. Id. at 187.
110. Id. at 188-90 (author's translation).
111. Id. at 202-04.
112. For example, in an action brought by Digges in 1571 to recover 50 acres of land
covered by the sea, "which are and of right ought to be in the hands of the lady the Queen
by reason of her prerogative," judgment was given for the defendants. Id. at 216. The
courts reached similar results in the following: (1) the Attorney General entered a nolle
prosequi in an action against Hebblethwait and others to recover a beach; and (2) the court
decided that the land between the flowing and reflowing of the sea belonged to the manor's
lord in an action against Hamond for 120 acres of marshland. Id. at 217, 219-24.
113. S. MOORE, supra note 63, at 310.
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cerning the Law of the Sea and its Arms). Although Hale adhered
to the basic premises of Digges' theory, he partly disagreed and
added new concepts to the theory Hale maintained, like Digges,
that title to the foreshore and lands under water was prima facie in
the Crown.114 Unlike Digges, however, Hale argued that individuals
could acquire proprietary interests in tidal lands and waters by
grant, prescription, or custom. 115 As support Hale cited chapter 33
of the Magna Carta, which excepted the seashore from the prohibi-
tion against obstructing navigation.116 Thus, although title to tidal
lands and waters was prima facie in the Crown, an individual
could, for example, acquire by usage a right to a several fishery,
"exclusive of that common liberty which otherwise of common
right belongs to all the king's subjects."1 7 A private proprietary
interest, however, could not be exercised in a manner creating a
nuisance to the remaining public rights, such as navigation, "for
the jus prwatum, that is acquired to the subject either by patent
or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum wherewith
public rivers or arms of the sea are affected for public use."" 8
In another work,"" Hale further refined his theory, increasingly
disagreeing with Digges. Whereas Digges based his theory prima-
rily on the Crown's private proprietary rights, Hale divided inter-
ests in coastal resources into three possible categories: (1) the Jus
regwm, which encompassed the police powers of the sovereign, or
the Crown's power as sovereign to manage the kingdom's resources
for the public safety and welfare; (2) the jus pnvatum, which in-
cluded private proprietary interests in property; and (3) the jus
publicum, which encompassed the interests of the general pub-
114. See generally M. Hale, supra note 60, at 370-413. Hale defined the shore as "that
ground that is between the ordinary high-water and low-water mark." Id. at 378.
115. Id. at 384-406. For example, Hale stated that while there was no common right to
moor ships on adjacent shores such a right could be acquired for towing by custom or usage.
Hale characterized the right as an easement when it was acquired for the commonwealth's
benefit, and as a servitude when acquired for the benefit of individuals. M. Hale, A Narra-
tive Legall and Historicall Touchinge the Customes, repnnted in S. MOORE, A HIsTORY OF
THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 319, 344 (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter cited as
M. Hale, A Narrative] [hereinafter paginated to S. MOORE].
116. M. Hale, supra note 60, at 388-89; see text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
117. Id. at 386.
118. Id. at 389-90. Hale defined an arm of the sea as a watercourse affected by the ebb
and flow of the tides. Id. at 378.
119. M. Hale, A Narrative, supra note 115.
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lic.120 Hale explained the interaction of all three categories by not-
ing that any private proprietary interests held by the King under
his jus prwatum were subject to appropriate public interests in the
jus publicum. If the jus privatum was in an individual, then the
King was defender of any public rights existing in the privately
held land under his jus regium.'12
Hale's work was important for several reasons. First, his work
introduced the concept of the jus publicum into English law. Al-
though the exact nature of the jus publicum remained unclear, 22
the concept meant at least that no one, not even the Crown, could
destroy or alienate certain public rights. 23  As more distinctions
were made between the Crown's private and public status, the con-
cept of jus publicum eventually developed into the public trust
doctrine. Hale, however, did not recognize the concept of the pub-
120. Id. at 327-47.
121. See id. at 355.
122. One commentator interpreted Hale as limiting the jus publicum to the right of navi-
gation. Consistent with this narrow interpretation, the same commentator argued that,
under Hale's approach, there was no public right of fishing. At best, the public had a liberty
"revocable" by the King. As support for this interpretation, the commentator noted that
Hale spoke of the King as having a "primary right of fishing," yet described the common
people as having merely a "liberty of fishing." Deveney, supra note 60, at 46-47. The rele-
vant passage provided:
But though the king is the owner of this great wast [the sea], and as a conse-
quent of his propriety hath the primary right of fishing in the sea and the
creeks and arms thereof; yet the common people of England have regularly a
liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms thereof, as a publick common of
piscary, and may not without injury to their right be restrained of it, unless in
such places or creeks or navigable rivers, where either the king or some partic-
ular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that common liberty.
M. Hale, supra note 60, at 377. In the quoted passage, however, Hale referred to the liberty
of fishing as a "publick common of piscary," which can be referring only to the common
right of piscary that developed during feudal days. This common right was a property right
or interest. See text accompanying notes 129-130 infra. Further, that the public common of
fishing could be destroyed by an exclusive grant from the King does not mean that it cannot
be classified as a right. Historically, common rights have been "revocable" in the sense that
they usually could be appropriated by a private party, whether through grant or usage. Fi-
nally, Hale's description of the King's interest as a "primary right of fishing" and the pub-
lic's interest as a "liberty of fishing" does not necessarily mean that the public had no right
of fishing. The different terminology might have been used by Hale to emphasize that the
King had title to the seas and the fish in it, while the public had only a common right of
fishing. Interpreted in this manner, the terminology is entirely consistent with the definition
of a common right as a right to use the land or waters of another.
123. See Deveney, supra note 60, at 38-39.
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lic trust, for he did not maintain that the Crown held title to cer-
tain lands in trust for the public and therefore could not alienate
those lands. Rather, his position was that title was subject to the
jus publicum regardless of who held title. It can be argued that the
King had a "trust" duty to preserve the jus publicum because he
was the defender of public rights under his jus regium. Under
Hale's theory, however, this duty arose out of the jus regium, out
of the duties that a sovereign owed to its people, and not out of thejus publicum.' 24
Second, and perhaps most important, the interests encompassed
by the jus publicum were in a sense indestructible. Not even the
Crown could authorize a direct nuisance to the jus publicum. 125
Further, if the Crown granted an exclusive fishery or conveyed title
to tidal lands to an individual, that party took subject to the Jus
publicum. 126
Finally, by adopting the prima facie theory, Hale increased the
area under the King's control. Under Hale's modified version of
Digges's theory, the Crown presumptively held title to all shores
and submerged lands. Ultimately, after the development of the
public trust theory, this proved to benefit the public.
B. Summary of the Legal Theory Underlying English Commons
By the American Revolution, the common rights concept was
firmly established in the English common law. The legal theory un-
derlying the commons concept, however, was not clearly defined.
What was clear was that before the Elizabethan era the common
law presumed that the riparian owner held the foreshore as owner
to the extent that he occupied and used it. 127 Digges's attempt to
change that presumption with his prima facie theory did not begin
to gain widespread acceptance until the middle to late 16001s.12s As
124. M. Hale, A Narrative, supra note 115, at 336; see Deveney, supra note 60, at 48-50.
125. M. Hale, A Narrative, supra note 115, at 338, 340.
126. M. Hale, supra note 60, at 389-90. According to Hale, fresh water rivers also were
subject to common or public use for transportation. These rivers were prima facie publict
jurts, common highways for man and goods, and therefore all navigational nuisances were
punishable by indictment. Id. at 374.
127. Deveney, supra note 60, at 41 n.183.
128. The courts expressly recognized that title to the land between the high and low
water mark was prima facie in the Crown. See Earl of Salisbury v. Joyn, 84 Eng. Rep. 992
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restated by Hale, that theory declared the Crown to be the prima
facie owner of tidal lands and waters. Even the Crown's proprie-
tary interest, however, was subject to the jus publicum, or public
rights, including at a minimum the right of navigation. Hale, how-
ever, did not state that the Crown could not alienate those lands
and waters held for the public. The concept of inalienable public
trust property developed later, as the private and public status of
the King was more clearly delineated.
Regardless of whether the English common law considered vari-
ous common rights as inalienable parts of the jus publicum, they
did exist m agrarian land as well as in tidal lands. Under the En-
glish system common rights were considered property interests and
were classified according to the subject matter of the use. 129 The
common of piscary, for example, gave a party the right to fish in
another's waters. This common right has been applied to two im-
portant situations. First, the right has referred to the public's
"common fishery," or to the public's right to fish in unappropri-
ated public waters. Second, the right has been interpreted as in-
cluding the common of fishery, which usually arose when two own-
ers of exclusive fisheries permitted each other to fish in their
respective waters, or when an owner of an exclusive fishery permit-
ted third parties to fish in his waters.13 0
(K.B. 1677); Lord Fitzwalter's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 766, 767 (K.B. 1674); Whittaker v. Wife,
84 Eng. Rep. 479, 480 (K.B. 1671); Kirby v. Gibs, 84 Eng. Rep. 183 (K.B. 1667); Bulstrode v.
Hall, 82 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1662).
129. E.g., 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 509, 547, 576, 579, 581 (4th ed. 1974); see 1
R. MINOR, supra note 31, §§ 72, 73. The most important common right apparently was the
right of pasture, followed by the right of turbary, and then estovers. ROYAL REPORT, supra
note 26, at 160.
130. Some commentators define the common of piscary more narrowly, limiting it to the
right to fish in the private waters of another. 1 R. MINOR, supra note 31, § 73, at 105.
Fisheries generally may be classified as exclusive or nonexclusive, with the common right of
fishing falling into the latter category. Exclusive fisheries, in turn, may be either corporeal
or incorporeal. A corporeal fishery grant conveyed the title to the water and soil as well as
the profit a prendre to fish in the granted waters. Exclusive corporeal fisheries most fre-
quently were conveyed in grants from the King to manor lords and monasteries. Grants of
incorporeal fisheries conveyed only the right to fish in the described waters and did not
transfer title to the waters. The two major forms of incorporeal fisheries were a franchise or
license from the Crown to fish exclusively in some portion of waters held by the Crown and
grants by the manor lord to his tenants to fish in the manorial waters. See generally J.
ANGELL, LAW OF WATERCOURSES 70-85, 324 (6th ed. 1869).
Other important common rights included the common of pasture, the common of turbary,
[Vol. 23:835
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Common rights were created in a variety of ways. Sometimes, for
example, the lord of a manor voluntarily gave his tenants common
rights, or the tenants and the lord agreed on common rights. In
other instances parts of waste lands that never were enclosed even-
tually were used in common.131 Management of common lands also
varied, usually being placed in the lord of the manor who governed
conflicts through his courts. As the manor system disintegrated
and the manor courts disappeared, management sometimes oc-
curred in village meetings.13 2 Eventually Parliament assumed full
control over the management of common lands and rights, adopt-
ing numerous statutes regulating the exercise of common rights. s3
0
and the common of estovers. The common of pasture, perhaps the most important of the
common rights under the feudal system, was the right to feed cattle, horses, and other ani-
mals on the land of another. This common right often existed as an incident of a grant
involving the military tenure. The common law apparently implied this right from land
grants made by a lord to tenants to be held in military tenure, reasoning that the tenant
would need to pasture his animals on the waste lands of the lord because the tenant's own
lands would be arable and therefore used for cultivation. If the common right of pasture
arose as an incidence of the feudal grant, it was described as appendant or annexed to the
land. The right of pasture also could arise independently of the creation of a tenure by grant
or prescription, in which case it would be either appurtenant to the land or a right in gross.
1 R. MINOR, supra note 31, §§ 71, 72.
The common of turbary was the right to dig peat or turf out of another's soil for use as
fuel in the commoner's house, whereas the common of estovers allowed a commoner to cut
and take wood from another's land. A person having the common of estovers generally could
cut timber for use as fuel (fire-bote), for making or repairing agricultural tools (plough-bote
or cart-bote), for repairing the house (house-bote), and for building or repairing fences and
hedges (hedge-bote). The common right of estovers must not be confused with the life ten-
ant's right of estovers, which was an exclusive right to make similar uses. 1 R. MINOR, supra
note 31, § 73.
131. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 6, 44-45; see notes 88-92 & accompanying text
supra.
132. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 63-66, 159-66, 178. For a discussion of the factors
contributing to the decay of the manor system, see id. at 63-65. Although a few manorial
courts still exist in England, tenure was abolished in 1922. Id. at 65.
133. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 159-66; see T. Smolen, supra note 21, at 4143.
Parliament enacted several major statutes to regulate the commons. The Inclosure Act of
1845 empowered the Inclosure Commissioners to authorize the inclosure of commons by
provisional order upon the application and consent of such persons "interested" in the com-
mons as defined by the Act. Inclosure Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 118, § 16, 25. The com-
missioners were required to report the provisional order to Parliament, certifying that the
inclosure would be "expedient," "having regard as well to the health, comfort and conve-
nience of the inhabitants where the land proposed to be inclosed is situate," as to "the
advantage of the proprietors of the land to which the application relates." Id. §§ 3, 27. The
inclosure was not final until Parliament confirmed the provisional order by the passage of a
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:835
Along with the power to manage the commons came the power
to alter the nature and scope of common rights. As history demon-
strates, common rights were not immutable, for the party manag-
ing the commons often changed the right of use to accommodate
the fluctuating needs of a particular manor or village. Sometimes
the change was only partial, involving a more restrictive definition
of the type of use or class of user."3 4 Sometimes, however, the
change totally extinguished the common rights. This process of ex-
tinguishment, better known under English law as "inclosure," liter-
ally involved erecting fences around common lands to destroy com-
mon rights and thus redistribute property rights in the land.13 5
Throughout the seventeenth century inclosure usually occurred by
private agreement executed among the lord of the manor and his
tenants, and frequently was confirned by the chancery courts. As
Parliament assumed greater control over commons, however, inclo-
sure began to be effected by private acts or general legislation. By
the mid-1800's only Parliament had the power to abolish common
"Public General Act." Id. § 32.
The Inclosure Act of 1845 was amended by 10 subsequent acts before it was substantially
revised in 1876. Schedule to Commons Act of 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 56. The Commons Act
of 1876 changed the criteria for reviewing applications for the inclosure of commons. Inclo-
sure would be permitted only upon proof satisfactory to the commissioners and Parliament
"that such inclosure will be of benefit to the neighborhood as well as private interests, and
to those who are legally interested in any such commons." Commons Act of 1876, 39 & 40
Vict., ch. 56, § 1.
The Commons Act of 1899 extended authority to regulate commons beyond Parliament
and the Inclosure Commissioners to urban and rural district councils. The Act authorized
the councils to regulate and manage any common within their district, "with a view to the
expenditure of money on the drainage, leveling, and improvement of the common, and to
the making of bylaws, and regulations for the prevention of nuisances and preservation of
order on the common." Commons Act of 1899, 62 & 63 Vict., ch. 30, § 1(1). The council's
regulations were, however, subject to approval and modification by the Board of Agriculture.
Id. § 2(4).
The Law of Property Act of 1925 provided that the public had rights of access for air and
exercise to any land that was a metropolitan common, manorial waste, borough or urban
district common, or any land which at the commencement of the Act was subject to rights of
common. Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 193(1) (1925). The construction of any
building, fence, or other work which would impair the public access to these lands was pro-
hibited without the consent of the appropriate minister. Id. § 194(1).
134. See notes 29, 85-86 & accompanying text supra.
135. ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 173. In contrast to the term "inclosure," the word
"enclosure" will be used to signify only that land has been fenced without regard to whether
common rights attach to the land. See id. at 23-24.
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rights.1"6 Parliament's exclusive control of common rights evi-
dences the importance of the commons concept in the English legal
system. The concept also was destined to play a significant role in
America.
III. THE COMMONS CONCEPT AND PUBLIC RIGHTS IN EARLY
AMERICA
Although the commons concept was transplanted from England
to colonial America, the concept never was as clearly defined nor as
strongly rooted as in England. This difference may be attributable
to several factors. First, by the time of the first American settle-
ments in the early 1600's, the English tenure system had dis-
integrated. 137 The only form of tenure still existing at that point
was free and common socage, which required a monetary payment
instead of the performance of some act or duty.138  Second, after
their initial battle for survival, the American colonists did not need
common lands and rights as did the English. During the early co-
lonial years, of course, the settlers needed to share products ob-
tamed from the land and sea to survive, but when the New Eng-
land and Virginia colonies became self-sustaining this need
diminished. Further, resources abounded and there was plenty of
land, fish, and game for everybody. In the words of one colonist,
"such a bay, river, and a land, did never the eye of man behold,
and at the level of the river. . are mountains, that promise
infinite treasure."13 9 Finally, the independent and often rebellious
nature of the first settlers served as a catalyst for the development
136. Id. at 161-66.
137. See, e.g., Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1833). The manor
system did not develop in America as it had in England because of different political and
economic considerations. The colonial governors were reluctant to grant manorial privileges
which would reduce their political and judicial power, and the New England environment
was better suited for mercantile rather than agricultural industries. In the southern regions
that produced agricultural goods, inadequate transportation and marketing systems hin-
dered manor development. See generally S. KiM, LANDLORD AND TENANT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK 3-44, 129-62 (1932). For cases involving the two principal New York manors, Van
Rensselaer and Livingston, see Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639- (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1833); Livingston v. Broeck, 16 Johns. 14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1819); Livingston v. Potts, 16
Johns. 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1819); Watts v. Coffin, 11 Johns. 495 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1814).
138. 2 F POLLOCK & F MAITLAND, supra note 103, at 271.
139. Letter from William Brewster to the Earl of Salisbury, repnnted in A. BROWN, supra
note 27, at 33.
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of a property system based primarily on private ownership.140
Given the basic differences between the English and early Amer-
ican property systems, it is not surprising that the evolution of the
commons concept eventually took a slightly different course in the
United States. The development of the concept in colonial America
will be considered by examining first the factual evidence of com-
mon rights and second the underlying legal theory
A. Early Historical Development
Common lands and rights existed in both the Virginia and the
New England colonies. On April 10, 1606, King James I granted
"Letters Patent" to Sir Thomas Gates and several others to estab-
lish the Virginia colony 141 These Letters Patent, which comprised
the colony's first charter, granted the patentees "all the lands,
woods, soil, grounds, havens, ports, rivers, mines, minerals, mar-
shes, waters, fishings, commodities, and hereditaments"'4 2 to be
held in "free and common soccage.' ' 14' The charter, which only
briefly referred to land grants provided that the King would grant
"lands, tenements, and hereditaments" to other individuals nomi-
nated by the patentees.1 4 4 Thus far, no historian or legal scholar
has uncovered evidence of grants to private parties. 45 In addition
to the Letters Patent, the King also issued Articles, Instructions
and Orders on November 20, 1606. They ordered that Virginia be
governed "as near to the common laws of England, and the equity
thereof as may be," and that "all the lands, tenements, and here-
ditaments to be had and enjoyed by any of our subjects
[within the colony] shall be had and inherited and enjoyed, accord-
ing as in the like estates they be had and enjoyed by the laws
140. Unlike settlers in England, settlers in colonial America did not constitute a depen-
dent peasantry. They tended to be absolute owners of the land they worked. As one scholar
noted, "[O]ne of the most remarkable circumstances m our colonial history is the almost
total absence of leasehold estates." 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 159-61 (1833). The existence of common rights was "uncongenial with the
genius of our government, and with the spirit of independence which animates our cultiva-
tors of the soil." Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639, 648 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1833).
141. 1 HENING'S STATUTES, supra note 27, at 57-75.
142. Id. at 59.
143. Id. at 66.
144. Id. at 65-66.
145. A. EMBREY, supra note 27, at 220.
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within this realme of England.' 46
On May 23, 1609 the Crown issued a second charter which fur-
ther enlarged and explained the first, and which incorporated the
patentees into one body called the London Company Like the
first, this charter granted the patentees, among other rights and
interests, all lands, soils, havens, ports, rivers, waters, fishmgs,
commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises, and
preheminences. 147 Yet the charter authorized the London Com-
pany to grant "portion[s] of lands, tenements, and hereditaments"
only to individuals nominated and approved. 48 The second char-
ter also clarified the status of persons born in Virginia by declaring
them to have all the liberties and immunities as "natural sub-
jects.' 49 Perhaps most significant, the charter committed the col-
ony's government to the Company 10
After the second charter was issued, the Company published a
pamphlet entitled "Nova Britannia" which explained various as-
pects of its operation in the New World. More specifically, the
Company defined an "adventurer" as a person who adventured his
money in the colony and a "planter" as a person who personally
came to the colony to live. Additionally, the pamphlet provided
that the adventurers were to hold their joint stock for seven years
from the second charter's issuance and that the planters were to
apply the fruits of their labors for the joint stock's benefit for the
same seven-year period. At the end of seven years, the lands were
to be divided among the adventurers and planters, with each
receiving fifty acres per adventure.' 5 '
During the first few years of the Jamestown settlement, the set-
tlers faced formidable obstacles. Disease and fights with the Indi-
ans seriously depleted the number of settlers, and the settlement
almost was abandoned in 1610. Although the settlement became
more stable by 1612, conditions were serious enough to cause Dep-
uty-Governor Dale and his council to build public works and to set
146. 1 HENING'S STATUTES, supra note 27, at 67-69.
147. Id. at 80-89.
148. Id. at 89.
149. Id. at 95.
150. Id. at 91-92. The charter also was important because it was the first form of "popu-
lar" or representative government in America. A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 74.
151. 1 P Force, Force's Tracts No. 6, at 1-28 (1835).
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aside "common" or public gardens for hemp and flax.152 This ap-
parently is the first reference to common lands in the colonial doc-
uments. Dale's plan seemingly worked well, for in 1619 the Mich-
aelmas quarter court praised him for "set[ting] up the common
garden" and providing the settlement with a "standing
revenue.
153
In 1616 His Majesty's Counsel for Virginia published a report on
the colony, describing it as a "flourishing state," which now in-
cluded settlements at several different sites.154 The report attrib-
uted the colony's success partially to Dale's good management. In
addition to setting up common gardens, Dale in part abandoned
the idea of joint stock, or common property, and authorized some
private enterprise. For example, he permitted settlers to own
whatever they could raise on three acres of Company land.155 The
report also stated that the Company was to make its first division
of land among the planters and adventurers. One historian de-
scribed this event as "the first establishment of a fixed property in
soil, fifty acres of land being granted by the Company to every
freeman in absolute right.' 1 56
Thus, by 1616-1617, it appears that the Virginia colony adopted
to a significant degree the concept of common or public lands. Al-
though settlers usually cultivated their own private gardens, they
also were required to work the common gardens. Crops produced
from the common gardens were used for the settlement's benefit.
In addition, settlers arriving at the Company's expense had to pro-
vide seven years of service to the Company This service usually
involved working Company lands, with half of the profits going to
the Company 157 Colony officers even received designated public
lands as compensation, which apparently were relinquished at the
end of their term and passed on to successors. Servants or tenants
of the colony worked these lands. For example, in 1620 when Sa-
152. A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 150.
153. Virginia Company of London, 1 Records of the Virginia Company of London 267
(reprinted from the manuscript in the Library of Congress 1910).
154. A. EMBREY, supra note 27, at 221.
155. Id. at 221; see generally A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 225-27.
156. C. CAMPBELL, HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND ANCIENT DOMINION OF VIRGINIA 116 (Phil-
adelphia 1860).
157. A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 323-24.
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muel Argall arrived to assume his post as principal governor, Gov-
ernor Yeardley "delivered to him a portion of public land called
the Company's garden.'""
On November 18, 1618, the London Company issued a document
entitled "Instructions to Sir George Yeardley "I" Better known as
the Great Charter of 1619, the document set forth a plan for the
colony's management and development that became the basis of
Virginia's land system until the Revolution. The Great Charter set
up a central colonial government, giving each town or plantation
the right to elect two burgesses to the colonial legislature, the Gen-
eral Assembly The Charter instructed the Virginia colonial gov-
ernment to establish four principal cities or boroughs: James
Town, Charles City, Henrico, and Kiccotan. e0 Within each of
these boroughs public land was to be set aside "for a further ease
to the Inhabitants of all taxes and contributions to support and for
the Entertainment of the particular magistrates and officers."' 1
For example, the Great Charter ordered that three thousand acres
of governor's land be set aside in James Town for the use and sup-
port of the present and each succeeding governor. The lands were
to consist of "freed grounds [worked] by the common Labour of
the people set thither at the Company's Charges." '62 Additionally,
the Great Charter directed that three thousand acres of Company
lands be set aside in each borough for the support of other officers.
Like the governor's lands, the Company lands were to be worked
by tenants transported to the colony "at the common charge of the
company "163 Fifty percent of the profits derived from the gover-
nor's and Company lands was allocated to the tenants occupying
the lands, twenty-five percent to the Company, and the remaining
twenty-five percent to the appropriate official. Not all of the Com-
pany lands, however, could be occupied and worked by Company
tenants, for under the instructions, the colony always had to re-
serve "a sufficient part" of the Company lands "for the securing
158. Id. at 253.
159. Instructions to Sir George Yeardley (1618) reprinted in 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRA-
PHY 154-165 (1894-95).
160. Id. at 156.
161. Id. at 158.
162. Id. at 155.
163. Id. at 155-57.
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and wintering of all sorts of Cattle which are or shall be the pub-
lick stock and store" of the Company 164
Besides setting aside governor's and Company lands, the Great
Charter also provided that each borough must allot one hundred
acres of glebe land "toward the maintenance of ministers" and
fifteen hundred acres of land "to be the common Land of the
Borough to be known and called by the name of the city's or
Borough's Land."' 1 5 Additionally, the borough of Henrico was to
set aside ten thousand acres for the establishment of a college. 166
Unlike the Company and governor's lands, the common lands were
to be worked by settlers or planters, persons who paid their pas-
sage from England but who had not bought London Company
shares. The planters worked for three years, with a fourth of the
profits paid to the Company 167 During this period the planter was
deemed to be an "occupier" of the common lands. After the three-
year period had expired, the settler had two years within which to
procure a grant from the appropriate court for the common land
occupied byohim. If he failed to do so, he forfeited his right to an
ownership interest and remained an occupier.16 8
These instructions demonstrate several important points con-
cerning public interests in early America. First, they show that sev-
eral kinds of public lands existed in colonial Virginia: governorS
lands, Company lands, glebe lands, college lands, and finally com-
mon lands.'69 Second, they reveal that although each category
served different public purposes, they all shared one characteristic:
each kind of public land had been intentionally set aside by the
London Company for the general public's use and benefit. Finally,
the instructions show that the common lands were the least perma-
nent of all the public lands. Whereas other kinds of public lands
were to be used over an indefinite time period, the instructions an-
164. Id. at 156.
165. Id. at 158.
166. Id. at 158-59. The ancient planters and adventurers received a 100 acre land divi-
dend for the economic and personal risks they bore in residing and investing in the Virginia
colony before it was settled. Subsequent planters and adventurers, who arrived after 1616
and benefited from the earlier settlers' efforts, received only a 50 acre dividend. Id. at 162.
167. Id. at 161.
168. Id. at 161-62.
169. Embrey appears to define common lands as including governor's and glebe lands. A.
EMBREY, supra note 27, at 16.
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ticipated that the common lands would be conveyed after a rela-
tively short time period to the settlers occupying them. Thus, the
colony not only had the right to alienate the common lands, but
also was to base its decision whether to convey the lands on a stan-
dard that closely resembled the Roman principle of occupanti.
In 1624 the patent to the London Company was overthrown and
the Crown resumed control of the colony 170 According to historian
Alexander Brown, after the demise of the London Company "the
public lands passed to the crown and were afterwards parceled out
and granted by patents as other lands.1' 71 This statement is inac-
curate because it implies that the colonists lost all rights and inter-
ests in public and common lands. There is ample evidence that
common rights existed even after 1625.172 Although many acts ex-
pressly provided for commons, the majority of acts establishing
towns and settlements did not contain specific language referring
to inhabitants' common rights. Most of the acts, however, con-
tained the following language, or its equivalent:
And be if further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, That the
freeholders and inhabitants of the said town, so soon as they
have built upon and saved their lots, according to the conditions
of their deeds of conveyance, shall then be entitled to, and have
and enjoy, all the rights, privileges and immunities, granted to
or enjoyed by the freeholders and inhabitants of other towns er-
ected by act of assembly m this colony.27 3
170. A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 601-03. Technically, the London Company charter never
was vacated from the records of the Office of the Rolls because of the ultimely death of
James I. Id. at 603. For a description of the state of the colony in 1624 when it was returned
to the King, see id. at 616-32.
171. Id. at 627.
172. Appendix, Tables 1 & 2.
173. E.g., 7 HENING'S STATUTES, supra note 27, at 597 ch. 20, "An act for establishing the
town of Charlottesville, in the County of Albemarle." See also id. at 600 ch. 22, "An act for
establishing the town of Mecklenburg, in the county of Frederick."; id. at 601 ch. 22, "An
act for establishing the town of Hanover, in the county of Hanover."; 8 id. at 424, "An act
for establishing towns of Rocky Ridge, Gloucester court house and Layton's warehouse
"; 9 id. at 555, "An act for establishing a Town at the Courthouse in the county of
Washington." (Whereas heretofore the language of the privileges and immunities clauses
had ended with "privileges and immunities, granted to or enjoyed by the freeholders and
inhabitants of other towns erected by act of assembly in this colony," the clause in id. and
12 id. at 402 ended with the language "privileges and immunities, which the freeholders and
inhabitants of other towns in this state, not incorporated by charter, hold and enjoy."); 10
id. at 134, "An act for establishing the town of Boonsborough, in the county of Kentucky.";
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When this clause is read in the light of a 1779 legislative enact-
ment entitled "An Act for adjusting and settling titles of claim-
ers,'174 and containing language giving each settlement in the west-
ern region of the colony 640 acres of land to be held as common, it
appears that the clause grants each established town the right to
set aside ground as a common in the future, perhaps even without
further legislative action. If this conclusion is correct, the existence
of common rights may be more pervasive than the historical evi-
dence indicates.
A closer examination of the 1779 Act, however, weakens this in-
terpretation. First, the Act contains language indicating its provi-
sions applied only to settlements in the western region of Virginia
that were not officially established by the General Assembly.
Clause V of the Act provides:
V And whereas several families have settled themselves in
villages or townships, under some agreement between the in-
habitants of laying off the same into town lots That six
hundred and forty acres of land shall be reserved for the
use and benefit of the said inhabitants until a true representa-
tion of their case can be made to the general assembly 175
Further, an earlier clause of the Act indicates that the Act's pri-
mary purpose was to protect the reliance interests of people who
settled in the western region without the benefit of patents or gov-
ernment charters. It provides:
IV And whereas great numbers of people have settled in the
country upon the western waters for which they have been
hitherto prevented from suing out patents or obtaining legal ti-
tles by the king and it is just that those settling under such
circumstances should have some reasonable allowance for the
charge and risk they have incurred and that the property so ac-
quired should be secured to them 116
Finally, a comparison of the language in the 1779 Act and in the
privileges and immunities clause suggests that the two are disjunc-
11 id. at 29, "An act to establish a town at the courthouse in the county of Buckingham.";
12 id. at 402, "An act to establish a town at the courthouse of the county of Accomack."
174. 10 zd. at 35-50 ch. 11.
175. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 38-39.
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tive. Under the terms of the privileges and immunities clause, in-
habitants of the appropriate town are entitled only to those
"rights, privileges and immunities, granted to inhabitants of
other towns erected by act of assembly in this colony" The 1779
Act, however, only recognized the right to set aside common rights
until the General Assembly established the town. Thus, under a
narrower interpretation, the broad language of the privileges and
immunities clause would not incorporate any common rights estab-
lished by the 1779 Act because those rights existed only in western
settlements not officially created by an act of assembly This inter-
pretation is strengthened since the 1779 Act was passed after many
of the eastern settlements were officially established and thus after
the privileges and immunities clause was inserted in many of the
town charters. 17
Even if the privileges and immunities clause cannot be construed
as incorporating the 1779 Act to augment settlers' common rights,
the Act's language suggests several important points about the ex-
istence of common rights in Virginia during the 1700's. First, it
shows that, at least in western Virginia, settlers created common
rights by agreement, as did the lords and tenants in feudal Eng-
land. It is reasonable to assume that this practice reflected what
had already occurred in many eastern settlements because western
settlers frequently migrated from eastern Virginia. Second, the
1779 Act indicates that the right to lay off 640 acres of common
land may have been only a temporary right because it existed only
until the General Assembly considered the merits of the settlers'
agreements to distribute lands and establish common areas. Given
the broad language of clause IV, however, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the General Assembly usually ratified the settlement
agreements.
177. Interpreting the 1779 Act as a general grant of the right to create commons appurte-
nant to every settlement also is incongruous with the language of a later act. 11 td. at 29.
That later act contained not only the standard privileges and immunities clause, but also a
clause mandating that four lots in the middle of town be reserved for public use and a
clause vesting 100 acres "to and for the common use and benefit of the inhabitants of the
said town." Id. at 30 ch. 12. There would be no need for specific grants of public and com-
mon land if it was within the town's power to claim land under the general grant.
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B. Early Legal Development
Although the previous discussion clearly establishes that the
common lands concept, as a practical matter, was transplanted
into the United States, the concept's development in American ju-
risprudence is not as clearly defined. The judicial system often in-
terprets the concept in conflicting ways and applies it to a wide
range of situations. One interpretation, for example, classifies the
commons concept as an easement, 178 while another equates com-
178. E.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 465 P.2d 50, 55-56, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 167-68 (1970)(blending the concepts of implied dedication and easements by prescrip-
tion in concluding that the public could acquire a public easement in a shoreline); Thornton
v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969) (trial court holding that the public acquired an
easement in a beach area for recreational pursuits, and the state supreme court affirming by
disregarding the concepts of implied dedication and prescriptive easements, relying instead
on the law of custom); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 935-37 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964)(relying on the theory of implied dedication to uphold the validity of the public's
recreational use of a beach, but noting that the prescriptive easement theory also could have
been used). The above cases show that the courts use various theories to support their find-
ing of a public easement. The legal significance of the easement approach is that private
parties, rather than the state, own the land subject to the public right of use. The market-
place, therefore, should govern and reflect the value of the public use. 1 H. FARNHAM, THE:
LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46 (1904). For a discussion of the easement approach
to public rights, see Note, supra note 60, at 768-72.
One federal statute, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), has adopted the easement approach in protecting "selected rivers of the
Nation with their immediate environments for the benefit and enjoyment of pre-
sent and future generations." Id. § 1271. Under the Act, the Secretaries of the Interior and
Agriculture may acquire "lands and interests in land" within a designated wild, scenic, or
recreational river area, including "scenic easements or such other easements as are reasona-
bly necessary to give the public access to the river" and to permit passage in the area. Id.
§ 1277. The Act defines "scenic easement" as "the right to control the use of land for
the purpose of protecting the natural qualities of a designated wild, scenic or recreational
river area." Id. § 1286(c). See also United States v. 637.84 Acres of Land, 524 F Supp. 688
(W.D. Mo. 1981)(interpreting the definition of scenic easement).
Pursuant to § 1284 of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, which imposes certain duties on
states, the Virginia legislature adopted its own Scenic Rivers Act, VA. CODE §§ 10-167 to
-175 (1978). In the Virginia Act, the General Assembly declared that "preservation of cer-
tain rivers or sections of rivers for their scenic values is a beneficial purpose of water re-
source policy." Id. § 10-167(b). The Virginia Act establishes a specific procedure for identi-
fying scenic rivers. See id. §§ 10-169 to -172. Once the General Assembly designates a
stream as a scenic river, "all planning for the use and development of water and related land
resources including the construction of impoundments, diversions, or other uses" that
will affect the scenic value of the river must give "full consideration" to the river as a scenic
resource. Id. § 10-167(d). Legislative approval for designation as a scenic river has been
given to parts of five streams: the Rivanna River, Goose Creek, Catocin Creek, the Appo-
mattox River, and the Staunton River. See Va. Water Resources Center, Virginia Water
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mon lands with public lands and resources owned by state and fed-
eral governments. 17 9 A third approach uses the law of custom to
explain common rights and public interests m certain resources.180
Law: A Functional Analysis with respect to Quantity Management, Special Report No. 7, at
9 (Feb. 1979). Strong opposition to the scenic rivers program has precluded other rivers
from receiving this special status. Id.
179. The federal government owns over one-third of all land in the United States. U.S.
Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land, app. F (1970). The
uncertain status of this land and of the public's rights and obligations towards it led to the
appointment of the Public Land Law Review Commission, 43 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964), and the
subsequent issuance of a lengthy report. For an analysis of the report, see Symposium
Presenting an Analysis of the Public Land Review Commission Report, 6 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 1-457 (1970). Commentators have taken a wide range of stances with respect to the
management and administration of these public lands. See Juergensmeyer & Wadley, supra
note 23, at 376-80.
180. The law of custom developed in feudal England long before a formal legal system
provided legal recognition to certain usages exercised by the people. The basic premise of
the doctrine of customary rights was that, because the usage must at one time have been
conferred upon the people by a legal authority, it now merited formal recognition. To war-
rant legal recognition, the usage had to be reasonable, certain, continuous, acquiesced in,
peaceably enjoyed, consistent with other customs and laws, and of immemorial duration. J.
BROWN, THE LAW OF USAGES AND CUSTOMS §§ 20, 25, 27, 30-31 (1881); 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 77-78 (Oxford 1765). The doctrine has been virtu-
ally uniformly rejected in the United States because it was developed to protect the expec-
tancy interest of those whose rights were created before the establishment of a recording
system, and because the requirement that the custom be immemorial was interpreted as
meaning that the custom commenced with the reign of Richard I (1189). Graham v. Walker,
78 Conn. 130, 61 A. 98, 99 (1905); Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor & Council of
Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (1975); Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125 (1825);
Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Harris v. Car-
son, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 632, 639 (1836). Recently, however, one court invoked the doctrine to
uphold public use of shoreline areas. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). See
generally Niven, Beach Access: An Historical Overview, 2 N.Y. SEA GRANr L. & POLICY J.
161 (1978); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. Rav. 564 (1970). Thornton demon-
strates how the various theories interact and often become confused. See note 178 supra.
The law of custom presents probably the best explanation of how common rights devel-
oped in the legal system. It essentially was used to ratify the reasonable expectations of
ordinary people by giving legal recognition to usages that were traditionally and widely ac-
cepted in a particular community. However, once the law found a common right had been
created by custom, it then recognized the right as a property interest. Eventually, this
meant that the law of custom was not needed to justify the common rights. By the time of
the American Revolution, some common rights existed independently of the law of custom.
In a sense, then, the law of custom served merely as a means to an end.
Indeed, a distinction must be made between the theoretical development of common
rights under the law of custom and the acquisition of rights of common by customary right.
Under English law a right of common, once recognized, was considered to be a profit a
prendre, which could not be acquired by custom. 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Custom
and Usage 1 431 (1975); J. GRAY, THE RULE. AGAINST PERFErurrms § 579, at 560 (4th ed.
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The various approaches adopted by the courts quite obviously
have created confusion and uncertainty about the nature and scope
of the commons concept.
In recent years several commentators have attempted to clarify
the law of public interests in natural resources and to unite the
various judicial approaches by advancing one legal theory. Known
by courts and commentators alike as the public trust doctrine,181
this theory first appeared in Martin v. Waddell, s2 a major Su-
preme Court opinion decided in 1842. As explained by the Court,
the concept of public trust evolved primarily from early English
common law, under which the Crown held title to tidal lands and
waters for the public benefit. English law apparently developed
this concept primarily to protect people's interests in tidal waters
from encroachment by the nobility."1 Any serious deprivation of
these interests by the Crown crippled the peasant economy be-
cause tidal waters provided the people with their principal means
of transportation and with an important food source.' Further,
inasmuch as "common property" included things incapable of be-
mg possessed, except perhaps in a transient sense, title to common
property logically could only be vested in the sovereign power for
the benefit of those people who ultimately exercised dominion and
control over it.1 85
In Martin v. Waddell the plaintiff, a lessee of Waddell, brought
an ejectment action against Martin and others, claiming as owner
1942). This rule was adopted to prevent land from being subjected to burdens in favor of
successive classes of persons who could not release the right. Attorney-General v. Mathias,
70 Eng. Rep. 241, 246 (V.C. 1858).
The commons concept also has been applied to Indian lands and specific resources, such
as air and water, incapable of ownership. For a discussion of various interpretations of the
commons concept see Juergensineyer & Wadley, supra note 23, at 367-80.
181. The leading advocate of this theory is Professor Sax. See Sax, The Public Trust
Doctnne in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MiCH. L. REv. 473
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax, The Public Trust]; Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from
its Historical Shackles, 14 U. CAL. D.L. Rav. 185 (1980). For a recent case recognizing the
validity of the doctrine with respect to federal lands under navigable waters, see Puyallup
Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 525 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
182. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
183. Id. at 409-16.
184. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); Borough of Neptune v.
Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, _, 294 A.2d 47, 52 (1972).
185. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (1821); Borough of Neptune v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61
N.J. 296, -, 294 A.2d 47, 52 (1972).
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the exclusive right to take oysters from lands below the high water
mark of a navigable tidal river located in New Jersey. Waddell's
title traced back to two charters granted from Charles II to his
brother, the Duke of York, to establish a colony in the New World.
Under the terms of the original charters, the King conveyed to his
brother all interests in the territorial lands and waters, as well as
all powers of government.186 Eventually, through a later convey-
ance, the Crown reacquired the powers of government to the terri-
tory originally conveyed to the Duke of York but did not reacquire
the private proprietary interests. The defendants also claimed the
exclusive right to take oysters from the disputed land under a lease
executed with the state of New Jersey pursuant to an 1824 act. In
that statute, the state legislature declared that certain shores and
submerged lands be set aside for the cultivation of oysters. The
designated area included the disputed land.187
The Supreme Court admitted that the "right of the king to
make this grant [to the Duke of York], with all of its prerogatives
and powers of government, cannot, at this day, be questioned."188
It was, however, "proper to inquire into the character" of the
rights claimed by the Crown and conveyed to the Duke.18 9 This
inquiry, in turn, required considering whether the King had the
power and intent to convey dominion and control to navigable wa-
ters, and the soils under them, so as to create an exclusive right of
fishery in the grantee and defeat any public interests in the
waters. 9 '
The Court first concluded that, prior to the conveyance to the
Duke of York, the Crown held title to the territory covered by the
charters "in his public and regal character as the representative of
the nation, and in trust for them."19 Accordingly, when the King
passed all proprietary interests in the territory, together with his
powers of government, to the Duke of York to create a colony, the
King must have intended that all interests m the territory also be
held in trust by the Duke of York for the "common use of the new
186. 41 U.S. at 407-08.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 408-09.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 410-11.
191. Id. at 409.
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community about to be established."192 To hold otherwise, accord-
ing to the Court, would be contrary to the reasonable expectations
of settlers, who were accustomed to having protected rights in nav-
igable waters in England and who would not expect to emigrate to
America only to find that all of the valuable water resources had
been privately appropriated.19
Under English law, one of the rights traditionally reserved for
the common use was the right of fishery. Further, even assuming
the King had the power to defeat the people's common rights by
granting an exclusive fishery, any grant made in derogation of pub-
lic rights was to be strictly construed."9 In the words of the Court,
it would require very plain language in these letters patent to
persuade us that the public and common right of fishery in navi-
gable waters, which has been so long and so carefully guarded in
England, and which was preserved in every other colony
founded on the Atlantic borders, was intended, in this one in-
stance, to be taken away. s
Using this rule of construction disfavoring the destruction of the
common right of fishery, the Court concluded that when the pow-
ers of government were restored to the Crown the right of common
fishery passed back as an incidence of the sovereign powers. This
conclusion necessarily followed from the absence of language
clearly indicating that the right of fishery was severed and re-
tamed. Thus, when the people of New Jersey assumed the powers
of the sovereignty after the Revolution, they acquired, in their sov-
ereign capacity, all the royal rights and incidences not effectively
conveyed away, including the common right of fishery. The state,
as trustee of the people's common rights, had the power to regulate
this right by, among other things, providing for the leasing of the
192. Id. at 411.
193. Id. at 414.
194. Id. at 410-11. The right of the Crown to alienate interests in tidal waters and the
soils beneath them was controversial. Most authorities appeared to conclude that, at least
since the adoption of the Magna Carta, the Crown could not grant exclusive interests, in-
cluding fisheries, in tidal waters. See td. at 410. See generally J. ANGELL, A Tm TISE ON THE
RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 20-21 (Boston
1826); M. HALE, supra note 60, at 376, 386-87; W McKECHNIE, supra note 94, at 343-48; S.
MOORE, supra note 63, at 720; S. MOORE & H. MOORE, supra note 99.
195. 41 U.S. at 414.
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exclusive rights to oyster beds to Martin and the other
defendants.196
The Supreme Court's treatment of the public trust doctrine in
Martin raised several important questions. First, because Martin
involved the Court's interpretation of several English patents, its
decision raised the question of whether the public trust doctrine
also applied to state grants. The doctrine arguably could have had
a limited effect on state conveyances because, as the Court con-
ceded, state grants must "be tried and determined by different
principles from those which apply to grants of the British crown,
when the title is held by a single individual in trust for the whole
nation. ' 197 Second, assuming states did hold property in public
trust, the decision left undefined the nature and extent of the
state's duties and powers over public trust property.
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois"9 ' partially answered these
questions. In Illinois Central, the state attorney general instituted
an action m equity against the Illinois Central Railroad and the
city of Chicago to determine the rights of the parties in lands re-
claimed from Lake Michigan and used by the railroad, as well as in
lands submerged under Lake Michigan and comprising most of the
Chicago harbor. The defendant railroad clauned to have absolute
title to the lands in dispute because of an act passed by the Illinois
legislature in 1869 for the purpose of constructing bridges and
other structures. The Act's language was very broad, providing
that "all the right and title of the State of Illinois in and to the
submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan" were
granted "in fee" to the railroad.' 99 In exchange for the interests
conveyed under the Act, the railroad agreed to pay rent and to
avoid creating navigational obstructions. 200 A map depicting part
of the land conveyed characterized some of it as "Public ground
for ever to remain vacant of buildings."'20 1 In 1873, the state legis-
lature repealed the Act, thereby questioning the validity of both
196. Id. at 416-17.
197. Id. at 410-11.
198. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
199. See id. at 406 n.1.
200. Id. at 406-07 n.1.
201. Id. at 392.
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the 1869 and 1873 acts.20 2
In holding that the state legislature could not convey such a
broad, absolute interest to the railroad, the Supreme Court re-
ferred to the well-settled principle "that the ownership of and do-
minion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters" passed
to the various states after the Revolution.0 " Consequently, the
state had the right to regulate or dispose of any of the tidal lands,
but only so long as it could be done "without substantial impair-
ment of the interest of the public in the waters, and subject always
to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation. '20 4
The Court then considered whether the "tidal" nature of the wa-
ters was central to the above principle by focusing on the defini-
tion of navigability under English law. Noting that in England the
"ebb and flow of the tide constitute[d] the legal test of the naviga-
bility of waters,2s0 5 the Court concluded that this definition would
not be rationally related to geographical conditions in the United
States, where there are a large number of navigable nontidal water
bodies. The Court reasoned that the key to the above principle was
not the tidal nature of the waters but rather the navigability of the
waters. Therefore, the principle should be equally applicable to
lands under navigable, nontidal water bodies such as the Great
Lakes. As the Court explained, the doctrine was developed to pre-
serve "to the public the use of navigable waters from private inter-
ruption and encroachment, a reason as applicable to navigable
fresh waters as to waters moved by the tide."206
After the Court extended the state sovereignty doctrine to all
navigable waters and the lands underneath them, it began to ex-
amme the nature of the state's title. In an oft-quoted passage, the
Court stated:
[Title to soils under navigable waters] is a title different in char-
acter from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale.
It is different from the title which the United States hold in the
public lands which are-open to preemption and sale. It is a title
202. See id. at 410-11. The defendant argued that the repealing act violated the contracts
clause of the Constitution. Id. at 418.
203. Id. at 435.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 436.
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held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or in-
terference of private parties.2 7
Further, although the state may grant parcels of submerged lands
to private parties to build wharves, docks, or other structures
designed to aid navigation, the state may not "substantially impair
the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. '20 8
Abdication of state control of navigable waters and submerged
lands in a harbor as valuable as Chicago was, in the Court's view,
"a gros* perversion of the trust over the property under which it is
held. '20 9 The Court explained:
Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust
which requires the government of the State to preserve such wa-
ters for the use of the public. The trust which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which
the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer
of the property.210
The Court declared the attempted cession of the state's ownership
interests in the disputed lands to be inoperative because the 1869
Act substantially impaired the public interest. The only rights ac-
quired by the railroad under the Act were those limited interests
needed to accomplish the enactment's stated purposes. In addi-
tion, the legislature's actions did not impair a valid contract be-
cause any grant of lands under navigable waters made in violation
of the public trust would be revocable, if not void.2 11
207. Id. at 452.
208. Id. The Court apparently adopted the "substantial impairment" standard to recon-
cile conflicts over state power to control lands under navigable waters. See zd. at 453-54.
209. Id. at 455.
210. Id. at 453.
211. Id. at 444, 453, 455. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the
Supreme Court delineated a three-part test for determining whether legislative action vio-
lates the contracts clause. First, a valid contractual obligation must exist. This obligation
may arise from a statute if the legislature had the "intent to create private rights of a con-
tractual nature enforceable against the State." Id. at 17 n.14; see Rivera v. Patino, 524 F.
Supp. 136, 143-44 (N.D. Cal. 1981)(concluding that to create a contractual obligation the
statute must represent more than an exercise of the state's police powers and must involve
"a voluntary, bargamed-for exchange" between the parties). Second, the legislative action
must impair the contractual obligation. Third, the impairment of the contractual rights
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There are several conflicting ways to interpret the Court's deci-
sion in Illinois Central. For example, certain language in the opin-
ion suggests that the Court is distinguishing between navigable
water resources, on the one hand, and lands generally owned by a
state or federal government, on the other, in defining the scope of
the public trust doctrine.2 12 If interpreted in its narrowest light,
however, Illinois Central is nothing more than a restatement of
Illinois law which, as the Supreme Court indicates, would govern
allocation of water rights and uses in Illinois.215 Under this inter-
pretation, the only federal question concerns whether the Illinois
legislature's actions impaired a contract obligation in violation of
the United States Constitution.
Even under the latter interpretation, however, the opinion's lan-
guage concerning the state's obligations as sovereign with respect
to navigable waters and lands is necessary to the decision. In Illi-
nois Central, the Court used the public trust doctrine to explain
why the legislative grant was facially void, or at least revocable by
subsequent legislative action. This explanation relates to the es-
sence of the state's obligations as a sovereign and to the validity of
its legislative process, and thus represents more than an impair-
ment of contracts case.
Although each state as sovereign has jurisdiction and dominion
over all navigable waters and lands within its boundaries, Illinois
Central demonstrates that there are outer limits beyond which a
state cannot pass in regulating these resources. At a minimum the
public trust doctrine requires a state to assume some responsibility
for resource management on behalf of the public. Total abdication
of these managerial duties is impermissible.
A broader interpretation of the Court's decision in Illinois Cen-
tral is difficult to support. The Court recognizes that title to navi-
gable waters and lands is somehow different than title to lands
generally held by the state and intended for sale,214 thus suggesting
that the former may be inalienable. Yet the Court's adoption of
the substantial impairment standard, as well as its repeated refer-
must not be reasonable or necessary. The Court in Illinois Central appears to have rejected
the railroad's impairment argument because no valid contractual obligation existed.
212. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 452.
213. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 43 (1894).
214. 146 U.S. at 452.
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ences to situations where the state could convey interests in public
trust property, supports the conclusion that the decision does not
hold certain trust property to be inalienable.2 15 The clear factual
situation presented in Illinois Central also weakens the broader
interpretation. Illinois Central was a relatively easy case for the
Court to decide, given the state's total abdication of its rights and
responsibilities. In addition, a broad interpretation would be in-
consistent with the nature of the commons concept, which was the
progenitor of the public trust doctrine. As mentioned earlier, the
commons concept developed as a flexible device for defining the
public's rights in certain resources to maximize resource use and
meet the economic needs of lords and peasants alike. As the needs
of the public and the economy changed, the nature and scope of
the commons concept also fluctuated. If the public trust device
could be used to declare resources inalienable, then the commons
concept no longer would serve the important economic policies
that led to its development.
Even if Illinois Central does not stand for the proposition that
state citizens have an inalienable interest in certain water re-
sources, it reiterates a point established in Martin and other cases:
any grant that destroys public interests in navigable waters and
lands is to be construed strictly and read as containing an implied
reservation of public rights not expressly conveyed away. Further,
those parties taking an exclusive right in public trust property take
subject to the remaining public rights.216
The Illinois Central decision unfortunately leaves several impor-
tant questions unanswered. This failure may be due in part to the
clear factual situation, which did not force the Court to address
several key aspects of the public trust doctrine. The decision, for
example, never clearly defines public trust property. As mentioned
earlier, some have construed Illinois Central as limiting the public
trust doctrine to lands under navigable waters. The Court's state-
ment that federally owned public lands are different from lands
held by a state in trust for its people certainly supports this inter-
215. See id. at 452, 453, 457 (grants of fisheries allowed, as well as grants of submerged
land to construct docks, wharves, and other similar structures); Deveney, supra note 60, at
61.
216. See 146 U.S. at 457-58; 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 178, at 223-25.
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pretation, as does the Court's expansion of the scope of the English
public trust doctrine to all navigable waters.
The Court's discussion of the public trust concept, however, con-
tains serious problems. For example, the Court generally ignores
the English commons concept, especially the fact that common or
public rights also existed under English law in lands other than
those under tidal waters. The Court also inadequately examines
the public trust doctrine's theoretical underpinnings. Further, the
Court's explanation of the substantial impairment standard sug-
gests anomalous results. Under its explanation, it appears that the
Court would have reached a different result if the legislature peri-
odically made a series of conveyances to the railroad for small par-
cels of submerged land, instead of granting a large quantity of land
in one conveyance. The aggregate effect, however, remains the
same.
Finally, the decision does not define what public uses warrant
protection under the public trust doctrine. Even the narrowest
reading of Illinois Central classifies the use of waters for naviga-
tion and commerce as protected public rights. Less clear is the sta-
tus of the right of fishery. In its discussion of the public trust con-
cept, the Court describes the state as holding title to navigable
waters and the soils under them in trust for the people "that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry commerce over them,
and have liberty of fishing.121 7 Thus, the right of fishery appears
to be included expressly within the scope of the public trust doc-
trine. Later in the opinion, however, the Court quotes from Stock-
ton v. Baltimore & New York Railroad,218 a case that uses "liberty
of fishing" as an example of a public use that could be granted
exclusively to private parties without substantial impairment of
the public interest. According to Stockton, after the fisheries were
granted the "land remained subject to all other public uses as
before, especially to those of navigation and commerce, which are
always paramount to those of public fisheries. '219 Thus, although
the Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois Central suggests that the
"liberty of fishery" is a public interest protected by the public
217. 146 U.S. at 452.
218. Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y. R.R., 32 F 9 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887).
219. Id. at 19-20, quoted zn Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 456-57.
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trust doctrine, it also implies that the right of fishery can be con-
veyed to private parties without violating the substantial impair-
ment standard. This conclusion makes sense in light of the basic
difference between the right of fishery and the right of navigation,
a difference that is inherent in the nature of the things being used.
Although in their natural state fish are not possessed by anyone,
they are capable of being possessed. A watercourse, however, never
can be possessed, at least not in the corporeal sense.220
Almost two years after the Illinois Central decision, the Su-
preme Court reconsidered the public trust concept in Shwely v.
Bowlby 221 In Shwely, the Court considered whether a grant from
the United States passed title to land below the high water mark
so as to prevent a subsequent state grant from passing the same
land. Before concluding that the United States grant did not pass
any interest in property below the high water mark, the Court dis-
cussed in detail the evolution of the public trust concept both in
England and in the United States. According to the Court, the En-
glish common law provided, since the time of Lord Hale, that the
King as sovereign held title to all tidal waters and lands below the
high water mark, just "as of waste and unoccupied lands. '222 This
proprietary interest was better known as jus prwatum. However,
as representative of the people, the King also held the right of do-
minion over these tidal resources for the public benefit. This royal
interest was called the jus publicum. As the Court explained, the
dual nature of the Crown's interests m the tidal waters and lands
arose because
[s]uch waters, and the lands which they cover are incapable
of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and improve-
ment; and their natural and primary uses are public in their na-
ture, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and
foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the king's
subjects. 223
After the Revolution this common law principle became the rule
220. Once again, the common law appears to borrow, perhaps unknowingly, from Roman
legal concepts. Cf. text accompanying note 50 supra.
221. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
222. Id. at 11.
223. Id.
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of law in the federal system as well as in the original states, unless
otherwise modified.224 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the federal
government held title to all lands outside the boundaries of the
original states "for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for
the several States to be ultimately created out of the Territory."22 5
The lands under tidal waters were subject to special trust duties
because they were "incapable of cultivation or improvement in the
manner of lands above the high water mark," and because they
were "of great value to the public for the purposes of commerce,
navigation and fishery ",226 Accordingly, congressional grants of
land bordering navigable waters would not convey "of their own
force" any rights below the high water mark.221 7
The Shwely decision is important for several reasons. First, con-
sistent with the Court's earlier decision, it appears to limit the
public trust doctrine to navigable waters and to lands below the
high water mark. Both the Court's language and reasoning support
this interpretation. The Court's explanation that tidal waters and
lands are "incapable of ordinary and private occupation," and
therefore are public by nature, applies to few resources other than
nontidal navigable waters, the lands beneath them, and perhaps
marshlands.228 Second, the Shively opinion, more than prior deci-
sions, recognizes the immense public value of tidal resources, espe-
cially the shore. Throughout its opinion the Court emphasized the
public importance of these resources for commerce, navigation, and
fishing.229 Finally, the decision supplies the theoretical background
missing in the earlier decisions. For the first tune the Court ex-
amined in detail not only the English common law approach, but
also the positions of the original states. One factor, however, may
limit Shwely's precedential impact. The grant questioned in
Shively was between the United States, a sovereign, and a private
party. Many disputes involving common rights, however, will arise
between two private parties.2 0
224. Id. at 14.
225. Id. at 57.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 58.
228. See id. at 11, 57.
229. See, e.g., id. at 11, 49, 57.
230. 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 178, at 223-25; see 152 U.S. at 10.
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Before discussing how Virginia law has dealt with the public
trust doctrine and the commons concept, several comments about
the federal approach must be made. In Martin, Illinois Central,
and Shwely, the United States Supreme Court stated that it devel-
oped a theory of public rights derived from English common law.
The public trust doctrine, however, did not exist under early En-
glish common law, at least not as the Court explains it. Rather, the
English legal system used the concept of commons to protect pub-
lic rights and interests in various resources. This concept differs in
several significant respects from the public trust doctrine.
For example, under the public trust doctrine the state holds le-
gal title to certain resources, while its citizens have an equitable
interest. By contrast, the commons concept gives a class of people
the legal right to make use of another's land. Although the lands
subject to common rights originally were owned by the community
or state, by the mid-1600's private parties had appropriated most
of these lands. Title to lands subject to common use therefore usu-
ally was vested in private parties, not the state.
Second, whereas the Supreme Court appeared to limit the public
trust doctrine to navigable waters and the soils beneath them, the
commons concept applied to other types of resources as well. In-
deed, the concept first developed in England as a tool for sus-
taining the agrarian economy As this function gradually lost its
importance, the English courts and scholars devoted more atten-
tion to common rights in tidal waters and lands.
Finally, because the two doctrines place legal title to appropriate
resources in different parties, they sometimes serve different pur-
poses. The public trust doctrine splits legal and equitable owner-
ship between a state and its citizens, and can be applied to a wide
range of resources and interests, including: (1) interests so intrinsi-
cally important to every citizen that private control runs contrary
to the nature of our democratic form of government (for example,
the right of navigation); (2) resources that are incapable of being
corporeally possessed, except perhaps in a transient sense (for ex-
ample, watercourses); (3) resources that are not possessed by an
individual but that are capable of dominion and control (for exam-
ple, wild animals, wildfowl, and fish); and (4) resources that are
public in nature, either because of their unique characteristics (for
example, natural wonders) or because they are incapable of ordi-
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nary use and occupation (for example, the shore).2"' Although use
of common lands for farming and grazing during feudal days ar-
guably is consistent with the interests included in the first category
because collective use of land was necessary for survival, such
would not be the case today. This calls attention to an important
characteristic of the public trust doctrine-its tremendous flex-
ibility The public trust doctrine may be more capable of respond-
mg to changed needs than the commons concept because the pub-
lic trust doctrine less clearly defines the nature of the public's
equitable interests. The various kinds of common rights, however,
were well defined and regulated by the English legal system.23 2
The nebulous nature of the public's interest under the trust doc-
trme enables the public uses protected by the concept to fluctuate
more easily, thus allowing the doctrine to respond better to
changes in societal needs. If, for example, the demand for environ-
mental areas that are aesthetically pleasing and suited to recrea-
tional uses drastically increases while the supply of such lands sub-
stantially decreases, these areas arguably would fit within the first
category of the public trust property described above.
Although history demonstrates that the commons concept is a
flexible device, the strong ownership interests of private parties in
lands subject to common use limit the amount of change that can
occur. Indeed, in our predominantly private property system, pri-
vate ownership interests tend to obscure common rights, making
their identification difficult. Advantages nonetheless flow from the
commons concept. The concept, for example, interferes less with
our system of private enterprise and ownership because the state's
role is minimized. Also, by superimposing various public rights on
privately owned land, the concept reduces the state's costs of
maintaining and regulating the burdened land."'
Regardless of whether the public trust doctrine or the commons
concept is used to define the public's interests in various natural
resources, both theories similarly affect private rights. The two
concepts recognize that certain public rights exist intrinsically;
231. See Sax, The Public Trust, supra note 181, at 484-85.
232. See notes 129-133 & accompanying text supra.
233. Accord, RoYAL REPORT, supra note 26, 106-08 (recommending that parties having a




these public rights actually limit, rather than regulate, the extent
to which private rights are recognized. Stated differently, under
the two theories private rights are subordinate to certain public
rights and generally may be impaired without compensation by the
exercise of these public rights.2
IV. THE COMMONS CONCEPT AND PUBLIC RIGHTS IN VIRGINIA
As explained earlier, the English transplanted the public rights
concept into the American colonies. After the American Revolution
each state assumed jurisdiction and control over all lands and wa-
ters within its territorial limits, except to the extent that the state
surrendered rights to the federal government pursuant to the
United States Constitution. Regulation of the lands and waters
generally was, and still is, a matter of state law.2 5
The historical evidence presented in part H. A. of this Article
establishes that common rights existed in Virginia both before and
after it became a state. Additionally, the evidence demonstrates
that those common rights often combined traits of both the tradi-
tional English commons concept and the public trust doctrine. For
example, grants establishing common lands usually referred to the
right of a class of people to use certain common lands, and not to
their right to own those lands, thus suggesting that the public's
interest was more similar to an easement than to a beneficial own-
ership. Some of these grants, however, also placed management
duties in a "trustee," and if the trustee failed to manage the com-
mons properly for the use and benefit of the local inhabitants, he
was subject to removal.23
Perhaps this hybrid nature confused the Virginia courts, but for
whatever reason, Virginia's position on common rights and the
public trust doctrine is far from clear. Some opinions of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court indicate almost total acceptance of the con-
cepts, while others demonstrate a reluctant acceptance, if not out-
right rejection.2
234. See, e.g., Oliver v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 538, 542, 178 S.E. 48, 53 (1935); cases
discussed m text accompanying notes 300-336 tnfra.
235. See text accompanying notes 196, 203-204 supra.
236. 12 HENINGo'S STATUTES, supra note 27, at 603; 10 td. at 135-36.
237. Compare Avery v. Beale, 195 Va. 690, 80 S.E.2d 584 (1954) with James River
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The leading Virginia case on the public trust doctrine is Com-
monwealth v. City of Newport News." 8 In Newport News, the
state sought to restrain Newport News from dumping untreated
sewage into the Hampton Roads River. The state's primary argu-
ment was that the state held title to the lands under navigable
waters in trust for state citizens. By emptying untreated sewage
into a navigable watercourse, Newport News was substantially im-
pairing various public rights, including the right of fishery 2"
In denying the state relief, the Supreme Court of Virginia se-
verely limited the public trust theory as applied to Virginia water
rights. Although the Virginia Supreme Court recognized that the
United States Supreme Court adopted the public trust doctrine in
Martin v. Waddell and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the
state judiciary construed the public trust concept narrowly, limit-
ing its scope to the right of navigation, and perhaps fishing. The
court explained its reluctance to adopt the public trust doctrine by
initially observing:
It is questionable whether the interposition of the conception
of a trust in these cases serves any useful purpose or tends to
clarity of thinking or correctness of decision
It may be of some assistance in helping the mind to grasp
limitations upon the powers of the state over its tidal
waters and their bottoms; but it wholly fails to prove or account
for the existence of such limitations 240
The court further pointed out that even if the Crown held cer-
tam lands and waters in trust for navigation and fishing, important
differences existed between the Crown and the State of Virginia.
Unlike the King, the state was a sovereign entity, having "acquired
not only the powers, prerogatives and rights of the British crown,
but also the powers and rights held by the people collectively
[and] exercised by the Parliament."2 41 The State of Virginia thus
acquired "full and complete proprietary right" in all lands and wa-
Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924)
and McCready v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 985, aff'd, 94 U.S. 391 (1876). See also
In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
238. 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932).
239. Id. at 527-29, 531-32, 164 S.E. at 690-92.
240. Id. at 539-40, 164 S.E. at 694.
241. Id. at 540-41, 164 S.E. at 694-95.
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ters, except as limited by the Federal Constitution. 4"
According to the court, if a public trust existed, it must have
arisen from the Federal Constitution or from a limitation imposed
on the sovereign state by the Virginia Constitution or its laws.
243
The United States Constitution provided, implicitly at least, the
basis for imposing a trust on navigable waters and their beds for
navigation. This trust relationship arose from the constitutional
power granted to the United States to regulate and control naviga-
tion and commerce among the states, as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Illinots Central.2
44
Whether the state constitution imposed a public trust on state
lands and waters was a more complicated question. In answering
this question, the court first made some general observations about
the nature of the state sovereignty. Noting that the purpose of a
constitution was to provide for the orderly exercise of government
and not for its abdication, the court concluded that it would be "a
perversion of the Constitution to construe it as authorizing . the
Legislature or any other governmental agency to relinquish, alien-
ate, or substantially impair the sovereignty," its inherent
rights, or its power to govern. Such protected "incidences" of the
sovereignty included the state's "police power, the power or right
of eminent domain, and the power to make, alter and repeal
laws. 12 4 5 Having defined some of the general principles governing
the relationship between a sovereignty and its constitution, the
court then focused on state powers over public domain. According
to the court, the state held two rights in the public domain. First,
as a sovereign, the state had "the right of jurisdiction and domin-
ion for governmental purposes over all the lands and waters within
its territorial limits. ' 246 Second, as a proprietor, the state had "the
242. Id. at 541, 164 S.E. at 695.
243. The court rejected classifying rights such as the rights of navigation and fishery as
"natural rights," stating.
If the basis for the trust or a limitation of the power of a state or its Legisla-
ture can be found only in the so-called natural law, it is beyond the power
of courts to enforce it. If it has any existence, it is enforceable only by force of
arms, or by the forces of nature, or by divine power.
Id. at 542-43, 164 S.E. at 695.
244. Id. at 543-44, 164 S.E. at 695-96.
245. Id. at 545-46, 164 S.E. at 696.
246. Id. at 546, 164 S.E. at 696.
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right of private property in all the lands and waters within its ter-
ritorial limits . of which neither it nor the sovereign state to
whose rights it has succeeded has divested itself. 241 7 The court re-
ferred to the first right as the jus publicum and to the second as
the jus prwatum.
The court interpreted the jus publicum as including all of those
property rights which were inherent in and incidences of state sov-
ereignty These inherent rights of the jus publicum were the rights
of the people and could not be substantially impaired or destroyed
since the people collectively comprised the sovereign. Thus, any
legislative grants of rights or interests in property belonging in the
public domain, including tidal waters and their bottoms, were sub-
ject to whatever rights were included in the jus publicum." 8 To
this extent then, the court conceded that a kind of public trust
existed. In the words of the court:
The Legislature, of course, owes to the people of the State a
most solemn duty to administer the jus privatum of the State
and to exercise its jus publicum for the benefit of the people;
but this is a very different thing from asserting that the
Legislature holds any part of the public domain m trust for any
particular use or for the use by the people m common for any
purpose.249
The practical effect of this public trust, however, was limited since
the state had broad discretion in determining what rights were in
the public benefit.
After defining the state interests in the public domain, the court
then specified the rights included in the jus publicum. According
to the court, only a few public rights of use were part of the jus
publicum, and those that were not could be regulated or trans-
ferred by the state to private parties so as to destroy the public
rights. The court reasoned that the right of navigation probably
was part of the jus publicum because it bore "a relationship to the
right of liberty, which comprehends the right to move freely" and
therefore is "an inherent and inseparable incident" of the sover-
247. Id.
248. Id. at 546-47, 164 S.E. at 696-97.
249. Id. at 549, 164 S.E. at 697-98.
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eignty 2 50  The right of fishery, on the other hand, was not "any
more an incident of the jus publicum than the right to take game
in the forest or use the unappropriated uplands for pasturage. 2 51
The court classified this right as a public use primarily because the
public shared the right of enjoyment. Once a party successfully ex-
ercised the right, however, he converted the property into private
property As part of the jus prwatum, the General Assembly could
grant the right of fishery exclusively to a private party, or could
permit the tidal waters and bottoms to be used to impair or de-
stroy their use as fisheries. The court then concluded that the de-
fendant was not violating any public rights since the General As-
sembly had authorized Newport News's sewage discharge into
Hampton Roads. 52
Although the court's analysis in Newport News clearly shows
that the court spent considerable time dealing with the difficult
issues before it, the decision is troubling in several respects. First,
the court states that the public trust theory can arise only from
one of two sources: (1) "the operation of a law ordained by a power
which has a dominion over the public domain of the state superior
to the sovereign authority of the state"; or (2) state law. 253 Yet, in
considering Virginia law, the court focused only on the state con-
stitution, ignoring relevant statutory and common law. The court
apparently believed that any limitation on the power of the sover-
eign state should come from the constitution. Many different legal
principles, however, at least indirectly limit a sovereign's power.
Statutes, for example, sometimes waive the sovereign immunity
that a government traditionally enjoys. 25 In addition, state consti-
tutions, more than their federal counterpart, need to be inter-
preted in light of statutory and common law. As one state constitu-
tional law scholar explained, "A state- constitution is not a code of
laws. It should be confined to the fundamentals of government,
250. Id. at 550, 164 S.E. at 698.
251. Id. at 551, 164 S.E. at 698.
252. Id. at 551-52, 555-56, 164 S.E. at 699-700.
253. Id. at 541-42, 164 S.E. at 695.
254. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.031
(1977) (completely waiving all state and local immunity from all liability, not just tort liabil-
ity)(cited m Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
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leaving statutory detail to the statute books."2 5 5 In recent years,
Virginia's constitutional draftsmen appear to have adopted this
tenet.256
Even assuming that the state constitution is the only appropri-
ate source for the creation of a limitation like the public trust con-
cept, that document need not expressly create the limitation. It
may be implied or emanate from the document and from the form
of government that the document seeks to establish. Judicial inter-
pretation of the Federal Constitution has proceeded by relying on
this principle.257
Finally, as the court conceded, a State Constitution "is based
upon the pre-existing laws, rights, habits and modes of thought of
the people who ordained it, and the fundamental theory of sover-
eignty and of government which has been developed under the
common law; and must be construed in light of this fact."258 One
of the "rights" or "habits" found in pre-existing law pertained to
the public's interests in certain natural resources, as expressed in
the commons and public trust concepts. The Virginia Supreme
Court's treatment of these public interest concepts is cursory at
best. Although some scholars would support the court's conclusion
that the law cannot recognize limitations on a sovereignty arising
from a body of natural laws,259 this conclusion assumes away the
255. Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193, 196
(1972) (citations omitted).
256. See Commission on Constitutional Revision, Report on the Constitution of Virginia
9-10 (1969); Howard, supra note 255, at 196-97.
257. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
are classic examples of this practice.
258. Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. at 545, 164 S.E. at 696. One legal
scholar argues in several articles that, at least until the Civil War, there was an understand-
ing that certain unwritten "higher law" principles had constitutional stature. Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 717 (1975). Grey also maintained
that a prominent part of the framework within which the legal system operated when
America became self-governing was the idea of legally binding, but unwritten, constitutional
principles. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 893 (1978). For a general discussion of vari-
ous approaches to federal constitutional interpretation, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST (1980).
259. See generally J. ELY, supra note 258, at 48-54. The Virginia Supreme Court relies
on an excerpt from T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONS'rrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1972) in con-
cluding that natural law principles alone cannot be used to limit a sovereignty's power. 158
Va. at 542 n.1, 164 S.E. at 695 n.1. Although Cooley provides some support for the court's
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question. The commons concept indeed may have originated in
natural law. The Romans justified their protection of various pub-
lic interests on natural law principles. By the American Revolu-
tion, however, some of the public rights had achieved legal recogni-
tion as valid property interests.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central
supports this statement, as do the opinions in Waddell and
Shwely. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, discounts the fed-
eral Court's discussion of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Cen-
tral, stating that the Supreme Court must have been "confused" in
"inadvertently" declaring that a state held navigable waters and
lands in public trust.260 If the state court is accurate in its charac-
terization of the Supreme Court's discussion of the public trust
concept, the Supreme Court's confusion was pervasive, for the Illi-
nois Central opinion contains several strongly worded passages ar-
ticulating the state's trust obligations.6 " Indeed, the Court in Illi-
nois Central extended the trust doctrine's traditional scope in
applying it to the bed of Lake Michigan.
Additionally, the Virginia Constitution specifically refers to the
public trust concept in section 3 of article XI, which provides:
The natural oyster beds, rocks, and shoals in the waters of the
Commonwealth shall not be leased, rented, or sold but shall be
held m trust for the benefit of the people of the Commonwealth,
subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General As-
sembly may prescribe, but the General Assembly may, from
time to time, define and determine such natural beds, rocks, or
shoals by surveys or otherwise.262
position, he primarily deals with a court's power to declare specific legislative acts unconsti-
tutional. Commonwealth v. City of Newport News did not involve a constitutional challenge
to any legislative act. Indeed, if accepted, the public trust doctrine would sustain the valid-
ity of a legislative act authorizing the city of Newport News to discharge its sewage into the
Hampton Roads River.
260. 158 Va. at 539, 164 S.E. at 694.
261. See text accompanying notes 207-211 supra.
262. VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 3; see 158 Va. at 553, 164 S.E. at 699. The oyster trust provi-
sion first appeared in the Virginia Constitution of 1902. VA. CONsT. art. 13, § 175 (1902).
The Constitition of 1870 contained a related provision prohibiting the state from taxing its
citizens for "the privilege of taking or catching oysters from their natural beds." VA. CONST.
art. 10, § 2 (1870). The language of the 1902 oyster trust provision resulted from a short
debate over the language of a version proposed to the Constitutional Convention. The pro-
posal provided protection for "natural oyster beds, rocks and shoals in the waters of this
1982]
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Despite this constitutional provision, the Virginia Supreme Court
concluded that the state constitution did not adopt the public
trust concept to limit the state's power to dispose of or use water
resources. According to the court, the constitutional provision only
prohibited "the legislature from authorizing, permitting or suffer-
ing a prwate use to be made" of the natural oyster beds, rocks,
and shoals.2"' It did not restrict the legislature's power to use those
resources for public purposes where the public use was authorized
by law. One legitimate use was discharge of sewage into tidal wa-
ters.264 Although section 3 of article XI is limited to "natural oys-
ter beds, rocks, and shoals," its use of the public trust language
suggests that the concept existed at common law. The provision's
narrow application does not necessarily mean that Virginia law re-
jects application of the public trust doctrine to additional re-
sources. Rather, it could signify simply that the doctrine is being
elevated to constitutional stature in one particular situation to fur-
ther enhance the legal protection given to natural oyster beds,
rocks, and shoals.
Besides failing to consider common law principles enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court, such as the commons concept,
the Virginia Supreme Court also ignored its own precedent. Earlier
opinions of the Virginia Supreme Court referred to the public trust
State, as at any time defined by law." II Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention of Virginia, 1901-1902, at 2880 (1906). At least some parties to
the Convention feared that the phrase "at any time defined by law" would fix permanently
the status of oyster beds once they were determined to be natural beds. One Convention
delegate noted that a survey authorized by the General Assembly had mistakenly deter-
mined some beds to be natural and others to be planting grounds. The delegate maintained
that under the proposed version such mistakes could not be rectified. Id. at 2881. The Con-
vention, apparently attempting to assuage these fears, amended the provision by deleting
the phrase and adding: "but the General Assembly may from time to time provide by law
for surveys to define such natural beds, rocks and shoals." Id. at 2880-81.
263. 158 Va. at 553, 164 S.E. at 699 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 554, 164 S.E. at 699. The court's conclusion that the provision did not restrict
the legislature's power to use the oyster beds for public purposes may have been correct, but
not for the reasons given by the court. Under the public trust doctrine, certain public uses
(those within the jus publicum) are superior to other public uses, as well as to private inter-
ests. See notes 207-210, 222-227, 248-252, & accompanying text supra. The proper inquiry
therefore should have been whether the discharge of sewage was a public use superior to the
public use of oystering. Article XI of the state constitution arguably answers that question
in the negative. Although the court suggested that the right to discharge sewage was part of
the jus publicum, id. at 554, 164 S.E. at 699, it did not base its decision on that suggestion.
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doctrine in more favorable terms. In Taylor v. Commonwealth,265
for example, the court approvingly quoted from Martin, Illinois
Central, and other cases discussing the public trust concept. In
Taylor, a riparian owner sued the Commonwealth, alleging that
her riparian rights were being violated by an artesian well con-
structed for withdrawing and selling water to the city of Rich-
mond. The well was in front of the plaintiff's riparian land be-
tween the low water mark and the line of navigability of the York
River. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court stated that the
"[C]ommonwealth holds as trustee a vast body of land covered by
the flow of the tide, precisely as in the case before us, for the bene-
fit of her citizens. It is not only her right, but her duty, as such
trustee, to render this property productive. ' 216 Although recogmz-
ing that the riparian owner had certain rights beyond the low
water mark, the court concluded that the riparian proprietor could
not exercise these rights "capriciously and arbitrarily," without re-
gard for the rights of others. One of these rights was the state's
right to develop soil resources underneath the York River "for the
common benefit of all of its citizens. ''267
Before ruling for the state, the court suggested that the result
may have differed if two private parties were involved.268  This
suggestion further highlights the court's reliance on the public
trust doctrine. Without that doctrine, the court could not have re-
solved the conflict between the respective rights of the riparian
proprietor and the state in the state's favor because the state
would not have had an interest.
Other decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court rendered before
Newport News also adopted the spirit, if not the legal principles,
of the public trust concept.269 Given that these earlier supreme
court decisions accepted the concept of common or public rights
more readily than the later opinions, and that common rights is an
ancient concept, perhaps the opinions closer in time to the colonial
265. 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904).
266. Id. at 775, 47 S.E. at 881.
267. Id. at 776, 47 S.E. at 881.
268. Id. at 776-77, 47 S.E. at 882.
269. See Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d 23 (1955); Commonwealth v. Gar-
ner, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 624 (1846).
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and early statehood periods should be entitled to more weight.27 0
Finally, the court ignored statutes specifically enacted to protect
common rights. The first major legislation protecting common
rights was an 1780 General Assembly act. Entitled "An act to se-
cure to the publick certain lands heretofore held as common," it
provided:
WHEREAS certain unappropriated lands on the bay, sea, and
river shores, in the eastern parts of this commonwealth, have
been heretofore reserved as common to all the citizens thereof,
and whereas by the act of general assembly entitled "An act for
establishing a land office, and ascertaining the terms and man-
ner of granting waste and unappropriated lands," no reservation
thereof is made, but the same is now subject to be entered for
and appropriated by any person or persons; whereby the bene-
fits formerly derived to the publick therefrom, will be monopo-
lized by a few individuals, and the poor laid under contribution
for exercising the accustomed privilege of fishing: Be it therefore
enacted by the General Assembly, That all unappropriated
lands on the bay of Cheasapeake, on the sea shore, or on the
shores of any river or creek in the eastern parts of this common-
wealth, which have remained ungranted by the former govern-
ment, and which have been used as common to all the good peo-
ple thereof, shall be, and the same are hereby excepted out of
the said recited act, and no grant issued by the register of the
land office for the same, either m consequence of any survey al-
ready made, or which may hereafter be made, shall be valid or
effectual in law, to pass any estate or interest therein.27 1
As the Act's preamble indicates, the General Assembly enacted the
statute to clarify the effect of a prior land grant act on common
lands and rights. 272 Enacted in 1779, this earlier legislation estab-
lished a land grant office and provided a procedure for private ap-
propriation of waste and unappropriated lands. 78  Because the
270. The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this point. See Garrison
v. Hall, 75 Va. 150, 162 (1881).
271. Act of May 4, 1780, ch. 2, 1780 Va. Acts 226.
272. Accord, Garrison v. Hall, 75 Va. 150 (1881).
273. Act of May 3, 1779, ch. 13, 1779 Va. Acts 50. The Land Office Act allowed anyone to
purchase waste and unappropriated land at 40 pounds per 100 acres. Upon payment of the
consideration fee, the Auditor's Office issued the purchaser a warrant stating the acreage
purchased. The warrant authorized the county surveyor to locate and survey a tract of waste
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1779 Act did not exempt the shores of the Chesapeake Bay, the
sea, and rivers and creeks, private parties could acquire interests in
these lands. To the extent that they did, the public right of fishery
was restricted. By reserving certain shorelines for common use in
its 1780 legislation, the General Assembly ensured that all citizens,
including the poor, could continue to exercise their "accustomed
privilege of fishing. '27
4
The problem of private appropriation of the shore created by the
1779 Act may have been exacerbated by a reference in the records
of the 1679 session of the Colonial Assembly to the rights of pri-
vate riparian owners. The reference was made in response to a
complaint by a colonist, Robert Liny, who alleged that third par-
ties were interfering with his exclusive right to fish from the shore
of his land. The third parties asserted that they were entitled to
use the watercourse and the adjoining shore for fishing because the
King held title to the waterway. In granting Liny relief, the Colo-
nial Assembly stated:
[Ift is ordered and declared by this grand assembly that every
mans right by vertue of his pattent extends into the rivers or
creekes soe farre as low water marke, and it is a priviledge
granted to him m and by his pattent, and that therefore noe
person ought to come and ifish there above low water marke or
hale their sceanes on shoare (without leave first obtained) under
the hazard of committing a trespasse, for which he is sueable by
law.27 5
The broadly-phrased order arguably applied to all lands adjoining
rivers and creeks. If this was the case, then any grant obtained for
and unappropriated land. The completed survey and warrant were returned to the Land
Office where, if after six months no caveat had been entered against the warrant, the pur-
chaser received a grant. Legislation eliminated the land warrant system in 1952, thereby
prohibiting the issuance of warrants after July 1, 1952. VA. CODE § 41-1 (1953). Since 1952,
waste and unappropriated land can be sold only m proceedings in the circuit or corporation
courts of the county where the land is located. VA. CODE § 41.1-16 (1981). For a judicial
description of the land grant procedure see Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 166 S.E.
557 (1932), and Powell v. Field, 155 Va. 612, 155 S.E. 819 (1930).
274. The original version of the 1780 Act referred only to the privilege of fishing, thus
suggesting that fishing was the only valid common use. Later versions, however, extended
the scope of the commons reservation to include fowling and hunting. See Code of Virginia
ch. 62, § 1 (1849); Garrison v. Hall, 75 Va. 150, 163-64 (1881).
275. 2 HENING'S STATUTES, supra note 27, at 456.
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riparian lands pursuant to the 1779 Act automatically would ex-
tend to the low water mark regardless of whether the grantee lo-
cated his land warrant to include the shore.2 76 The Virginia Su-
preme Court has long puzzled over the meaning of the Robert Lrny
order, not knowing whether to interpret it as a legislative enact-
ment, a legal judgment, or an advisory opinion. The court's deci-
sions have been inconsistent.277
Regardless of how Virginia jurisprudence resolves the debate on
Lrny, it is clear that the boundaries of lands bordering the Atlantic
Ocean, the Chesapeake Bay, and Virginia rivers and creeks now
extend to the ordinary low water mark.2 78 In 1819 the General As-
sembly passed a statute that accomplished this result, apparently
for the purpose of erasing any "doubts" as to the "rights of own-
ers" of land bordering the above waters. The language of the stat-
ute, however, explicitly provided:
That nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit
any person or persons from the right of fishing, fowling and
hunting on these shores of the Atlantic ocean, Chesapeake bay
and the rivers and creeks thereof, within this Commonwealth,
which are now used as a common to all the good people
thereof 279
276. This approach would have been contrary to the majority position, which presumed
that grants of land abutting tidal waters extended only to the high water mark. Miller v.
Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 929, 931, 166 S.E. 557, 561, 562 (1932). See generally 1 H.
FARNHAM, supra note 178, §§ 36-61. As a practical matter, it seems that a private party
would not want his grant to include the intertidal strip or marshland because these areas
essentially were worthless from an agrarian standpoint. Once a party paid the fee for a
warrant, he was limited to the number of acres specified m the warrant and probably would
not want to waste this acreage on nonagrarian land. See Act of May 3, 1779, ch. 13, 1779 Va.
Acts 50, 52. Thus, if Ltny had general applicability, it increased the 1779 Act's infringement
on public interests.
277. Compare Garrison v. Hall, 75 Va. 150 (1881); French v. Bankhead, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.)
136 (1854) and Commonwealth v. Garner, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 624 (1846) (high water mark);
with Steelman v. Field, 142 Va. 383, 128 S.E. 558 (1925); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va.
759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904) and Waverly Waterfront & Improvement Co. v. White, 97 Va. 176,
33 S.E. 534 (1899)(low water mark). For a more complete discussion of the Robert Liny
order, see M. Livingston, Colonial Virginia Laws, Cases, and Grants Relating to Water and
Waterfront Lands (1981) (manuscript available at DePaul University College of Law, Cl-
cago, Illinois).
278. VA. CODE § 62.1-2 (1973).
279. 1 VA. CODE ch. 87, § 1 (Rev. 1819).
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Thus, while extending the boundaries of land on tidal waters to
the ordinary low water mark, the 1819 Act continued to preserve
the public's right to use the shore for fishing, fowling, and hunting
if the shores previously had been used in common.280
A third statute protects the public's common rights in "[a]ll un-
appropriated marsh or meadow lands lying on the Eastern Shore of
Virginia." Passed in 1888 and still applicable today, the Act pro-
vides that all lands, "which have remained ungranted, and which
have been used as a common. . shall continue as such common,
shall remain ungranted," and shall be subject to the right of the
people to "fish, fowl, or hunt. '28 1 The legislature apparently passed
the act to clarify the status of the public interest in certain mar-
shes and meadowlands. A previous act had modified the protection
of the 1780 Act by limiting its scope to "[a]ll the beds of the bays,
rivers and creeks, and the shores of the sea within the jurisdiction
of this commonwealth, and not conveyed by special grant or com-
pact according to law. '282
Although there is disagreement over whether the phrase "which
have been used as a common by the people of the state" represents
a legislative recognition that all such lands have in fact been so
used, or whether it represents a qualification of the kinds of lands
reserved by the Act, the statute provides further evidence that
common rights exist. Indeed, the 1888 Act appears to give greater
protection to the common areas falling within its scope than does
the 1780 legislation, as modified by the 1819 Act and subsequent
statutes.8 3 Whereas the 1780 Act reserves only a public right to
use certain lands owned by private parties, the 1888 Act reserves
280. A comparison of the development of the commons concept in Virginia and in Eng-
land reveals striking similarities. Initially, the concept m both places connoted a communal
ownership interest. However, as each land became more populated, the concept lost its
public ownership characteristics and acquired traits similar to an easement. Through its
adoption of the 1819 Act, the General Assembly completed the evolutionary process, making
it clear that, at least with respect to tidal shores, common lands signified lands privately
owned yet subject to certain public uses.
281. VA. CODE § 41.1-4 (1981) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 24, 1888, ch. 219).
282. Act of April 1, 1873, ch. 333, 1873 Va. Acts 310. The 1873 act repealed 1866 legisla-
tion authorizing the sale of common lands and thus reinstated, in modified form, the com-
mon lands reservation of the 1780 Act. See note 286 infra.
283. Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, Chancery No. 16, slip op. at 374 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb.
27, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1288 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1979).
1982] 903
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
all relevant lands from being granted. Further, unlike the present
version of the 1780 legislation, the 1888 Act does not contain a
phrase limiting the protected land to that "not conveyed by special
grant or compact according to law," thus suggesting that, at a min-
imum, the legislature expressly would have to repeal or amend the
1888 Act to convey the marshlands covered by the Act.2 8
Since 1780, the General Assembly has significantly altered the
protection accorded common rights under the 1780 Act. In 1802,
for example, the legislature extended the common lands exemption
to the "banks, shores, and beds of the rivers and creeks in the
western parts" of the state.285 Then, as mentioned earlier, in 1866
and 1867 the General Assembly enacted reconstruction statutes
that repealed the common lands reservation first codified in 1780
and authorized the sale of these previously protected lands.2 6 Not
until 1873 was the common lands legislation reenacted, with some
substantial modifications. In its revised form the statute provided:
1. All the beds of the bays, rivers and creeks, and the shores of
the sea within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth, and not
conveyed by special grant or compact according to law, shall
continue and remain the property of the commonwealth of Vir-
gina, and may be used as a common by all the people of the
state, for the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking and
catching oysters and other shellfish, subject to the reservations
and restrictions [hereinafter] imposed.287
284. Compare Act of April 1, 1873, ch. 333, 1873 Va. Acts 310 and VA. CODE § 62.1-1
(1973) with Act of Feb. 24, 1888, ch. 219, 1888 Va. Acts 273 and VA. CODE § 41.1-4 (1981).
285. 2 S. SHEPHERD, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 317 (Richmond 1835).
286. See Act of Feb. 28, 1866, ch. 44, 1865-1866 Va. Acts 160; Act of March 20, 1867, ch.
34, 1866-1867 Va. Acts 804-05.
287. VA. CODE ch. 62, § 1 (1873). A comparison of the 1873 and 1780 acts reveals some
significant revisions, including: (1) the deletion of the phrase "unappropriated lands" and
the use of the phrase "All the beds of the bays, rivers and creeks"; (2) the reservation of the
"shores of the sea," instead of the shores of rivers and creeks; (3) the inclusion of the lan-
guage "not conveyed by special grant or compact according to law," apparently in recogni-
tion of possible oyster, hunting, or fishing right grants, see Darling v. City of Newport News,
123 Va. 14, 28, 16 S.E. 307, 311 (1918)(Sims, J., dissenting); French v. Bankhead, 52 Va. (11
Gratt.) 136, 152-53 (1854); (4) the omission of hunting from the protected activities and the
addition of "taking and catching oysters"; and (5) the deletion of the language "which have
been used as a common." Arguably, the legislators made the last change because they con-
sidered it nonrestrictive and therefore unessential. Alternatively, it can be argued that pre-
viously only those lands used as a common could be reserved and that after 1873 this re-
quirement no longer was necessary. Also, the title of § 1 of the 1873 act contradicts the body
904 [Vol. 23:835
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The common lands statute in effect at the time of the Newport
News decision was substantially similar to the 1873 version." 8
Thus, even statutory law recognized the validity of public interests
in tidal resources.
Yet, even if the court m Commonwealth v. City of Newport
News accurately described Virginia law in 1932. the court's posi-
tion has since lost merit. Important changes have been imple-
mented in constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with
water policy. For example, the Virginia Constitution now declares
that "it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, de-
velop, and utilize its natural resources, its public lands, and its his-
torical sites and buildings" and "to protect its atmosphere, lands,
and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the ben-
efit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Common-
wealth."2" Section 2 of the article authorizes the General Assem-
bly to implement the broad policy of section 1, stating that "the
General Assembly may undertake the conservation, development,
or utilization of lands or natural resources of the Common-
wealth." e0 The drafters of section 1 apparently thought that it
of the act. Whereas the act is entitled "Ungranted shores of Chesapeake bay, and of the sea
and rivers or creeks, to be sold or rented by the board of public works as fisheries," the text
of the act itself refers to "[aill of the beds of the bays, rivers and creeks, and the shores of
the sea." According to the canons of statutory construction, the body of the act controls
because the code revisor, not the legislature, supplies the titles. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.03, 47.14 (4th ed. 1943 & Supp. 1981). See also VA.
CODE § 1-13.9 (1979)(headlines of sections are mere catchwords to indicate contents of stat-
ute and are not considered titles of statutes unless expressly provided); Chesapeake & Olo
Ry. v. Pew, 109 Va. 288, 293, 64 S.E. 35, 37 (1909)(the court, in referring to the 1904 code,
states that titles to acts are inserted by a compiler for convenience).
288. See VA. CODE § 3573 (1930)(current version at VA. CODE § 62.1-1 (1973)). The few
changes included the deletion of the word "and" that preceded "creek" in the earlier stat-
utes and the addition of the language "Subject to the provisions" of proceeding sections and
future acts of the General Assembly. Although the second change clearly was intentional,
the first change probably should not be construed as indicating a change in the statute's
meaning. Under the canons of statutory construction, there is a presumption that a change
in statutory language is to clarify the statute especially when the change is in a code, which
serves primarily to simplify the law. Also, if the modified language can be construed consist-
ently with the old wording, it should be interpreted as such. See IA C. SANDS, supra note
287, § 28.11. It is interesting to note that the earlier versions of the common lands statutes
were more clearly drawn, perhaps because they more accurately reflected common law
principles.
289. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
290. Id. § 2.
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would create a public trust in certain lands and waters. Indeed, the
records of the 1969 Senate debates that accompanied consideration
of section 1 of article XI indicate that one senator attempted to
modify the section's language by including a statement that "open
lands and waters" owned by the state were to be held in trust for
the people of the state. The article's floor sponsor opposed the
amendment because he believed the article already established a
"trust" for "public lands and waters."2 91 When these two constitu-
tional provisions are interpreted in light of the third section, which
establishes the trust for natural oyster beds, rocks, and shoals, the
floor sponsor's conclusion appears logical.292 When interpreted in
light of certain statutes enacted contemporaneously, the conclusion
becomes inescapable.
One key statutory provision is Virginia Code section 10-178
which is part of the Virginia Environmental Quality Act.2" After
providing that the section was passed "[iun furtherance of Article
XI of the Constitution of Virginia and in recognition of the vital
need of citizens . to live in a healthful and pleasant environ-
ment, '2 4 the provision then states:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth to
promote the wise use of its air, water, land and other natural
resources and to protect them from pollution, impairment or de-
struction so as to improve the quality of its environment. It
shall be the continuing policy of the government of the Com-
monwealth to mitiate, implement, improve, and coordinate
environmental plans, programs, and functions of the State in or-
der to promote the general welfare of the people of the Com-
291. Proceedings and Debates of the Senate of Virginia Pertaining to Amendment of the
Constitution 374-77 (extra session 1969, regular session 1970); see Howard, supra note 255,
at 219. A report on the proposed revision of article XI of the state constitution described the
"proposed Conservation article" as "making a statement of policy" and "removing possible
legal barriers to effective governmental programs." It also stated that the proposal "should
operate as part of the climate of state and private initiative to deal with such increasingly
important problems as air and water pollution, access to the countryside for recreation and
other purposes." Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision to His Excellency,
Mills E. Godwin, Jr., Governor of Virginia, The General Assembly of Virginia and the Peo-
ple of Virginia, H. Doc. No. 1, H. & S. Doc. 322 (1969); see notes 293-295 & accompanying
text infra.
292. See VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
293. VA. CODE §§ 10-177 to -186 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
294. Id. § 10-178 (1978).
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monwealth and fulfill the State's responsibility as trustee of the
enwronment for the present and future generations.295
Enacted shortly after article XI was amended, the above section
not only supports the floor sponsor's conclusion that a trust existed
for public lands and waters specifically, but suggests that the scope
of the trust also included environmental resources generally.
Another important Virginia statutory provision provides that
"[e]xisting water rights are to be protected and preserved," but
that this protection is "subject to the principle that all of the State
waters belong to the public for use by the people for beneficial pur-
poses without waste." 296 This statement recognizes that the public
has important interests in Virginia's water resources and that ex-
isting private rights "are to be. preserved subject to" the pub-
lic's ownership interests. Similarly, another statutory provision de-
clares that state waters are natural resources subject to regulation
pursuant to state police powers.29 7 Such regulation is "to be exer-
cised with a view to the welfare of the people of the State" and to
the public's "changing wants and needs." '298
In summary, the Newport News decision is questionable both
because of its analysis and because of the subsequent adoption of
important statutory and constitutional provisions granting greater
recognition to the public interest in water resources. The court in
Newport News, however, is correct in its description of the interac-
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. Id. § 62.1-44.36 (1973). Section 62.1-44.36 also provides that-
(2) Adequate and safe supplies should be preserved and protected for human
consumption, while conserving maximum supplies for other beneficial uses
(3) It is in the public interest that integration and coordination of uses of
water and augmentation of existing supplies for all beneficial purposes be
achieved for the maximum economic development thereof for the benefit of the
State as a whole.
Under the Code, the term "water" includes "all waters, on the surface and under the
ground, wholly or partially within or bordering the State or within its jurisdiction and wich
affect the public welfare." Id. § 62.1-10(a) (1973). Furthermore, § 62.1-10(b) defines "bene-
ficial use" to mean "domestic, agricultural, recreational and commercial and industrial
uses."
297. VA. CODE § 62.1-11(a), (b) (1973); see note 296 supra.
298. VA. CODE § 62.1-11(c) (1973). Also, the discharge of untreated sewage no longer is a
valid use of navigable waters under current federal and state law. See Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & 1979 Supp. III); VA. CODE §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:7 (Supp. 1981).
9071982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tion between the jus publicum and the jus prwatum. As the court
explained, when the state grants interests in tidal waters and lands
to private parties, those parties take subject to the jus publicum.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that the interest con-
veyed to the private party actually will be restricted or subordi-
nated to public rights. Rather, the private interests will be af-
fected only to the extent that there is a valid public right or
interest being jeopardized.
Under Illinois Central and Newport News, determining the ex-
tent to which a private interest should be restricted requires the
court to make three inquiries: first, whether a particular public use
should be protected as part of the jus publicum, and therefore su-
perior to conflicting private interests, or as part of the jus
privatum, and therefore subject to alienation to private parties;
second, assuming a valid public use exists, whether the private in-
terests substantially impair the public right; and third, whether
the substantial impairment is the result of a legislative decision to
use the resources for another valid public purpose.9 9
Regardless of how the conflict concerning the public trust doc-
trine is resolved, Virginia clearly must accept the doctrine to a de-
gree. Although after the American Revolution each state acquired
jurisdiction and dominion over all lands and waters within its
boundaries, Illinois Central establishes that each state bears non-
delegable responsibilities for navigable waters and lands. Yet,
under the doctrine, the state can both meet these responsibilities
and transfer interests in natural resources to private parties, as
long as the state does not violate the substantial impairment stan-
dard by, for example, totally disposing of its ownership interests or
abdicating its duties. Thus, if properly used, the doctrine provides
a flexible method for accommodating the interests of both public
and private parties.
Determing the extent to which the doctrine can be used in Vir-
ginia requires considering the kinds of public uses that the Virginia
299. For example, in Newport News, the court decided that the right of fishery was part
of the jus pnvatum, which meant that the public could exercise the right to the extent that
it had not been conveyed to private parties. Nonetheless, the court denied the state relief
because the substantial impairment of the public's right of fishery resulted from a legislative
decision to use the resources for another valid public use, sewage discharge. 158 Va. at 551-
52, 555-56, 164 S.E. at 698-700; see text accompanying notes 250-252 supra.
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courts protect. The most obvious public use protected by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court is the right of navigation. As previously men-
tioned, the public right of navigation arises from the federal consti-
tutional right to regulate navigation and commerce, and is part of
the jus publicum, such as it exists in Virginia.300 Whether this
right includes uses indirectly related to navigation is unclear. The
state courts have tended to construe strictly the scope of the navi-
gation right in the public trust doctrine, limiting, for example, the
power to improve navigable waters without compensating injured
riparian proprietors to improvements made for the purposes of
navigation, flood control, and power development.30 1
The Virginia Supreme Court, in Boerner v. McCallister,30 2 mdi-
cated that the right of navigation is the only public interest in nav-
igable waters.0" In Boerner, the plaintiff sought an injunction to
restrain the defendant from trespassing and fishing in the part of
the Jackson River that flowed through the plaintiff's property. The
plaintiff claimed to be the exclusive owner of the bed of that por-
tion of the river. The defendant argued that he merely was exercis-
ing the public's right to fish in navigable waters. In deciding for
the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff owned the bed pursu-
ant to a Crown grant conveying not only the lands bordering on
the river, but also "the rivers, waters and watercourses . . to-
gether with the privilege of hunting, hawking, fishing, fowling."'
Then, after noting that the defendant had not established the nav-
igability of the river, the court stated that "there is persuasive au-
thority to the effect that even though a stream may be floatable,
and in some instances navigable, the public interest is therein lim-
ited to the right of navigation.M0
5
300. See text accompanying notes 204 & 250 supra.
301. For example, in Oliver v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48 (1935), the
Virginia Supreme Court allowed diversion of navigable waters to improve navigation and
refused the compensation claims of several riparian owners although diversion would dimin-
ish the stream's flow. As the court explained, the impairment of the riparian land was
"merely incidental to the exercise of the servitude to which their property has always been
subject." Id. at 550, 178 S.E. at 53. See also Old Dominion Iron & Nail Co. v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 116 Va. 166, 81 S.E. 108 (1914).
302. 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
303. Id. at 174, 89 S.E.2d at 27.
304. Id. at 170, 89 S.E.2d at 24.
305. Id. at 174, 89 S.E.2d at 27.
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This statement lacks merit for several reasons. First, the court's
language concerning the scope of the navigability right is dictum
because the stream was unnavigable. Second, as mentioned earlier,
current statutory and constitutional provisions now provide greater
recognition of public interests in natural resources.30 Third, the
court in Boerner failed to conduct even a cursory examination of
the public trust doctrine as it originated through the commons
concept and as it developed in the American legal system. More-
over, when the court construed the Crown grant, it stated that
"[a]t the time of the grant [between 1749 and 1751] there was no
law preventing the conveyance" of watercourses.307  Yet by that
time the public trust doctrine had begun to develop and common
rights were regulated carefully in England. Finally, other Virginia
decisions indicate that the public interest in navigable waters is
broader than the right of navigation.
For example, Virginia courts have recognized sewage discharge
into navigable waters as a legitimate public use. Indeed, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. City of Newport News,
quoted approvingly another court's description of this use as "part
of the jus publicum."0 8 The Virginia Supreme Court in City of
Hampton v. WatsonsO9 made a similar reference. In Hampton, an
individual riparian proprietor sued the city of Hampton to recover
damages for pollution of navigable waters caused by the city's sew-
ers. The plaintiff claimed that the pollution was damaging the oys-
ter planting grounds that he had leased from the state. In ruling
for the city, the court held that under the public trust doctrine
Hampton had
the right to use the waters of Hampton creek for the purpose of
carrying off its refuse and sewage to the sea, so long as such use
does not constitute a public nuisance, and as such be discontin-
ued by the legislature, which has control over the extent to
which these waters may be so used.310
306. See text accompanying notes 262, 289-298 supra.
307. 197 Va. at 174, 89 S.E.2d at 26.
308. 158 Va. at 554, 164 S.E. at 699 (quoting Sayre Co. v. Newark, 60 N.J. Eq. 361, 45 A.
985 (1900)).
309. 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916).
310. Id. at 101, 89 S.E. at 82.
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The court explained that the "sea is the natural outlet for all the
impurities flowing from the land" and the public health demands
of the rapidly growing coastal cities "should not be obstructed in
their use of this outlet, except in the public interest." ' Moreover,
it declared that sewerage systems of well-settled areas have become
"an imperative necessity, a public right, which is superior to the
leasing by the state of a few acres of oyster land" to the plaintiff.31
The court, however, noted the well-established distinction between
pollution of navigable tidal waters and unnavigable streams, for
only the former are held by the state for the public use and
benefit."1 '
A similar result was reached in Darling v. City of Newport
News,3 14 where the Virginia Supreme Court once again denied re-
lief to a lessee of oyster planting grounds suing for damages to
those grounds caused by the city's sewer system. The court ex-
plained that the lessee acquired only a limited right to plant and
take oysters from the grounds. All other public rights were pre-
served, including the right of drainage. 815
311. Id.
312. Id. at 101-02, 89 S.E. at 82.
313. Id. at 90, 89 S.E. at 81.
314. 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918).
315. Id. at 19-20, 96 S.E. at 309. In a frequently cited dissenting opinion, Justice Sims of
the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the city should pay damages to the plaintiff "to
the extent of the just compensation required" under the Virginia Constitution for injury by
the state to private property interests. Id. at 40, 96 S.E. at 315 (Sims, J., dissenting). Al-
though Justice Sims agreed that the state held navigable waters and their beds for the pub-
lic benefit, id. at 23, 96 S.E. at 309 (Sims, J., dissenting), he also believed that the state had
the statutory right to transfer exclusive fishery rights to private parties. As Justice Sims
explained, upon obtaining independence from England the states acquired both the Crown's
and Parliament's powers, except as limited by the United States Constitution. Although the
Magna Carta prohibited the Crown from granting exclusive fisheries, it did not restrict Par-
liament's power to grant fisheries; the states therefore assumed Parliament's right. Id. at 23-
26, 96 S.E. at 310 (Sims, J., dissenting). Further, according to Justice Sims, "aside from the
public right of navigation," which derives from the. United States Constitution, "there is no
jus publicum, or public right, or public interest m tidal navigable salt waters or the beds
thereof, except as the public is permitted to enjoy by legislative sufference or legislative
grant." Id. at 26, 96 S.E. at 310 (Sims, J., dissenting). Under the facts of Darling, the plain-
tiff acquired a property right, the exclusive right to use oyster beds for planting, before the
city obtained its power to discharge sewage. Id. at 29, 38-39, 96 S.E. at 312-13 (Sims, J.,
dissenting). Tis fact enabled Justice Sims to discount City of Hampton v. Watson, where
the plaintiff acquired his oyster lease after the city began discharging sewage. Id. at 33, 96
S.E. at 313 (Sims, J., dissenting).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
DuPont Rayon Co. v. Rwhmond Industries,316 carried the reason-
mg of the above cases further by suggesting that the public right to
use a sewer system would be protected even though the city inhab-
itants were not riparians. In DuPont, a riparian manufacturing
corporation sued to enjoin a dyeing plant's waste discharge into
the James River through the Richmond sewerage system. Denying
the injunction, the Fourth Circuit stated:
If the waters of the stream become polluted from [public
sewage disposal], no right of the riparian owner is invaded, be-
cause Ins right to use such waters is subject to the superior right
of the public for it is clear under the law of Virginia that
neither the public health nor the industrial development of its
tidewater cities, both of which are dependent upon sewage dis-
posal, can be subordinated to the rights of a riparian owner to
make use of public waters for private purposes.317
The court found unpersuasive the plaintiff's argument that the de-
fendant was not a riparian owner and therefore had no right to use
the river for sewage. The court responded that "the inhabitants of
a city are not to be denied the right to use the public sewers emp-
tying into a tidal stream because they are not riparian owners on
such stream."318
The dissents analysis creates several problems. First, it fails to understand the essence of
the public trust doctrine and the jus publicum. Although the defendant city in Darling did
not acquire the power to discharge sewage into navigable waters until after the plaintiff
obtained his leasing interest, the state would have had this power before the plaintiff ob-
tained his interest. The key inquiry under the public trust doctrine should be whether the
state held powers and rights for the citizens' benefit, not whether it had delegated some of
this power to a local political unit. Second, the dissent ignores the common law origins of
the public trust doctrine, focusing only on whether the legislature has authorized a public
use. Under the common law public trust doctrine, any public rights not granted by the
legislature were preserved for the benefit of the people. See text accompanying notes 194-
195, 207-211, 218 supra. Further, as the dissent concedes, grants in derogation of public
rights must be strictly construed. See 123 Va. at 38, 96 S.E. at 314 (Sims, J., dissenting).
Third, the dissent's emphasis on the temporal priority of the plaintiff's interest closely re-
sembles principles of the prior appropriation doctrine. Virginia, however, is a riparian doc-
trine state. See note 318 infra.
316. 85 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1936).
317. Id. at 984.
318. Id. Like most Eastern states, Virginia adopted the common law riparian doctrine to
govern allocation of rights in natural watercourses. As explained by the Virginia Supreme
Court, this doctrine provides:
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Numerous cases also have referred to a public right or liberty of
fishing. For example, in McCready v. Commonwealth, 19 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia stated that a legitimate public use of the
soil below the low water mark was "the right of the people of the
state to take and plant oysters subject to the regulations of law. '3 20
McCready involved the validity of a legislative act prohibiting oys-
ter planting in state waters by any person not a citizen of Virgima.
The statute was challenged on constitutional grounds as being vio-
lative of both the privileges and immunities clause and the com-
merce clause. In rejecting the constitutional challenges, the Vir-
A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in con-
nection with this riparian estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed,
provided he leaves the current diminished by no more than is reasonable, hav-
ing regard for the like right to enjoy the common property of other riparian
owners.
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 467, 130 S.E. 408, 410 (1925)(quoting
Stratton v. Mt. Herman Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 88-89, 103 N.E. 87, 89 (1913)). The
basic premise of the riparian doctrine is that the right to use the water of a natural water-
course is "a right inherent in the [riparian] land." Mumpower v. City of Bristol, 90 Va. 151,
153, 17 S.E. 853, 854 (1893). In other words, water rights are vested property rights that are
created as an incidence of ownership of land through or by which natural watercourses flow.
Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 226, 8 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1940). As the above description
indicates, there are two basic components to the riparian doctrine. First, a riparian owner's
water use must be for the riparian land. Second, the riparian proprietor has the right to
make a reasonable use of the watercourse. See generally 2 H. FARNHAM, supra note 178, §§
461-474.
Most of the Pacific coast states have modified the common law by replacing the riparian
doctrine with the prior appropriation doctrine. Under the latter doctrine, watercourse rights
depend on the priority of the use. Generally those parties who first appropriate flowing
water and apply it for a beneficial purpose acquire a legally protected right. Thins principle
was more sensible in the arid west, where there often was insufficient water to satisfy all
riparian needs. See generally 3 id. §§ 649-695.
Recent cases also have supported the conclusion reached by earlier courts that a "riparian
right to use public waters is always subject to the superior right of the public to pollute
those waters for sewage disposal." In Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443, 446 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979), the Fourth Circuit rejected an argument that inter-
vening changes in Virginia law, specifically the state water quality law, weakened an earlier
line of sewage disposal cases. In Ancarrow, the court held that riparian owners were not
entitled to just compensation for impairment of their riparian rights because a riparian own-
er is subject to the public's superior right to dispose of sewage. (The State Water Control
Law is found in VA. CODE §§ 62.1-44.2 to .34:7 (Supp. 1981).) If a municipality uses naviga-
ble or public waters for sewage disposal, the city arguably also should be allowed to use
these waters for public drinking supplies. The latter use is as necessary to the public health
and development as sewage disposal.
319. 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 985, afld, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
320. Id. at 988.
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ginia Supreme Court held that the state had plenary power to
regulate soil use under navigable waters for purposes such as oys-
ter planting, as long as the exercise of that power did not interfere
with navigation and commerce.32 1 Although the court referred to
several public trust cases of the United States Supreme Court, in-
cluding Martin v. Waddell,3 2 2 it acknowledged that the public
trust doctrine's validity was disputed, stating: "It is a question of
no importance, as far as this case is concerned, whether the people
of Virginia were clothed with the legal title to the lands and waters
in question, or only had a beneficial interest in them or right to
their enjoyment."' 23 The key inquiry instead was whether the
state's citizens had a "proprietary right in common. 3 2 4 The an-
swer, according to the court, was that "[w]here private rights
do not exist to the exclusion of the common right, that of fishing
belongs to all the citizens or subjects of the state.' '1 2 5 This common
right was a property right, which was held by the state's citizens as
"tenants in common" and which did not have to be shared with
the people of other states.32 6
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, stating that the privileges
and immunities clause did not vest the people of one state with
"any interest m the common property of the citizens of another
State. 3 27 According to the Court, each state acquired exclusive do-
minion and control over the navigable waters and beds within their
boundaries after the American Revolution, except as limited by the
federal right of navigation. Virginia, therefore, had the right "to
appropriate its tide-waters and their beds to be used by its people
as a common for taking and cultivating fish."3 8 Further, when
such appropriation occurred, the state's citizens acquired "a prop-
erty right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship,"
which arose not only from their citizenship but also from property
321. Id. at 991.
322. Id. at 987-88.
323. Id. at 990.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 989.
326. Id. at 989, 993.





In Garrison v. Hall,330 the Virginia Supreme Court again consid-
ered the nature and extent of the public's interest in fisheries. Ac-
cording to the court, at common law "the public right of fishing
existed, and was common to all the people of the State," as long as
private parties had not acquired riparian rights in the area.33 1 The
land grant legislation of 1779 and 1780 altered this situation. As
mentioned earlier, the 1779 Act established a land grant office and
set up a procedure for granting waste and unappropriated lands.
This Act apparently included the shores of navigable waters within
the land grant process, so that the public right of fishery was re-
stricted to the extent that land was privately appropriated pursu-
ant to statutory procedure. Thus the 1780 Act was passed to pre-
serve the common right of fishery "which the people had been
accustomed heretofore to enjoy."33' According to the court, the ef-
fect of the Act was
to reserve the right of fishing, and by a liberal construction, of
fowling and hunting, being only coextensive therewith, as a com-
mon right to the people of the State, as an aquatic right on the
public waters, which embrace the shores and the lands adjacent
to them, so far as necessary for the enjoyment of those rights,
and to that extent excepted them from location and grant by
land office treasury warrant.333
The court's opinion in Garrison suggests that the right of fishery
was a pervasive right, well established by custom and usage. The
court refers to evidence indicating that the surveyor, in laying the
boundaries of the plaintiffs land, left a space between the bound-
ary and navigable waters apparently to accommodate the public
interests in fishing, fowling, and hunting.33' Although the court ap-
329. Id. The Court also concluded that the statute did not violate the commerce clause
because oyster planting and cultivation did not involve commerce. Id. at 396.
330. 75 Va. 150 (1881).
331. Id. at 159.
332. Id., see text accompanying notes 271-274 supra.
333. 75 Va. at 163.
334. Id. at 162. See Power & Kellogg v. Tazewells,'66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 786 (1875), which
considered the nature of the interest given to private parties by the various oyster statutes.
The court suggested that the interest was more than a revocable license because, inter alia,
the right to fish existed before the statutory enactments.
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peared hesitant to construe the public interest as including the
rights of fowling and hunting, other decisions have described the
right of fowling in all waters affected by the 1780 Act as "common"
to all state citizens.3 5 The court in Garrison, however, indirectly
reached the same result by interpreting the right of fishing as in-
cluding the rights of fowling and hunting. The court then inter-
preted the 1780 Act as reserving common rights in all lands "nec-
essary for the enjoyment of those rights," which may include land
above the high water mark."3 '
In summary, Virginia case law indicates that only a few public
uses are part of the jus publicum-the category of state property
interests arising from the state's sovereignty and therefore impos-
ing a duty on the state to its people and limiting private interests.
Public uses included within the jus publicum appear to be limited
to the right of navigation and the right to dispose sewage in navi-
gable waters. Most other public uses that can be made of natural
resources, including the rights of hunting, fishing, and fowling, ap-
parently are part of the jus prwatum. Although the Virginia courts
never explained fully how they reached their decisions on the sta-
tus of various public interests, their classifications appear consis-
tent with previous law. Though not clearly enunciated, the follow-
ing factors apparently play an important role in deciding whether a
public use should be part of the jus publicum or of the jus
privatum.3 3 7 First, a court considers the nature of the public use.
This inquiry requires asking whether the public use involves prop-
335. See, e.g., Meredith v. Triple Island Gunning Club, Inc., 113 Va. 80, 84, 73 S.E. 721,
723 (1912)(first describing the 1780 statute, then referring to the "right of fowling in these
waters," apparently meaning the waters affected by the 1780 Act). See also In re Steuart
Transp. Co., 495 F Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980)("Under the public trust doctrine, the State
of Virginia and the United States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the
public's interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from ownerslp of
the resources but from a duty owing to the people."). But see Coupland v. Morton, 5 ENvTL.
L. Rap. 20504, 20506 (E.D. Va. 1975)(No. 145-73-N), aff'd per curnam 5 ENVTL. L. REP.
20507 (4th Cir. 1975)(claiming that common rights of hunting, fishing, and fowling in all
property within several miles of the Atlantic Ocean is foolish given the tremendous commer-
cial development in the area).
336. 75 Va. at 163.
337. Tins analysis assumes that the court has determined the validity of the public use.
That is, it assumes that the public use of certain natural resources already has received legal
recognition and that the inquiry concerning the jus publicum and jus prwatum attempts to
discern the degree to which the use should be protected.
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erty that can be possessed by an individual (e.g., wildfowl or fish),
or whether the natural resource used cannot be possessed corpore-
ally by an individual, except perhaps in a transient sense (e.g., wa-
tercourses). If the property is capable of possession, the law must
allow private appropriation to maximize resource use. This is one
of the basic assumptions of our property system. If, however, the
law determines that the resource should be subject to a public in-
terest and not absolutely owned by a private party, it must struc-
ture its system of private appropriation in a manner that gives all
state citizens a reasonably equal opportunity to privately possess
the property 38 Virginia previously has accomplished this goal in
one of two ways: either by allowing all citizens to exercise the par-
ticular public use or by setting up a regulatory system allocating
exclusive use of the public right to a limited number of citizens
through leasing or licensing arrangements. The right of fishery, for
example, initially was available to the general public, but over time
has been increasingly regulated as an open allocation system led to
inefficient results.8 9
Second, a court should consider whether an obligation should be
inposed on a sovereign to govern use of certain natural resources
to ensure its citizens' survival and health. Previously, for example,
both early English and Roman societies imposed duties on the sov-
ereign to protect the people's interests in navigable waters. The
right of commerce and the freedom to travel by watercourse was
vital to the survival of both societies. Today, the United States
338. This surely is one of the points of Illinots Central. See text accompanying notes
198-211 supra.
339. Regulation of fishing existed as early as 1680 with "An Act restraining strikemg and
killing fish at unseasonable times," 2 HENING'S STATUTES, supra note 27, at 487, repealed by
3 id. at 30. By the 1800's regulation of fishing began to include the use of certain kinds of
nets. See, e.g., 3 S. SHEPHERD, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 173 (Richmond 1835)(regulating the
hauling of seines at certain places and within certain time periods) (amended 1836-1837 &
1839). Towards the end of the 1800's the General Assembly began to impose various licens-
ing requirements on those wishing to fish. See, e.g., 1879-1880 Va. Acts 162 ch. 66 (current
version in VA. CODE §§ 28.1-47 to -81 (1979 & Supp. 1981)) (tidal waters); 1910 Va. Acts 543
ch. 343 (current version in VA. CODE §§ 29-52 to -92 (1979 & Supp. 1981))(inland waters). As
the licensing requirements became more complex, the state legislature established various
regulatory bodies. Currently, regulation of fishing in tidal and inland waters is divided be-
tween the Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries, see VA. CODE §§ 29-3 to -23.01, -125 to
-182 (1979 & Supp. 1981), and the Marine Resources Commission, see VA. CODE §§ 28.1-1 to
-36 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
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Constitution implicitly recognizes the importance of this right in
the commerce clause, which limits the otherwise plenary powers of
the states over navigable watercourses within their boundaries.
The Virginia courts appear to recognize the right to discharge sew-
age into state waters as a right that the state as sovereign should
protect to insure the health of its people. As a corollary, this sec-
ond variable considers whether the resource is one that a free peo-
ple would want one party to control. Indeed, the preamble to the
1780 Act clearly established that this consideration was of para-
mount importance in the Act's passage.
CONCLUSION S40
The Nature Conservancy controversy is an excellent example of
the relevance of a largely forgotten, ancient concept. The commons
concept attained legal stature in English common law before
America was colonized. A somewhat nebulous legal doctrine, the
commons concept served as a means of ratifying people's reasona-
ble expectations by giving legal validity to property interests cre-
ated either by private agreement or by long usage and acquiesence.
The English legal system used the commons concept to elevate
what appeared to be at least a well-accepted practice, and at best a
private contractual right, to the status of a public property right.
Although common rights apparently developed in England initially
in the context of feudal manor lands, the rights also existed in
tidal waters and the lands underlying them. Further, just as the
rights first developed by private agreement, they also later were
extinguished by both private contractual arrangements and private
appropriation. The appropriation process eventually created a
conflict between the lords, who wanted to obtain exclusive use of
the common lands, and the peasants, who needed the common
lands to survive. The Magna Carta partially alleviated the ten-
sions of the competing interests by giving the peasants certain lim-
ited protection; it was Parliament, however, that eventually re-
solved the conflict by assuming full responsibility for common land
340. The following conclusory remarks are made primarily in light of the common law
development of the commons concept in England and Virginia, and generally without con-
sideration of statutory and constitutional changes in the concept, especially under Virgnia




The common rights concept was brought to colonial America
and, at least at the beginning of the colonization period, common
lands played an important part in the settlers' lives.3 ' Eventually,
however, the common right approach substantially yielded to pri-
vate ownership. Several factors contributed to the deterioration in
the importance of common rights. First, the commons concept de-
veloped in the context of the English feudal tenure system-a sys-
tem in which land played an integral role in maintaining the mili-
tary and governmental framework, in providing an important
source of revenues and in establishing the social hierarchy. Com-
mon rights gave peasants interests m the land and allowed them to
use property without requiring the Crown to transfer seisin, and
thus governmental power and social prestige. The feudal system,
however, never existed in the United States to the same extent as
m England. Second, there were bountiful resources in the New
World and a steady source of immigrants from the Old World to
replace those who did not survive the many perils of life in
America. The economic need for common rights was not nearly as
strong in the New World as it was in feudal England. Finally, per-
haps because of the independence of many American settlers, pri-
vate enterprise and ownership became the foundation of America's
property system. So, although common rights clearly existed in
colonial Virginia and America, they played a more limited role
than in England.
Once Virginia became a state sovereignty, its legislature passed a
series of statutes to protect the common rights of Virginia citizens,
primarily in tidal resources. Although the particular nuances of
each statute are beyond the scope of this Article, the statutes
demonstrate that, the commons concept remains viable. Similarly
designed state constitutional provisions support this statement.
Despite these statutes, constitutional provisions, and the common
law heritage of the commons concept, the Virginia Supreme Court
has only reluctantly applied legal protection to common rights and
has avoided interpreting that protection broadly. Nor has the court
341. In the Virginia colony, for example, there was no evidence of private land grants
before 1615. Juergensmeyer & Wadley, supra note 23, at 368; see notes 141-151 & accompa-
nymg text supra.
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fully accepted the statements of the United States Supreme Court
on public rights in natural resources.
The state court's reluctance is understandable in light of the
flexible, vague use of the commons concept, the absence of a clear,
theoretical underpinning, and the private ownership bias of our
property system. Yet, the concept's flexibility has assured its sur-
vival thus far by permitting it to respond to society's changing
needs. In Roman society, for example, the economy centered
around navigable watercourses, and common rights consequently
existed in watercourses and their underlying soils. In feudal Eng-
land, however, the agrarian economy caused the commons concept
to apply primarily to farming or grazing land. Since the concept
has been transplanted into America, the doctrine's focus has
shifted back to navigable waters and the soils underneath them. 42
Although the doctrine's vagueness may cause the state judiciary
to balk at the prospect of adopting it, the concept can be applied
in a legally responsible manner. For example, because the doctrine
developed in England and the Roman Empire in a property con-
text, it seems logical to apply the concept consistently with prop-
erty law policies. A traditional policy of property law, exemplified
by the law of custom, is to ratify people's reasonable expectations.
Determining reasonable expectations in the common rights context
requires focusing on evidence of common use, or the lack thereof,
depending on the burden of proof.3' 3 If there is no evidence of ei-
ther prior legal recognition or actual common use of common
rights in disputed resources, then subjecting the property to com-
mon rights would not ratify the public's or the private landowner's
reasonable expectations.
Another important property law policy, more clearly enunciated
342. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). This shift is logical in light
of the strong private ownership bias of our real property system.
343. Determining who bears the burden of proof partially depends on the theory used to
support the common rights. For example, under the prima facie theory, title to tidal waters
and lands was prima facie in the Crown. See text accompanying notes 107-110 supra. The
Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted the 1780 common lands statute as placing the bur-
den of proof on the party claimig that certain land falls within the common lands exemp-
tion. Garrison v. Hall, 75 Va. 150, 154 (1881). According to the court, "all lands wich
ha[ve] never before been patented are to be considered as waste and unappropriated "
French v. Bankhead, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 136, 168 (1854).
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in recent years, concerns efficient use of resources. 44 If the com-
mons or public trust doctrines were accepted and interpreted in
the broadest possible manner, then the allocation of resources sub-
ject to those doctrines arguably would be inefficient. The historical
development of the commons concept in England, for example,
demonstrates some of these inefficient results,3 5 including the
problem of the freerider, who willingly allows other commoners or
the private landowner to bear maintenance and management costs
to reduce his own costs and thus maximize his short-run benefits.
Another inefficient result is the individual user's failure to perceive
accurately the costs of increased use because the costs are spread
among the entire class while the benefits are measured only in
terms of individual gain.3 46 Finally, history demonstrates that the
costs of management are increased because all members of the
class of users have an interest in the common lands, and manage-
ment therefore must occur by consent. These inefficiencies could
be minimized by placing management duties in one entity, whether
it be the state as holder of legal title and trustee for the people, or
the private landowner.
In addition to the problems suggested by the English experience,
application of the commons concept in modem America raises
other unique economic considerations. A private landowner who
improves his land without notice of common rights has a tremen-
dous reliance interest at stake. Subjecting his proprietary interests
to common or public interests discourages future economic land
development. If, however, the private landowner had notice of the
common rights, either through deeds, other recorded documents,
actual use of the land by the public, or through any other legally
accepted method of putting a party on notice, then the proprietor
should be subject to the public's property rights just as with other
property interests. 47 By focusing on the status of the party who
344. See generally B. AcKERmAN, ECONOMIC FoUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAw (1975); H.
MANNE, TH ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (1975); R. POSNER, ECONOmIc ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2d ed. 1977).
345. See ROYAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 9-10, 14, 42-43, 45-47, 52-53, 67-68.
346. See note 29 supra.
347. Notice, for example, is important in determining whether a subsequent purchaser of
real estate can prevail against a prior purchaser. See generally 4 AMEaicAN LAw OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 17.4-.36 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Similarly, it is important in determining whether a
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purchased the disputed land after the creation of the common
rights, the legal system perhaps can strike an equitable balance be-
tween the competing interests.
Further, in addition to conducting a policy analysis of the viabil-
ity of the commons concept in our modern world, a court could
consider certain established principles discussed in this Article to
resolve Virginia common rights disputes. The common law back-
ground and the state's constitutional and statutory provisions
firmly established the existence in Virginia of common or public
interests in certain resources. So, the key inquiries in common
rights controversies should concern (1) whether a particular piece
of property is subject to common use and (2) if so, the nature and
scope of the use. The legal existence of common rights, however,
does not guarantee their continued existence, for the rights are not
indestructible. Regardless of the theory used to explain the com-
mons concept, the Virginia General Assembly, as representative of
the state's citizens and as partial successor to the English Parlia-
ment and Crown, generally has the power to regulate property sub-
ject to common rights. Although Illinois Central demonstrates
that this power is not absolute, the state legislature appears to
have the power to alienate, within limits, common rights to exclu-
sive, private use. The legislative provisions regulating common or
public rights in natural resources, however, must be interpreted in
light of their common law origins. For, while resolution of the sta-
tus of public interests in water resources ultimately may depend on
the philosophical predilections of the decisionmaker, the commons
concept deserves a thorough consideration of its common law his-
torical development.
remote purchaser of a lot m a planned subdivision is subject to various use restrictions on
is land, known m equity as equitable servitudes. See Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 540, 2
S.E.2d 355, 358 (1939); Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). See generally 2 AMERi-
cAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 9.24-.40 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Whether the party took his interest






Evidence of Common or Public Lands i W. Hening, The Statutes
at Large
1 HENING'S STATUTES 199 (1632)
In this Act, which prohibited the killing of wild hogs with-
out a license from the governor, the killing of deer and other
wild beasts or fowl was permitted "in the common woods, for-
ests, or rivers," to encourage training in the use of arms.
1 HENING'S STATUTES 230 (1642)
"The Declaration against the company to be entered as the
twenty-first act."
In this declaration the Governor and the Grand Assembly
sought to bar the Virginia Company from returning to power
in the colony. The declaration denounces the Company's con-
demnation of the King's grantees as "occupiers of our land
that is to say of the common land of us the said Treasurer and
Company." Id. at 232. The declaration later states: "We [the
Governor and Grand Assembly] cannot. . . give up and re-
sign the lands which we had granted and hold from the king."
Id. at 233.
Cary v. Brewer, 1 HENING'S STATUTES 548 (1660)
This order adjudges to the inhabitants of Stanley Hundred
a right of common to 50 acres on the plantation.
Case of Rob't Lmy, 2 HENING'S STATUTES 456 (1679)
"[I]t is ordered and declared by this grand assembly that
every mans right by vertue of his pattent extends into the riv-
ers or creekes soe farre as low water marke ..
3 HENING'S STATUTES 101 (1692)
"An act for Confirmation of Lands"
This Act recognizes a right of private proprietorship in un-
inhabitable marshes and sunken grounds. See also id. at 307,
527.
3 HENING'S STATUTES 419, 427 (1705)
"An Act continuing the Act directing the building of the
Capital and the city of Williamsburg; with additions."
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This Act directs that a sufficient quantity of land at each
port and landing place be left in common.
5 HENING'S STATUTES 68 (1738)
"An Act, for better securing the title of certain Lands to the
Feofees of the Town of York; and for settling the same, for a
Common, for the use of the Inhabitants of the said Town."
This Act, which creates a common at the Yorktown water-
front, traces the history of the common:
(1) The original survey of Yorktown denoted several unin-
habitable waterfront parcels as parcels "to be laid off for a
common shoar." Id. at 69.
(2) The Act also recognizes that from the time of the set-
tling of Yorktown to the time of the Act "the inhabitants of
the said town, have always used and enjoyed the aforesaid
small parcels of land . . as and for a common." Id. at 70.
(3) The Act finally declares that those particular waterfront
parcels "shall be . . and remain, as and for a common
for ever." Id. at 71. See also E. Riley, The Founding and De-
velopment of Yorktown 1691-1781, at 200 (1942)(Ph.D. disser-
tation University of Southern California).
5 HENING'S STATUTES 191, 192 (1742)
"An Act, for establishing the Town of Richmond.
This Act establishes an area adjacent to the river to be held
forever as a common for the use and benefit of the inhabitants
of Richmond.
7 H.NING'S STATUTES 424, 427-28 (1761)
"An Act for further enlarging the town of Dumfries
This Act empowers the trustees to lay off and assign any
unimproved and unsold lots for a market place and a
common.
8 HENING'S STATUTES 613 (1772)
"An Act to encourage the further settlement of the town of
Alexandria
This Act forever vests the wharf at Point West in the trust-
ees of Alexandria who are directed to run it and free the pub-
lic from any future expense associated with the wharf.
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10 HENING'S STATUTES 35, 39 (1779)
"An Act for adjusting and settling the titles of claimers to
unpatented lands under the present and former government
This Act grants, en masse, to each settlement in the western
part of the colony 640 acres of common land adjacent to the.
settlement until each settlement can make a representation of
their particular case to the general assembly
10 HENING'S STATUTES 134 (1779)
"An Act for establishing the town of Boonsborough, in the
County of Kentuckey"
This Act establishes the town of Boonsborough and states
that "six hundred and forty acres of land allowed by law to
every such township for a common may also be laid off adjoin-
ing thereto."
10 HENING'S STATUTES 226 (1780)
"An Act to secure to the publick certain lands heretofore
held as common."
This Act excludes from any future grant lands on the Ches-
apeake Bay, the seashore, or shores of rivers and creeks which
previously had been held as common.
10 HENING'S STATUTES 279, 285 (1780)
"An Act for emitting and founding a sum of money for sup-
plying the present urgent necessities of this commonwealth."
This Act concerns raising money for the war effort. The Act
specifies that, in the event taxes prove unproductive, the capi-
tol and palace in Williamsburg, and the public lands in James
City County and on the Eastern Shore, are to be sold.
11 HENING'S STATUTES 29, 29-30 (1782)
"An Act to establish a town at the courthouse in the county
of Buckingham."
Buckingham Courthouse is established with the provision
that four of the lots in the center of town "shall be, and they
are hereby reserved for the public use of the said county." It
further provides that 100 acres adjoining the town are vested
in the trustees to the common use and benefit of the
inhabitants.
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11 HENING'S STATUTES 58 (1784)
"An Act to amend the act for erecting a Light House on Cape
Henry."
This Act directs that a lighthouse be erected at Cape Henry
and that the adjoining land be vested in the trustees to be
held as common.
11 HENING'S STATUTES 399 (1784); 2 Code of Virginia ch. 36, at
414 (rev 1819)
"An Act directing the sale of the public lands and other
property in or near the city of Richmond."
This Act directs the sale of public lands, with the proceeds
to be used for the erection of public buildings.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 97 (1785); 2 Code of Virginia ch. 47, at
423 (rev. 1819)
"An Act for the sale of certain public lands."
In this Act, public lands in York and Elizabeth City Coun-
ties are directed to be sold.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 207 (1785)
"An act to repeal the act of assembly for establishing the
town of Walkerton."
Land previously directed to be held by the town's trustees
as a common is revested in the legal representatives of John
Walker.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 208-09 (1785)
"An act for establishing the town of Clarksburg in the county
of Harrison."
One-half acre is directed to be appropriated by the trustees
for the establishment of a courthouse.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 218 (1785)
"An act for giving further powers to the trustees of the town
of York."
The trustees of the town of York are empowered to dispose
of lands previously held by the town as common.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 227 (1785)
"An act to empower Robert Mackey and John Peyton to
build upon and convey certain lots in the common annexed
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to the town of Winchester"
The title of this Act describes its content.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 495-96 (1787)
"An act directing the sale of certain public lands."
Public lands in James City and Northampton Counties are
directed to be vested in commissioners charged with the sale
of those lands.
12 HENING'S STATUTES 603 (1787)
"An act to explain and amend the act for establishing the
town of Boone's Borough in the County of Kentuckey."
This Act explains that 70 of the 640 acres vested in the
trustees are to be laid out and sold as lots; the remainder are
to be held in common.
13 HENING'S STATUTES 173, 175 (1790)
"An act authorizing several lotteries, and the sale of certain
lots in the town of Portsmouth."
The Act permits certain lots belonging to the Common-
wealth to be sold by lottery, the proceeds to be used to build
schools, churches, and roads.
13 HENING'S STATUTES 524 (1792)
"An act to amend an act entitled, An act authorizing the ex-
ecutive to direct the sheriffs to sell certain Lands the prop-
erty of this 'Commonwealth.'"
The Act directs that public lands are not to be sold by the
sheriffs except when the proceeds of the sales equal the debts
incurred by the public.
HENING'S SUPPLEMENT 443 (circa. 1748-49)
"An act establishing a town at Hunting Creek in Fairfax
County."
This Act establishes Alexandria and directs the trustees to
set apart portions of land for a market place and a public
landing.
HENING'S SUPPLEMENT 447 (circa. 1748-49)
"An act to empower the Vestry of the Parish, of Newport in
the County of Isle of Wight to sell the Glebe Lands in the
said Parish and to purchase a more convenient glebe in lieu
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thereof "
The title of this Act describes its content.
Later Acts
Code of Virginia ch. 37, at 415-23 (rev 1819)
"An act directing the sale of certain public lands, and for
other purposes."
This Act, along with its amendments, directs that the pub-
lic land be sold and appoints commissioners to carry out the
Act.
Code of Virgmia ch. 41, at 31 (1850-51)
"An act amending the Code of Virginia."




Evidence of Common or Public Lands in Various Historical Jour-
nals and Books
A. The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography
Abstracts of Virginia Land Patents, 1 VA. MAG. HIST. & Bi-
OGRAPHY 82 (1893-94)
This discussion of the early land patent and grant system
mentions the grant of public lands in colonial Virginia.
Instructions to Governor Yeardley, 1618, 2 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 154 (1894-95); A. EMBREY, WATERS OF THE STATE 9
(1931) [hereinafter cited as A. EMBREY]
These instructions from the Virginia Company to the new
Governor, Sir George Yeardley, make several references to
common and other public land:
(1) Yeardley was to lay out 3,000 acres of the Governor's
land and 3,000 acres of the Company's Land. 2 VA. MAG.
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY at 155-56; A. EMBREY at 9-10.
(2) In each borough an additional 3,000 acres of the Com-
pany's land were to be laid out to be worked by Company te-
nants. 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY at 157; A. EMBREY at 11.
(3) Each borough was to have 100 acres of glebe land. 2 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY at 158; A. EMBREY at 12.
(4) Each borough was to have 1,500 acres of common land
to be known as the Borough's Land. 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG-
RAPHY at 158; A. EMBREY at 12.
(5) The instructions pronounce that occupiers of land with-
out a grant from the Virginia Company are deemed occupiers
of the common lands of the Company. 2 VA. MAG. HIST. BIOG-
RAPHY at 162; A. EMBREY at 15; see 1 HENING'S STATUTES 230.
(6) The Company reserved the right to later enlarge the
acreage of Glebe and Borough Lands. 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & Bi-
OGRAPHY at 163; A. EMBREY at 15.
Instructions to Berkeley, 1642, 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
281 (1894-95)
These instructions to the colonial Governor direct that each
Virginia congregation have a parsonage house and 200 acres of
"Gleable lands." The instructions also direct the reassignment
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of lands formerly granted to public society Id. at 285.
Ballagh, Book Review, 3 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 434,
436 (1895-96)(white servitude in the colony of Virginia)
This book review mentions the communal manner in which
land was held and worked in the early years of the colony See
also V. DABNEY, VIRGINIA THE NEW DOMINION (1971); 22 WM.
& MARY. Q. 89 (1913-14).
Robinson, Notes from the Council and General Court
Records 1641-1664, 8 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 162 (1901)
Glebe land of the Bristol and Hampton parishes is men-
tioned. Id. at 165. Action regarding the glebe land of the
Henrico parish also is mentioned. Id. at 166.
Robinson, Notes from the Council and General Court
Records 1641-1678, 9 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 44 (1901-
02)
These records of the General Council direct that the glebe
lands be laid out for the parishes of Marston in York County
and Middleton in James City County The Council ordered
that marshland in James City remain in common for a pas-
ture. Id. at 45.
Virginia Council Journals, Dec. 21st, 1738, 14 VA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 241, 242-43 (1906-07)
This journal reports the vesting of a small parcel of land on
the waterfront in the feofees of Yorktown to be used as a com-
mon. See also 5 HENING'S STATUTES 68.
Miscellaneous Colonial Documents, 18 VA. MAG. HIST. & BI-
OGRAPHY 57-59 (1910)
This is the petition of inhabitants of Princess Anne County,
signed between 1770 and 1772, asking the Council to preserve
Cape Henry and its vicinity as common land. See also 11
HENING'S STATUTES 58.
Miscellaneous Colonial Documents, "Papers in Regard to
Bruton Glebe," 20 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 29-31 (1912)
Governor Berkeley granted the inhabitants of Bruton Par-
ish escheated land, near Queens Creek.
Southall, Captain John Martin of Brandon on the James, 54
930 [Vol. 23:835
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VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 21 (1946)
The author discusses the transition from communal land
ownership to private ownership during Thomas Dale's tenure
as Colonial Governor. See also V DABNEY, VIRGINIA THE NEW
DOMINION (1971); 3 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 434 (1895-
96).
B. The William and Mary Quarterly
Stephenson, Some Inner History of the Virginia Company, 22
WM. & MARY Q. 89, 90-91 (1913-14)
This article discusses the communal or corporate manner in
which land was held and worked under the Virginia Company.
Forman, The Bygone "Subberbs of James Cittie", 20 WM. &
MARY Q. (2d ser.) 475, 476-80 (1940)
This article mentions the setting out of 3,000 acres of Gov-
ernor's land in 1619 upon the governorship of Yeardley. The
article discusses the leasing of the land and its working by
tenants.
Hatch, An Old Wharf at Yorktown, Virginia, 22 WM. & MARY
Q. (2d ser.) 222 (1942)
This article mentions the construction of a public wharf in
1749, maintained at York County's expense.
C. The Calender of Virginia State Papers
Letter from Col. Davies to the Governor (Mar. 12, 1782), 3
CALENDAR VA. ST. PAPERS 97 (1883)
This letter from Col. Davies concerns the mismanagement
of public property. The property apparently is appropriated
for or held by the military.
Letter from J. Prestis to the Governor (Dec. 1782), 3 CALEN-
DAR VA. ST. PAPERS 410 (1883)
Prestis reports the pillaging of timber on "[t]he lands be-
longing to the Palace" in Williamsburg.
Letters from Commissioners to the Governor (Nov 10, 1785),
4 CALENDAR VA. ST. PAPERS 63 (1884)
This letter reports to the Governor regarding the progress
of funds collected by the sale of public lands to raise money to
1982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
erect public buildings. See also 11 HENING'S STATUTES 399.
5 CALENDAR VA. ST. PAPERS 342 (1885)
This report of July 1791 from Samuel Shepard to the Gov-
ernor concerns the proceeds of sales of "Public Boats and
Gosport Lands." See Code of Virginia ch. 42, at 419 (Rev.
1819).
10 CALENDAR VA. ST. PAPERS 41 (1892)
This is a required report dated Jan. 12, 1809 of all repairs
necessary on the "public square."
D. Proceedings of the Virginia Historical Society
2 PROC. VA. HIST. Soc'Y 29 (1891)
This letter from Governor Spotswood discusses the ex-
change of Governor's land at Jamestown for land at the new
capitol in Williamsburg.
2 PROC. VA. HIST. Soc'y 155 (1891)
This letter from Governor Spotswood discusses a disputed
boundary on the Governor's Land.
E. Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine
Petition of the Lessees of the Governour's Land, 2 TYLER'S Q.
HIST. & GENEALOGICAL MAG. 181 (1920-21)
This petition by lessees of the Governor's land protests "an
Act directing the sale of certain public lands," the proceeds of
which would go the "University [sic] of William and Mary."
F The Virginia Historical Register and Literary Advertiser
The Mode of Acquiring Lands in Virginia in Early Times, 2
VA. HiST. REG. & LITERARY ADVERTISER 190 (1849)
This article does not mention public or common land but
explains the technical mode of acquiring land m colonial
Virginia.
G. Books and Dissertations
V DABNEY, VIRGINIA THE NEW DOMINION 22-23 (1971)
Dabney discusses the transition from communal ownership
and working of the land to private landholding. See also 3 VA.
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MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 434 (1895-96); 22 WM. & MARY Q.
(2d ser.) 89 (1913-14).
R. MORTON, 1 COLONIAL VIRGINIA 51-61 (1960)
Morton discusses the significance of the "Instructions to
Governor Yeardley," which mentions Governor's Glebe, Com-
pany, Common and Borough Lands. See A. EMBREY, supra, at
9; 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 154 (1894-95).
J. WISE, YE KINGDOME OF ACCAWMACKE OR THE EASTERN
SHORE OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 227-29
(1911)
Wise discusses the difficulty in persuading the inhabitants
of the Eastern Shore to settle into towns. The General Assem-
bly attempted to induce the settlements of towns by passing
the "Act of Cohabitation," 2 HENING'S STATUTES 471. Wise re-
ports that the statute provided that 50 acres should be pur-
chased by each county to be held in trust for the town's bene-
fit. The trust appears to provide a location for a settlement of
private lots rather than a permanent common or public use.
I. Hecht, The Virginia Colony, 1607-1640: A Study in Frontier
Growth 127-153 (1969)(Ph.D. thesis University of Wash-
ington)
Hecht discusses public and common lands in her chapters
on Virginia Company Land policy- "A Study In Mismanage-
ment, 1617-1624" and "The Emergence of the Private
Section":
(1) Hecht cites and discusses the "Instructions to Year-
dley" Id. at 127-28.
(2) She mentions the settling of colonists on common and
public lands. Id. at 130.
(3) She notes that 600 people were to be settled on public
lands. Id. at 131.
(4) She cites the laying out of common and Company land
in each borough. Id. at 139.
(5) She discusses the beginning of private land holding. Id.
at 142.
(6) She notes that, upon the founding of Berkeley Hundred,
1,500 acres were set aside for public uses. Id. at 152.
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E. Riley, The Founding and Development of Yorktown, Vir-
ginia 1691-1781 (1942)(Ph.D. dissertation University of South-
ern California)
Riley's history of Yorktown contains several references to
the waterfront common.
(1) The first survey of Yorktown denoted a series of water-
front lots as a "common shore" and the inhabitants subse-
quently used them as such. Id. at 200. See also 5 HENING'S
STATUTES 68, 69-70.
(2) Certain individuals subsequently disputed the owner-
ship and use of the waterfront as a common and claimed own-
ership in themselves. E. Riley at 201.
(3) These claims were bolstered when the Virginia govern-
ment granted individuals property below the high water mark.
Id.
(4) Riley discusses the citizens' petition of the General As-
sembly, asking to have the waterfront vested m trustees and
held as common. Id. at 203.
(5) He discusses the inhabitants of the common and the
uses made of that area. Id. at 204.
(6) He notes the division of the common and the sale of its
parcels to private individuals. Id. at 205. See also 12 HENING'S
STATUTES 218.
1 R. WHITELAW, VIRGINIA'S EASTERN SHORE (1968)
Whitelaw's history makes several references to the Com-
pany's and Secretary's lands:
(1) In 1620, the first settlements on the Eastern Shore were
made on the Company and Secretary's lands. Id. at 22.
(2) In 1623, the Eastern Shore was represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly by John Wilcockes, "the representative of the
Governor on the Company land." Id. at 23.
(3) When the Company land was ceasing to exist as such,
William Eppes was possibly in charge of the Secretary's land.
Id. at 26.
(4) Whitelaw mentions that the private settlement at Dale
Plantations existed when the first settlers arrived on the Com-
pany's and Secretary's land. Id. at 96.
(5) Five hundred acres of land were laid out at the Secre-
tary's land to be seeded and planted. Id. at 168.
[Vol. 23:835
THE COMMONS CONCEPT
(6) The tract known as the Secretary's land later became
known as Town Fields. Id. at 169.
(7) The Secretary's land became the official seat of local
government in approximately 1632. Id. at 169.
(8) In 1680, the Secretary's land was chosen as the town site
in Northampton County as directed by "An Act of Cohabita-
tion." Id. at 173.
(9) In 1784, Littleton Eyre willed his interest in the Secre-
tary's land. Id. at 174.
(10) The same London court that authorized the Secretary's
land provided that Company lands should also be seated
throughout the colony. Id. at 175.
(11) Ten Company tenants were sent to plant the Secre-
tary's land on the Eastern Shore. Id. at 176.
(12) During 1655 three courts were held at the Company
land. Id. at 178.
(13) In 1620 Captain Wilcockes established Company land
on the Eastern Shore. Id. at 216.
(14) John Savage, the first permanent white settler on the
Eastern Shore, conveniently located his home near the Com-
pany land. Id. at 217
(15) Wilcockes was the Governor's official representative at
the Company land. Later representatives of the Governor
probably administered business at the Secretary's land. Id. at
246.
(16) By 1626 "the Company Land project had ceased to be,"
and the first church on the Eastern Shore was erected on the
Secretary's land. Id. at 1394.
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